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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
OPEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
A POLITICAL HISTORY OF DECISIONS AND BEHAVIOR 
by 
Reza Sanati 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
The conventional understanding behind how the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) has formulated its decisions and subsequently behaved in the 
international system has consistently centered on the role of market forces. Either 
proactively or reactively, it has been assumed that OPEC’s actions were merely engaging 
and responding to the supply and demand dynamics in the global economy. Though space 
was always given to the political considerations of certain OPEC Member States, and 
how that impacts the behavior of the Organization, inquiry into OPEC decision-making 
and behavior has generally centered on economic considerations, with politics playing an 
intermittent supporting role.  
 This work challenges the assumptions behind the conventional narrative of 
OPEC’s behavior in the international system. By utilizing a historically-based process 
tracing method, relying heavily on archival data from OPEC’s headquarters and 
declassified American national security documents from the late 1940s to the present, a 
more sophisticated model of decision-making and behavior is developed. Accordingly, 
OPEC’s decisions and behavior are more accurately a product of four inter-related 
v 
determinants: the role of market forces, the influence of outside actors (usually great 
powers) upon the Organization, interstate relations and politics among Member States, 
and the pressure of the internal state dynamics within OPEC Member States. It is at the 
intersection of these four variables where OPEC’s behavior is more readily understood. 
Thus, with a sophisticated understanding of the interplay of these determinants, OPEC’s 
decision-making process and behavior can be more accurately understood and possibly 
forecasted to a limited degree.  
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INTRODUCTION • UNDERSTANDING THE DETERMINANTS BEHIND OPEC’S 
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR 
 
For over half-a-century, the decision-making and behavior of the Organization of Oil 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been a critical area of inquiry for disciplines ranging 
from economics to security studies. Due to its sustained presence in the global economy 
and its influence over global oil prices, the ramifications of OPEC’s decisions have 
hovered over many of the research questions posed by scholars while affecting the 
strategic and policy prescriptions of practitioners. Naturally, the attributes that 
characterize OPEC and the behavior of the Organization, particularly its internal 
dynamics, have factored into virtually all, comprehensive assessments of OPEC from its 
genesis. 1 Nevertheless, while study of the Organization and its influence upon the global 
political economy is still a topic of heavy scrutiny, the framework underpinning what 
OPEC is and the determining factors behind OPEC’s actions has now long been 
conventionalized. 2  
 In essence, this conventional understanding of the Organization characterizes 
OPEC as either a cartel or a sophisticated intergovernmental organization with cartel-like 
qualities, whose actions, particularly periods of consensus or breakdown, are primarily 
                                                        
1 See: Fariborz Ghadar, The Evolution of Opec Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977); Everett 
M. Ehrlich, "Structural Change in Opec Member Country Production Decisions," OPEC Review 4, no. 4 
(1980); Ian Seymour, Opec: Instrument of Change (London, UK: Macmillan, 1980); Theodore H. Moran, 
"Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives," International Organization 35, no. 2 
(1981); John Evans, Opec, Its Member States and the World Energy Market (Harlow, Essex, U.K. : 
Longman, 1986). 
2 Theodore H. Moran, Oil Prices and the Future of Opec: The Political Economy of Tension and Stability 
in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Washington, DC Resources for the Future, 1978). 
2 
 
motivated by the logic of market forces. 3  Though at times, an acknowledgement of 
geopolitical factors include the market forces narrative behind OPEC’s behavior, much of 
these analyses have been unsystematic, still centered on the economic logic of supply and 
demand. 4 
 As will be detailed throughout this work, this conventional approach, both the 
characterization of the OPEC and the understanding behind the determining factors 
underpinning its behavior, does not capture the nuances of the Organization’s internal 
dynamics, ultimately obscuring a comprehensive picture of OPEC, its decision-making, 
which proves ineffective in explaining many aspects of its internal and external behavior. 
In light of this, this analysis seeks to reexamine the central concepts behind what are now 
the conventional understanding of OPEC, its internal dynamics, and what ultimately 
determines its behavior. As such two main premises are put forth in this study. The first 
concerns the traditional understanding of what OPEC is, not in its self-advertised name or 
what its critics have labeled it, but based upon the functional impact it has had throughout 
its institutional life. This work argues that OPEC is neither a cartel nor a trade-centered 
intergovernmental organization, but far more politically-oriented international institution, 
that while brought together for the explicit purpose of protecting their Members’ 
economic interests as it relates to their export of oil and remuneration that they receive, 
                                                        
3 Ibid; Moran, "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives."; P.V. Hansen and L. 
Lindholt, The Market Power of Opec 1973 - 2001 (Statistics Norway, 2004); A.L.P. Burdett, Opec: Origins 
& Strategy, 1947-1973 (Archive Editions, 2004); Mohammad Baqer Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and 
Politics," Rahbord 20 (60), no. Fall (2011). 
4 See: I. Skeet, Opec: twenty-five years of prices and politics  (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Moran, 
Oil Prices and the Future of Opec: The Political Economy of Tension and Stability in the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries; ———, "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives."; 
Hansen and Lindholt, The Market Power of Opec 1973 - 2001; Burdett, Opec: Origins & Strategy, 1947-
1973; Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and Politics." 
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its actions cannot be quantified nor explained by the simple, singular logic of economic, 
profit-motivated rationality.  This study argues that OPEC, by reason of the confluence of 
several factors that have influenced its internal decision-making, its external behavior, 
and its wider impact upon the global political economy, acts far more as a political forum 
where economics and politics (domestic, regional, and global) merge, with often times 
the latter trumping the former.  
 To understand this phenomenon, the main determinants behind OPEC decision-
making are examined throughout the institutional life of the Organization. In challenging 
the established thinking behind OPEC’s attributes and behavior, this analysis puts forth a 
new framework that incorporates 4 disparate, yet interconnected determinants that 
underpin OPEC behavior. In addition to market forces, the following areas have and 
continue to produce distinct impact to the internal and external organizational dynamics 
of OPEC and its wider influence upon the international system: 1.) Outside actor 
intervention into OPEC (via great powers, multinational corporations, etc.); 2.) Interstate 
member politics within the Organization (i.e. bilateral relations of member states or 
coalition building within the Organization); and 3.) the Intrastate dynamics of member 
states (i.e. the domestic political, social, environmental, and economic scene within 
individual member states). Collectively, it is argued that the interaction of these 4 
variables, provides the ultimate basis and context where OPEC decision/indecision is 
made, thus producing external behavior.  
 It is with this framework in mind, that OPEC’s history as an international 
organization, from 1960 to the present, will be examined. In doing so, many of the 
decisions and actions (and inactions) that OPEC has made throughout its history, either as 
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a unitary actor within the international system or a composite organization made up of 
several differing states, will become more explicable – beyond what the traditional, 
singularly-focused market forces narrative of the Organization has offered. More so, in 
running this model through OPEC’s institutional life, certain patterns of behavior from its 
member states, the unitary conception of the Organization, and its relations with outside 
actors in the international system will provide not only more explanatory power, but 
predictive capability for OPEC’s future.  
The Historical Context of Analysis  
Within this study, the institutional life of OPEC will be placed on a historical trajectory 
that both reveals the political attributes of OPEC beyond the mere economic or cartel-
based characterization and also the determinants that have influenced the Organization’s 
behavior throughout time. With over five decades of OPEC behavior in the context of 
geopolitics and geo-economics, 5 critical periods become dividing lines in the overall 
evolution of the Organization.  
Thematic Phases of OPEC’s History 
Embryonic 
Post WWI - 1959 
Infancy 
1960 -1968 
 
Ascendancy 
1969 -1979 
Fragmentation 
1980 -1993 
Rebalancing 
1994 - 2008 
 
 
 The first is the Embryonic phase, which primarily focuses on the pre-OPEC 
environment in global political economy, the oil industry in particular, and the particular 
circumstances within each individual OPEC Member State. The second phase is the 
Infancy, which describes the initial years of OPEC’s growth, from its inception in 1960 
5 
 
and ending in the beginning of the 1970s. 5 The third would be the Ascendancy phase, 
which witnessed the rise of OPEC on the world stage and the expansion of the 
Organization outside of the putative cartel label, manifesting the assertion of its 
geopolitical and geo-economic power from the 1971-73, throughout the 1970s up until 
the Iran-Iraq war . 6 The fourth is the Fragmentation phase, which many foresaw would 
be the dramatic weakening and possible disintegration of OPEC. As internal 
disagreements and, more consequently, open hostilities between member states raged, the 
first being Iraq against Iran, polarizing inter-member politics within OPEC, only to be 
exacerbated by outside forces, and later Iraq against Kuwait, which had a similar affect, 
the notion of consensus could no longer be reached amongst members – only to be 
compounded by the stagnation in oil prices beginning in the from the mid-1980s. 7 The 
fifth is the Rebalancing phase, characterized by not only several important changes 
within the internal dynamics of member states and their relations with one another, but 
also the massive macro changes in the global political economy, the most important being 
the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. As new, more efficient 
upstream technologies increased global production by the ‘opening’ of the former Soviet 
                                                        
5 OPEC’s Resolution 90 of June 1968, and the February 1971 Tehran Agreement can be seen as dividing 
lines from the first phase of OPEC to the second, more assertive phase. See: Chalabi, Fadhil, Oil Policies, 
Oil Myths  
6 M. A. Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as Opec Tax-Collectors," Foreign Policy, no. 
9 (1972); Ali M. Jaidah, "Pricing of Oil: Role of the Controlling Power," OPEC Review 1, no. 5 (1977); 
Ghadar, The Evolution of Opec Strategy; F. J. Al-Chalabi, "A Second Oil Crisis? A Producer's Point of 
View on the Oil Developments of 1979*," OPEC Review 4, no. 4 (1980); Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The 
Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991); R. Vernon, The Oil Crisis 
(Norton, 1976). 
7 Y. Ibrahim, The Future of Opec (Middle East Institute, 1984); M.E. Ahrari, Opec: The Failing Giant 
(University Press of Kentucky, 1986); S. Shojai and B.S. Katz, The Oil Market in the 1980's: A Decade of 
Decline (Praeger, 1992); M.I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2010). 
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Republics, in many cases with assistance from Western states and international oil 
companies (IOCs), OPEC’s impact on the global economy descended into a hibernation 
phase. Moreover, as the resurrection of Iraq in the international system, from rogue 
nation to a political order, however fragile, that has access to technology and the wider 
spectrum of the global markets, which invariably will help it exploit the massive export 
potential that was denied it by the Baathist political system and the years of devastating 
wars and sanctions that Iraq went through. Coinciding with this internal Rebalancing has 
been the continuation of the macro changes since the end of the Cold war: the end of the 
undisputed unipolar American moment of domination, consequential changes within the 
Middle East regional power structure, the dramatic rise of oil prices by reason of growing 
Chinese and Indian economic prowess and the evolution of each OPEC member state. 8 
With this chronological division of OPEC’s history providing an aerial picture of the 
evolution of the Organization, OPEC’s attributes and the determinants behind its 
decision-making and behavior is given crucial context on how and under what conditions 
they manifest themselves. Thus, a systematic appreciation of the Organization and how it 
has functioned throughout its institutional life is more readily achieved.   
The Conventional Understanding of OPEC 
 Cartel vs. Economically-based Intergovernmental organization  
 
                                                        
8 M. Al-Seghyer, Opec: Tested by Fire - Prepared for the Future; a Review of Its Development, History 
and an Assessment of Its Effectiveness (University of Exeter, 2000); M. Mazraati and S. M. Tayyebi 
Jazayeri, "Oil Price Movements and Production Agreements," OPEC Review 28, no. 3 (2004); Marco G. D. 
Guidi, Alexander Russell, and Heather Tarbert, "The Effect of Opec Policy Decisions on Oil and Stock 
Prices," OPEC Review 30, no. 1 (2006); E.R. Pitt and C.N. Leung, Opec, Oil Prices and Lng (Nova 
Science Pub Inc, 2009); Heshmatzadeh, "50 Years of Opec and Politics."; Daniel Yergin, The Quest: 
Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Penguin Group US, 2011). 
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The conventional understanding behind the nature of OPEC has been rooted in the initial 
economic basis of its formation. In viewing the established thinking, OPEC and its 
decision-making and behavior has essentially been viewed through the lens of two wide 
subcategories, always underpinned by market forces and the logic of supply and demand. 
In the first framework, of which was quickly developed early on and in some respects 
still exists, analysis of the Organization was looked at through the cartel model, 9 which 
during times of OPEC effectiveness and consensus, largely viewed the Organization as a 
unitary actor within the global economy and international system. From the unitary 
standpoint, the economic motive via the rational model for profit underpinned the major 
understanding of not only why OPEC came into being, but largely the focus of its 
operational decision-making throughout time. 10 Using this cartel logic, a prime example 
would be instances where low global demand leads to price decreases, bringing about 
OPEC production cuts, which in turn, is meant to stabilize prices for the benefit of each 
member’s domestic revenue. 11 Yet in times where consensus was unable to be reached, 
the unitary framework would give way to a composite understanding of OPEC as a 
                                                        
9 Charles F. Doran, "Opec Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy," The 
Journal of Politics 42, no. 1 (1980); Richard P. Castanias, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis, 1974-
1983: Discussion," The Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985); A. Almoayed, Opec: The Imperfect Cartel 
(University of Oxford, 1998); James L. Smith, "Inscrutable Opec: Behavioral Tests of the Cartel 
Hypothesis," SSRN eLibrary (2002); Vincent Brémond, Emmanuel Hache, and Val√©rie Mignon, "Does 
Opec Still Exist as a Cartel? An Empirical Investigation," Energy Economics, no. 0 (2011). 
10 Michael Kennedy, "An Economic Model of the World Oil Market," The Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 5, no. 2 (1974); Adelman, "Is the Oil Shortage Real? Oil Companies as Opec Tax-
Collectors."; G.E. Iyamah, Opec Cartel: An Analysis of Its Strength and How to Weaken Its Hold on the 
U.S. Economy (Morgan State University, 1979); Claudio Loderer, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis: 
1974-1983," The Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985); Castanias, "A Test of the Opec Cartel Hypothesis, 
1974-1983: Discussion." 
11 Iyamah, Opec Cartel: An Analysis of Its Strength and How to Weaken Its Hold on the U.S. Economy; 
Doran, "Opec Structure and Cohesion: Exploring the Determinants of Cartel Policy."; Albert L. Danielsen, 
"Cartel Rivalry and the World Price of Oil," Southern Economic Journal 42, no. 3 (1976). 
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collective entity with varying states with different economic sensitivities, and often times, 
divergent economic interests. This was the fulfillment of what Raymond Vernon and 
other economists had long predicted to be the natural demise of cartels, as members 
invariably diverge based upon their own parochial economic interests, as opposed to the 
collective’s wider, shared interest. 12 However, gradually a more sophisticated framework 
developed, viewing OPEC through the lens of an economically-based intergovernmental 
organization. This view transcended the Organization outside the parochial cartel label, 
taking on a more nuanced, functionary role for OPEC. 13 In this framework, while the 
binary between the unitary and composite nature of OPEC still applies, its actions would 
be explicable in more functional terms outside the conventional understanding of cartel 
behavior. From the unitary standpoint, in periods of supply shortage and high demand, 
the explanation of why OPEC would increase output would not only be for fear that the 
global economy would transition away to other producers of oil, thus shrinking OPEC 
member states’ market shares , or even from hydrocarbons to alternatives, 14 but in such 
circumstances, the collective role of OPEC was seen being a principle custodian of global 
price stability.  In this role, which is principally held by the Organization itself, OPEC’s 
function would be viewed as both merging together the producers’ domestic revenue 
concerns with the apprehensions of the global economy on prices, maintaining the 
                                                        
12 See: Raymond Vernon, The Oil Crisis. Norton, 1976. 
13 Raino Malnes, "Opec and the Problem of Collective Action," Journal of Peace Research 20, no. 4 
(1983); Evans, Opec, Its Member States and the World Energy Market; N.D. White, The Law of 
International Organisations (Juris Pub., 2005); C. Linde, The State and the International Oil Market: 
Competition and the Changing Ownership of Crude Oil Assets (Kluwer Academic, 2000). 
14 A.M. El-Mokadem, Opec and the World Oil Market, 1973-1983 (Eastlords Pub., 1983); J.W. Plunkett, 
Plunkett's Energy Industry Almanac 2008 (Plunkett Research, Limited, 2007); G. Luft and A. Korin, 
Turning Oil into Salt: Energy Independence through Fuel Choice (Booksurge.com, 2009). 
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equilibrium that perpetuates the global dependence on oil (and more importantly OPEC’s 
market shares) but also acting as a bulwark against volatility. 15 
  Yet, in times of consensus failure and gridlock, the composite makeup of the 
organization would be stressed, being attributable, not just to the parochial member 
state’s focus on their own economic interests, but more by reason of the trappings of 
bureaucratic or inter-member politics within the Organization, which often led to 
organizational paralysis and dysfunction. 16 
Why the Cartel and Economically-based Intergovernmental organization labels fall 
short    
 
Within both these subcategories, whether OPEC is seen as a unitary actor that acts upon a 
consensus-based decision, either as a cartel or an economically-based intergovernmental 
organization, or whether consensus could not be reached by reason of varying economic 
interests among member states or bureaucratic dysfunction, OPEC decision and behavior 
has generally been underpinned by market forces. With only a few exceptions, such as 
Ian Skeet’s OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics published in 1991, 17 the 
role of politics becomes either minimized or ignored, and virtually never examined in a 
systemic way. This specifically has to do with the larger geopolitical scene in which the 
                                                        
15 M. Marien, Future Survey Annual 1986: A Guide to the Recent Literature of Trends, Forecasts, and 
Policy Proposals (Transaction Publishers, 1987); Luft and Korin, Turning Oil into Salt: Energy 
Independence through Fuel Choice. 
16 Ian Skeet, Opec: Twenty-Fve Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1991); P. 
Wonnacott and R.J. Wonnacott, Economics (Wiley, 1990); Steven G. Lanning, "Costs of Maintaining a 
Cartel," The Journal of Industrial Economics 36, no. 2 (1987); James¬†M Griffin and Weiwen Xiong, "The 
Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of Opec," Journal of Law and Economics 40, no. 2 (1997). 
17 Skeet, Opec: Twenty-Fve Years of Prices and Politics; Wonnacott and Wonnacott, Economics; Lanning, 
"Costs of Maintaining a Cartel."; Griffin and Xiong, "The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of 
Opec." 
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Organization operates in, the inter-state politics that seep into the OPEC’s organizational 
dynamics, or the intrastate domestic politics at the national level of each OPEC member. 
This becomes extremely important when considering that many of OPEC’s decisions, its 
inability of forming consensus, its behavior, or lack of action, are often times inexplicable 
with the market forces paradigm, both the cartel and economically-based 
intergovernmental organization models. As will be detailed throughout the study, such 
primary examples that transcend outside the mere economically based logic of decision-
making are the following: The Arab Oil Embargo via OAPEC of 1973-74, the Saudi 
decision to undercut Iran’s revenue during the latter days of the Pahlavi dynasty, the 
Persian Gulf Arab exporters of OPEC ramping up production during the latter stages of 
the Iran-Iraq war (when oil prices were low); Baathist Iraq’s destruction of much of 
fellow member Kuwait’s oil wells in its retreat in the 1991 Desert Storm war; and Saudi 
Arabia’s decision to boost production in 2001-2012 to complement the US sanctions 
regime on the Islamic Republic of Iran.   
 The reasoning behind why the traditional framework is simply incapable of 
explaining certain patterns of behavior that the Organization has exhibited in its 
institutional life is due to the fact that both the cartel and the economically-based 
intergovernmental organization labels misconstrue and mischaracterize what OPEC has 
been in its functional role within the global economy and the international system – 
regardless of the Organization’s self-advertised mantra or the labels given to it by both its 
critics and supporters alike. On the cartel label, while OPEC is certainly a collection 
major oil exporting states, whose conventional crude oil reserves are roughly 80% of 
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global supply and whose production is roughly 42% of global production, 18 it has seldom 
acted according to the logic of how a cartel operates. A cartel’s primary motivation, and 
thus its raison d'être, is the protection of its market-share. However, OPEC, while 
cognizant of the importance of protecting its market-share from either other oil-producing 
competitors or from alternate sources of energy, has never really functioned based upon 
this principle. In many ways, OPEC’s founding was a reaction to what its member states 
viewed as the abuse of another cartel, specifically how the ‘Seven Sisters’ (the major 
IOCs that had oil concessions in OPEC member states) would unilaterally reduce prices 
or alter production, to protect their own market shares from other competitors in the 
global oil industry. As the member states that would eventually form OPEC were at the 
time mere tax collectors whose domestic national revenues would derive from taxing 
what the IOCs exported from their territories, any reduction of prices or changes in 
export volume that would lessen what the particular government gleaned from the IOC 
would be to the detriment of that government’s revenues as a whole. Thus, a major 
catalyst behind why OPEC was formed was price protection from the unilateral decisions 
of the IOCs, and ultimately to have a say in both prices and export volume. Yet, 
throughout its history, regardless of the early cognizance of the important of market-share 
protection, 19 OPEC decision and behavior gradually became focused on short-term price 
protection. During the 1970s, with the confluence of factors in the global political 
                                                        
18 See: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012 & other Data figures. 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
19 In OPEC’s Resolution II.6, which laid out the Organization’s governing statutes, a clear acknowledgment 
was made regarding the OPEC’s market share juxtaposed to current or future competitors. The efforts were 
to follow the geological developments, geophysical methods of oil discovery, estimate potential new 
reserves in the world, and to study the world markets for petroleum consumption trends, transportation of 
supply, and forecast supply. See: “Resolutions of the Second OPEC Conference”. Caracas, 15-21 January 
1961. 
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economy, rising prices were seen, at least from a collective basis, as something positive 
from the Organization, and thus supported and even exacerbated by many key OPEC 
members. However, as historians now understand, the dramatic rise in global oil prices 
was the major reason that led to the shift in alternative sources of energy (particularly 
nuclear power in Europe and Japan), the entrance of cheaper Soviet oil in the global 
market, as well expanded upstream activity in more expensive areas of drilling, such as 
the North Sea. Hence, in supporting price hikes that eventually eroded the Organization’s 
market share, OPEC behaved exactly how a cartel should not. OPEC’s collective 
behavior at times where supply outstrips demand has primarily been focused on short-
term price protection.  
 Regarding OPEC’s characterization as an economically-based intergovernmental 
organization, there have been several instances in history where the Organization 
responded to calm rising prices that would eventually lead towards price volatility, and 
thus avoid damaging the consumer market that the Organization depends upon.  
Nevertheless, equally or more often, there have also been instances where, due to lack of 
consensus, OPEC would allow price increases by not collectively raising production 
levels, with each member state responding differently based upon their particular 
geopolitical, as well as economic calculations. Often, these geopolitical calculations 
would come in the form of coalitional formations, with one dominant member, such as 
Iran or Saudi Arabia, leading a group against another within the Organization. And at 
other times, collective production levels, even if the economic rationale for profit would 
favor stemming back exports, such as in the 1980s, became wholly consumed by 
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geopolitical calculations that contradicted both the Organization’s and individual member 
states’ bottom line.  
 These discrepancies within what is ostensibly an economic organization render 
the need to take into account the totality of the political and security contexts it OPEC is 
embedded in – at the international level, the inter-member level amongst the various 
OPEC states, and at the domestic, intrastate level or each particular OPEC member. In 
viewing OPEC through the prism of half-century of behavior, there have been many 
instances where the conventional framework of OPEC and its behavior has proven 
insufficient in explaining certain patterns of behavior by its members and, subsequently, 
the Organization.  This is acutely aggravated by the concurrent evolution of OPEC, its 
individual members, and the international system that the prior two operate in.    
A New Framework of Analysis  
In challenging the established thinking behind OPEC behavior, it is argued that the 
internal mechanisms of the Organization that underpin its behavior, that formulate 
whether or not consensus is reached, and the external environment that influences its 
actions are more complex and specifically more politically-oriented than what has 
traditionally been accepted. While this proposal accepts the logic behind the conventional 
economic narrative behind OPEC behavior, which is based upon market forces (i.e. 
supply and demand as being the basis for inter-member cooperation and organizational 
functionality) this narrative alone cannot fully explain the Organization’s internal 
dynamics and external behavior. Thus, this analysis presents 4 disparate, yet 
interconnected factors on what influences OPEC behavior, the nexus and interaction of 
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which ultimately sets the internal conditions that formulate the climate within the 
Organization that affects consensus/non-consensus, decision/non-decisions and 
ultimately, action/inaction.  
 In addition to market forces, the following areas, while interrelated, produce 
distinct impacts to the internal and external organizational dynamics of OPEC: 1.) 
Outside actor intervention into OPEC; 2.) Interstate member politics within the 
Organization; 3.) Intrastate dynamics of member states. Collectively, it is argued that the 
interaction of these 3 variables, with that of the conventional economic narrative, 
provides the logic behind OPEC internal dynamics, which is ultimately the basis and 
context where OPEC decision/indecision is made, and thus producing external behavior. 
And while these determinants are distinct, they do not operate in isolation from one 
another, but display an interactive quality where at times some can be prejudiced over 
others while at other times all can be identified as having noticeable impact upon 
decision-making and behavior. 
Outside Actor Intervention  
The role of outside actor’s, 
specifically great powers and major 
multinational corporations (MNCs), 
upon individual states within the 
organization has consistently had a 
noticeable amount of influence upon 
the overall structure of OPEC’s 
Market Forces
Outside Actor Intervention 
Interstate Member Relations
Intrastate Member Dynamics
15 
 
internal dynamics, with sustained impact upon the interstate relations between members 
in general. 20 At times, this influence ebbed and flowed but its presence always remained. 
Moreover, as many of OPEC members have had close, intimate ties with great powers, 
some of which could be characterized as patron-client relations, and major multinational 
corporations (particularly during the genesis of the petroleum industry in their countries) 
decision-making by member states, at least tangentially if not out rightly, needed to have 
some consideration of the aforementioned and their preferences . Furthermore, the 
relationship between member states and outside actors could be both complimentary, 
evinced when great powers and MNCs roughly had parallel interests, or in direct conflict, 
as other times powerful states outside the Organization had conflicting interests with 
MNCs, with the member state being caught in the middle. Reversibly, interactions with 
the outside actors, either collectively in the context of the Organization’s raison d’être or 
individually, would be of crucial importance, as the purported “standing” of each member 
state in the international community, normatively and materially, is invariably affected by 
it relationship with great powers and major multinationals. As has been witnessed, both 
these players often facilitate, enhance, or hinder individual OPEC member’s systemic 
access (i.e.  ‘access’ to globalized technology and R&D, etc.), while at the same time 
changing the nature of the internal power makeup and relational context of interaction 
between OPEC members. Just as like the conventional market driven narrative, this 
dynamic is and has been a constant throughout the 50-plus year life of the Organization. 
                                                        
20 A.D. Johany, The Myth of the Opec Cartel: The Role of Saudi Arabia (University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, 1980). N.J. Citino, From Arab Nationalism to Opec: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of 
U.S.-Saudi Relations (Indiana University Press, 2002). Skeet, Opec: Twenty-Fve Years of Prices and 
Politics. & F.S. Al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968-1971 (I.B. 
Tauris, 2003). 
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Interstate Member Relations within the Organization 
The internal relations between member states, the bilateral or multilateral ties between 
actors within OPEC itself, outside the boundaries of great power relations, is of 
tremendous importance and carries a logic of its own within the Organization itself. 
Throughout OPEC’s lifespan, issues of bilateral or multilateral concern that are non-
petroleum related that derive from other arenas of either conflict or cooperation between 
the member states, particularly as it relates to Middle East politics, has bled into the 
Organization’s internal dynamics . As power dynamics have changed throughout the last 
50 years, not only on a macro geopolitical level (i.e. from bipolarity, to uni-polarity, to 
multi-polarity), but also amongst member states themselves, for a whole host of reasons, 
the politics between or amongst members outside of the OPEC arena, often affects 
internal and external organizational behavior. As the Middle Eastern political milieu has 
consistently hovered over the internal deliberations of OPEC members, issues of regional 
security, highlighted by regional security complex theory, where the politics amongst and 
between regional states do display certain patterns of enmity and amity, has at times 
clashed or complicated the national order behind traditional impact of market forces or 
great power penetration onto OPEC decision-making and behavior . Hence, it is vital to 
appropriate an independent space of analysis for the role of inter-member relations, and 
the continuities and changes within these relations and the impact of these relations upon 
the Organization throughout its lifespan.  
Intrastate Member Dynamics  
The internal political, social, economic, and even environmental dynamics that have 
evolved within the individual member states of OPEC throughout the Organization’s 
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lifespan have proven consequentially influential on internal organizational decision and 
behavior. The changing nature or consistency of the political systems of each OPEC 
member state, not only affect the domestic politics and economic scene within that 
particular country, but also affect the climate of how that state has access to that 
technology (i.e. individual member’s extraction, production capacity, and research and 
development). The ideological underpinnings behind a member state’s regime typology 
have had major implications for the power and influence they yield within the 
Organization. Is the state a status quo power? Is it a revolutionary power? Throughout the 
history of the Organization, members have passed the gauntlet of political changes that 
have swept their domestic political fronts, and thus their interstate relations within the 
organization changed, which eventually affected internal consensus dynamics and 
external behavior. Some important examples can be clearly seen in the transformation of 
Baathist Party in Iraq and its subsequent rise and fall, the transformation of Libyan 
domestic dynamics from King Idris to Moammar Qaddafi to the latter’s downfall in 2011, 
to the Iranian Revolution and its, to US occupation of Iraq, and ultimately the continuing 
integration of GCC states into one unitary union .   
 Concerning production capacity, R&D, and reserve amounts, the amount of effort 
into exploration, drilling efficiency, and spare production capacity that each member state 
has allocated from their domestic budgets have massive and consequential impacts upon 
their power and influence within OPEC, and thus do affect inter-member relations, 
internal organizational dynamics, and often their relationships with great powers. States, 
such as Saudi Arabia and monarchial Iran, who put much effort in this endeavor, 
eventually became major players within the Organization. Yet, when a member lost this 
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“edge”, such as Baathist Iraq or Qaddafi controlled-Libya, due primarily to political 
change and a denial of systemic access, their influence within the Organization suffered, 
thus changing the context in which decision was made, and ultimately OPEC behavior. 
Moreover, the amount of hydrocarbon reserves, in both quantity and quality, which a 
member state has under its territory, is not a neutral factor either, for reserve figures 
throughout OPEC’s history has fluctuated. A distinctive pattern within OPEC has 
emerged that indicates that members with larger reserves, more allocation to R&D, spare 
capacity production, eventually attain more clout and power within the Organization, 
which affects decision making. 
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CHAPTER I • THE EMBRYONIC PHASE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM & THE BIRTH OF OPEC 
 
The members of OPEC came from extremely diverse backgrounds, located in different 
parts of the globe, with varying histories, political systems, languages, cultures, domestic 
economies, and geopolitical alliances and relations. Even their individual national 
experiences with the rise of the global oil industry were vastly different from one another 
other, as some members became enmeshed in hierarchical concessionary agreements to 
major international oil companies (IOC), often with consent from a great power, while 
others experienced more favorable conditions within the concessionary system as junior 
partners. But regardless of the disparities amongst them, three broader attributes that each 
shared, united their collective experience and ultimately laid the foundation for OPEC’s 
formation: all were members of the developing world with little power in international 
institutions as well as being militarily weak, all had substantial amount of hydrocarbon 
reserves in their territory that they did not have dominion over, and all, in the years prior 
to OPEC’s formation, had their economies, of which oil exports to varying degrees was a 
major factor, negatively impacted by forces outside their control.  
Within the environment preceding OPEC’s entrance on the world stage, a 
confluence of factors at the national, interstate, and international levels ultimately led to 
the group’s configuration. These factors, while ostensibly economic in nature, chiefly as 
it relates to price and volume of the oil exports from what eventually became OPEC 
members, also had a major geopolitical and strategic genesis. What led to OPEC’s 
formation was only partially economic in nature, specifically a reaction by the developing 
world’s exporters to the lack of price and export control that existed in the global oil 
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industry in the late 1950s. However, there were also important geopolitical factors at 
work as well. OPEC’s formation happened in the aftermath of the wave of independence 
movements within the developing world, which invariably left indelible marks in regions 
that great powers had dominated, primarily the Middle East, North Africa, and to a lesser 
extent Latin America. 21 Moreover, OPEC’s birth happened in the midst of a bipolar 
international system dominated by the US and the USSR, where virtually every domestic 
and regional development, particularly, in the developing world, was viewed by great 
powers through the zero-sum logic of Cold War dynamics. 22  Internally within OPEC 
states, as the revenue from oil exports made up a sizeable portion or even the brunt of 
member states’ economies, the survivability of the political regimes in power and even 
the cohesion and continuance of certain post-colonial states lay in the balance, many 
times inviting intervention by regional actors or great powers, whose home multinational 
firms had a major interest in petroleum-endowed developing countries.  
Accordingly, to understand the Organization’s creation, it is crucial to link the 
larger macro influence of market forces in the context of the geopolitical dimensions of 
great power rivalries, the changing nature of the global oil trade, the internal political and 
economic dynamics within the states that became members of OPEC, and later, their 
relations with one another. This chapter lays out the environment before the 
Organization’s formation, the first decade of OPEC’s institutional life, and how powerful 
                                                        
21 See: D. Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the 
Modern Middle East (H. Holt, 2001), 43. & D. Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the 
Middle East since 1945 (University of North Carolina Press, 2008). 
22  Odd A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); M.P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the Cold War (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
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outside forces dealt with OPEC’s formation, both the great powers and the major 
international oil companies, with the domestic political and socioeconomic realities 
within the states that would eventually became OPEC members.  
The geo-economic and geopolitical context  
 Creating the Home-IOC-Host triangle 
At the dawn of the globalization of the oil industry, when exploration and production 
began the expansion outside the initial American and Russian centers, the growing 
international oil companies (IOC) quickly understood the significance of market share 
accumulation, from the upstream component to the downstream consumer level. This was 
seen initially in the domestic US and Russian contexts in which they operated and their 
eventual ventures abroad. This expansion had its genesis at the beginning of the 20th 
century, in the major shift in strategic thinking as it related to energy transportation and 
for the major economies of the world – specifically the mass transition from coal to crude 
oil. As with many future technologies that eventually spread to societies writ large, the 
invention of the internal combustion engine quickly became a key area of interest to the 
militaries of major powers. As Leonardo Maugeri has catalogued, crude oil’s 
attractiveness lay in the following qualities: its 1.) Higher thermal efficiency, enabling 
large vessels to ‘travel faster and cover greater distances while enjoying greater self-
sufficiency’’ 2.) Versatility of use, in that ‘with oil a ship could be refueled while 
underway, whereas the loading of coal required a ship to stop in ports equipped with the 
necessary facilities’; and 3.) Storage, in that ‘oil products were far simpler to store and 
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move once on board than coal, ‘ requiring less space and significantly fewer personnel. 23 
As the major economies of the day, gradually grasped the efficiencies and benefits of oil 
and its clear advantage over coal, which up until that time, had been the lifeblood of the 
19th century’s economy, grand strategies of the world’s major powers now shifted to 
having access to this vital commodity. In doing so, the major powers, took a new or 
renewed interest in the activities of their still nescient multinational oil companies that 
were based out of their respective territories. And either by default and design, the 
foreign acquisition activities of oil firms based in their countries, which was profit-
motivated, came to be mutually reinforcing with the strategic imperatives of great powers, 
not just for their economies, but to enhance their military might. The result, as the unique 
characteristics of crude oil elevated it from being just another commodity to a crucial 
factor in grand strategy, military dominance, and economic vitality, was that the home 
governments of these multinational oil firms, such as the US, France, and Britain, became 
enmeshed in their firms’ foreign dealings in their hunt for oil.  
What would become the major catalyst for the grand strategic shift towards crude 
oil was World War I, and its immediate aftermath, as petroleum products ‘emerged as the 
leading fuels for moving people, armies, airplanes, and naval fleets throughout the world.’ 
24  Moreover, the dramatic increase of oil consumption during the war caused world 
markets and the major powers to augment their concern about supply and access, even 
spurring a decline in confidence in American crude reserves, though the US was still 
                                                        
23 L. Maugeri, The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial 
Resource (Abc-Clio Incorporated, 2006), 22. 
24 Ibid., 24. 
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major exporter of crude oil. 25 Compounded by the increase in consumption because of 
the War, what exacerbated concern was the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia and the devastating civil war from 1917-1920, which dramatically cut production 
from Russia and within months, led to full nationalization of Russia’s oil fields in June of 
1918. 26 Realizing the extent that political and economic volatility in a major producing 
countries could impact access to supplies, creating shortages and mass panics, the 
international oil companies, already engaged in broadening their acquisition and 
production activities outside their home countries, accelerated the pace – in Latin 
America, and more consequentially, the Middle East, where the brunt of conventional 
petroleum reserves are located. 27  It was this initial catalyst that not only laid the 
groundwork for the home government/IOC/host government nexus, and the 
complications that it brought, but also, the future coordination between the international 
oil companies, to protect their market shares, which later became a consequential factor 
in the creation of OPEC.  
The Companies scramble 
 Creating the Concession System 
In the Middle East, even before the anticipated demise of the Ottoman State, once 
its disastrous entry into WWI ended its political viability as a unitary state, diverse 
European powers, including Russia and the United States, had become aware of the large 
                                                        
25 Mira Wilkins, "The Oil Companies in Perspective," Daedalus 104, no. 4 (1975): 159-61. 
26 See: Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia, 24. & Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian 
Revolution (New York Oxford University Press, 1982. 1994). 
27 Mira Wilkins, "Multinational Oil Companies in South America in the 1920s: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru," The Business History Review 48, no. 3 (1974): 425-26. & Maugeri, 
The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's Most Controversial Resource, 26-32. 
24 
 
amount of oil deposits in the frontiers beyond the Turkish Empire, in Iran, and its former 
colonies in the Caucus, particularly in and around the Caspian city of Baku. 28 Once the 
Ottoman Empire was dismantled by force by the victorious British and French in the 
aftermath of WWI, ‘enormous new commercial opportunities throughout [its] former 
territories’ now lay open for both private European enterprise as well as the national 
designs of their home states. 29 For years, various entrepreneurs of European, and later 
American origin, traveled to the Ottoman territories and Iran in search of lucrative 
business opportunities in the newfangled petroleum industry. 30  Eventually, these 
individual missions, because of the confluence of regional circumstances, were able to 
obtain significant concessions in developing states, becoming the forerunners for the 
entrance of powerful European and US multinational firms.  31  
 With the centrifugal forces intrinsic to the decaying Ottoman Empire, 
compounded by its consequential loss in the first World War, dramatically disintegrating 
the state, for the first time in the history of the collective memory of the contemporary 
Middle East, the once bifurcated political design that comprised two stable Ottoman and 
Iranian states morphed into a 21-state sub-system, comprising of a weak Iran, a truncated 
Turkish Republic, later a resurrected Jewish entity, with newly created Arab states that 
were mostly vassals and protectorates of the British and French. 32 Suffice it to say, 
                                                        
28 Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia, 17-24. 
29 R. Howard, The Oil Hunters: Exploration and Espionage in the Middle East (Bloomsbury, 2008), xi. 
30 Ibid., 1-22.  
31 See: V. Marcel and J.V. Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Chatham 
House, 2006). Howard, The Oil Hunters: Exploration and Espionage in the Middle East; Yergin, The 
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power. 
32 K. van der Pijl, Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq (Pluto Press, 2006), 43. 
25 
 
juxtaposed to the ‘centuries of domination in Latin America and South Asia, the period of 
formal European colonialism in the Middle East was short-lived’ as the ‘Ottoman 
territories appropriated after World War I were given independence within a decade or 
two.’ 33 However, sovereignty, either for newly created entities with no history of a 
political culture or for weakened states in transition, such as Iran, with feeble civil 
institutions and a corrupt ruling apparatus, was quite an elusive notion. As such, this 
reality ebbed into every aspect of governance, particularly the state’s economic dealings. 
In this new regional reality, the economic designs of the British, French, and later the 
Americans, while at times being visibly antithetical to each other, were now mostly 
unimpeded by any indigenous forces within the developing states that possessed large 
amounts of hydrocarbon reserves.  
Reeling from internal political turmoil and edging closer to state bankruptcy, the 
first noteworthy Middle Eastern oil concession was made by the Iranian Qajar court to 
British businessman, William D’Arcy in 1901. Whether by reason of extreme naïveté or 
desperation, the Shah of Iran gave exclusive rights for vast swaths of Iranian territory for 
oil exploration and production for the next 60 years, in exchange for a paltry £20,000, an 
equal amount in shares of D'Arcy's company, and a promise of 16% of future revenue. 34 
Coincidentally, this was the same Qajar court that a decade earlier had granted a 
monopolistic concession for the entire handling, buying, and selling of all tobacco raised 
in the country to a British firm, eliciting massive public discontent to the point that the 
concession was revoked a short time later.  Yet, though the weak Qajar potentate was 
                                                        
33 F. Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 82. 
34 S. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Wiley, 2011), 48. 
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virtually stripped of most kingly powers in Iran’s constitutional revolution in 1906, the 
newly formed parliament found itself devoid of any meaningful liquid assets in the 
national treasury, and thus, the concessions to D’Arcy remained. 35 After years of toil in 
the Iranian hinterland, William D’Arcy discovered that his own funds were drying up, 
and in a last ditch effort to save his enterprise, he combined investments in Iran with the 
British-owned Burma Oil Company in 1905. 36  After striking the first well in 1908, the 
first payment of £2,900 came to a cash-strapped Iranian government in the years of 
1912–13. 37 With now tangible proof that Iran contained oil, this allowed D’Arcy to 
continue his business endeavors, transforming Burma Oil into the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (later to be renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the modern day British 
Petroleum).  
As ‘the world’s great industrial and military powers’, realized that unlike other 
commodities and resources, oil was an unique strategic asset for the long-term 
advancement and economic, political, and military aggrandizement of their nations, both 
domestically and globally, they implemented policies to control ‘critical strategic 
resources as an advantage over their geopolitical and economic competitors.’ 38 For this 
reason, Iran, like many of its neighbors and other developing states with large quantities 
of oil reserves, quickly transformed into an arena of confrontation amongst the major 
powers, often times in collaboration with powerful multinational oil firms. 39 For the 
                                                        
35 E. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 54-56. 
36 Marcel and Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, 16. 
37 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 55.   
38 Marcel and Mitchell, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East, 14.   
39 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran. & Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power. 
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British, noticing that a domestic firm had unimpeded access to large quantities of this 
strategic resource was an opportunity that had to be harvested, protected, and exploited. 
This strategic repositioning merely coincided and, in many ways, was a response to the 
British Royal Navy’s decision to convert its warships from coal-fired boilers to diesel 
motors, prompting London to acquire a 51 percent interest in D’Arcy’s enterprise. 40 
Britain’s fateful decision, providing ‘a monopoly over Iranian oil for the next forty years’, 
41 to be maintained at all cost, despite indigenous resistance that witnessed a change of 
Iranian dynasties, massive internal modernization efforts, and transformational regional 
events, 42 essentially marrying the national interests of the empire, the profit motivations 
of the firm (Anglo-Iranian), with internal events within Iran. In other words, there now 
was clear link between domestic Iranian politics and socio-economics, the profitability of 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the domestic and international interests of one of the 
globe’s superpowers. Although initially, the British were focused on obviating 
Russian/Soviet attempts at forcing concessions upon the feeble Iranian court, fearing that 
any concession may undermine its own interests in the country,  (only to be proven later 
by kinetic Soviet attempts at occupying Iranian territory in World War II), London’s 
efforts quickly moved to quelling any indigenous nationalistic tendencies at concessional 
revisionism, which became a hallmark of the Iranian government’s dealings with the UK 
and the US, in nationalization attempts in 1933, 1953, up until undisputed total 
dominative control in the OPEC era. 
                                                        
40 Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, 46. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 63-96. S.A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic 
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The interaction between Iran, its internal dynamics, and the great powers in the 
height of geopolitical factors disallowed any firm to enter into the Iranian state, granting 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, buttressed by British military, economic, and diplomatic 
might, total and complete monopoly over all of Iranian energy. Within this dynamic, a 
weak Iranian state, trapped in the contours of power politics, became incapable of 
mustering the negotiating power to alter its fortunes.  It was this dynamic, also evident in 
other developing, oil-endowed countries, that formed the underlying basis for the internal 
modernization and later nationalization efforts that would be witnessed intermittently in 
the decades ahead.   
Expanding the Concession System in the Middle East  
 As developments were progressing in Iran, and partially spawned by Anglo-
Iranian’s successful efforts, German firms were garnering simultaneous interest in the 
Ottoman Mosul province. Just as the British synthesized attempts to maximize domestic 
corporate profits with the national security interests of the state, German entrepreneurs 
began a rigorous campaign at exploration in establishing the Turkish Petroleum Company 
(TPC). 43  Albeit, as war broke out in August of 1914, only to be followed by Germany’s 
defeat four years later, all Turkish rule over what later became Iraq, fell under Allied 
control. Naturally, Anglo-Iranian and Royal Dutch Shell, a hybrid Dutch/British venture 
created a little more than a decade earlier, ‘gained a controlling interest in the TPC’, 
while turning Germany’s share over to France. 44 As the limbs of the former Ottoman 
state were being strewn to France and Britain, the mandate that the League of Nations set 
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forth allocated Syria and Lebanon to France while Britain controlled Jordan, greater 
Palestine, and Iraq, with Turkey, Yemen and what would later become Saudi Arabia, 
emerging as independent entities. 45 
In this geopolitical flux, the US, under the Wilson administration, realized that 
sole European attempts at 
dominating large tracts of 
oil-endowed territory 
would have a possible 
long-term impact on US 
energy needs and would 
surely disadvantage 
domestic corporate profit 
potential, with the 
possibility of leaving the 
US in an vulnerable 
position. 46 This was only 
to be reinforced by the 
secretive San Remo 
agreement, which temporarily precluded any American multinational from the petro-
spoils of the Great War. 47  For its part, France, realizing the strategic value of oil, 
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although later than its counterparts, traded ‘some of its Syrian territorial interests’ in 
exchange for the French IOC, Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP), the ancestor of 
Total, to take part in the TPC. 48 Having been formed in 1924 on the Paris government’s 
initiative, but ‘wholly administered by private interests’, CFP was proof that regarding oil, 
the synthesis of domestic private enterprise with the national interests had now been 
adopted by the French.  
Within Washington, this mixture had a direct impact upon policy. The Standard 
Oil Company of New York (SOCONY) was particularly adamant about being included 
into what was rapidly becoming a multi-party affair, persuading ‘the State Department to 
step up its pressure on the British to permit U.S. multinationals to buy into the TPC 
consortium.’ 49 With Britain having de-facto say on the business climate in the embryonic 
Iraq, and fearing economic retaliation by Washington, the terms were negotiated into 
allowing US partners. Therefore, SOCONY and Jersey Standard split a 23.75 percent 
share of IPC stock while Anglo-Iranian, Royal Dutch Shell, and CFP received 23.75 
percent respectively. 50 The remaining 5 percent was allocated to Calouste Gulbenkian, a 
former Ottoman subject, ‘who had helped win the original concession from the Turks.’ 51 
Moreover, in a move to further quell the US government, the British agreed to a joint 
venture between Anglo-Iranian and the American Gulf Oil into their Kuwait protectorate. 
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52 Within a short amount of time, TPC was conveniently relabeled the Iraq Petroleum 
Company (IPC), to represent the region’s new political realities. 
The wrangling between the diverse IOCs, their home governments, and the 
administrators of the new state of Iraq proved to be a watershed moment in the 
interaction and cooperation within the emergent home-IOC-host nexus, creating, within a 
relatively short time, a ‘global map’… of ‘cross border company interests supported by a 
concentration of the oil industry.’ 53 As the network between home, host, and the IOCs 
became more complex, ‘competition between exporting countries could take place only 
through competition between the international oil companies, ’ 54 garnering a collection 
of strange bedfellows. This was evinced by the sudden glut in international petroleum 
supply. The great panic caused by WWI, the subsequent scramble of the IOCs into Latin 
America and in the Middle East, and the rebound of Russian/Soviet exports from the 
instability caused by the October Revolution of 1917 had so succeeded into bringing 
additional supply into the global oil market, that nearing the end of the 1920s, prices had 
decreased extensively. As the global oil market became saturated, fearing profit reduction 
and in attempt to ward off other oil-seeking entrepreneurs and firms from future 
exploration opportunities, the participants of the IPC in July of 1928, with tacit approval 
of all home governments, designated a zone, known as the Red Line 55 around ‘the 
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prewar Ottoman Empire, an area that included Iraq and Saudi Arabia but not Iran or 
Kuwait,’ with a gentlemen’s agreement that all members would refrain from seeking new 
concessions inside the settled territory without the approval of the consortium as a whole. 
56 However, as market saturation only increased, only months later, in September of 1928, 
the major IOCs Standard Oil of New Jersey, Anglo-Iranian, and Royal Dutch Shell, met 
in Achnacarry in Scotland, UK and set up the “As-Is” or Achnacarrry Agreement, to 
coordinate oil output in order to organize the market, in an effort to halt the decrease of 
prices and bring about market stabilization. 57 To do so, companies agreed on a quota 
system in differing markets, according to the their respective percentage shares of 
consumer consumption in a respective country, and would only increase oil output if total 
demand rose – again, based upon their particular shares. 58 These efforts, nonetheless, 
were futile as too many intervening factors, both economic and political, undercut any 
real sustained impact from collaboration of the three major IOCs. Amongst the most 
consequential were the Wall Street crash in 1929, the interwar economic crisis within 
Europe, the Great Depression, the large oil discoveries in East Texas in 1930-31, the 
advancing nature of the technological efficiency in oil extraction and refinement, and 
rudimentary efforts at conversation from the major economies of the world, all of which, 
in combination, led to unprecedented decline in global oil prices. 59 
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The Seeds of Nationalization and the beginnings of the ‘domino cascade’  
 The resulting 1930s oil glut and collapse in prices set off a chain of events that 
would forever remake the architecture of the global oil industry, altering the nature of the 
interaction between the developed world and oil-endowed countries of the developing 
world. As previously mentioned, while the concessionary agreements led to an interactive 
nexus of cooperation amongst the major IOCs, often backed by their great power home 
states, what the 1930s oil collapse engendered was the rise of the ‘domino cascade’ of 
nationalization attempts and concessional revisionism from host governments, as one 
producing country’s actions would set precedent, in which other producing countries 
would either learn from, directly mimic, and/or integrate in their national energy export 
strategies. Virtually no producing country could ignore the tremors of this tectonic shift.  
And as the IOCs, with the great powers, responded to each case rather differently, the 
slow process of power transfer gradually began from the IOCs to producing countries, 
although the road was long and arduous. The end of that road was OPEC. 
The Mexican Catalyst  
 The genesis of the host state pushback, incidentally, happened not in some remote 
corner of the world where the US and European powers had little control over, but in the 
what was traditionally seen as America’s backyard, Latin America – more curiously, in 
Mexico. It is here where the importance of what transpired between the Iranian Qajar 
court and British entrepreneur William D’Arcy manifests again. As the early hunt for oil 
spread into Latin America, another British entrepreneur, Weetman Pearson, an expert 
engineer in large-scale national infrastructural projects, was invited by Mexican President 
Porfirio Diaz and commissioned to aid Mexico’s development plans, chiefly in national 
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railways and canals. 60 However, in the course of time, Pearson discovered that Mexico 
possessed large oil reserves, and therefore, shifted from being a foreign commissioned 
engineer to becoming Mexico’s D’Arcy. In approaching Mexican President Diaz, the 
Iranian concession agreements to D’Arcy acted as a template for how Pearson would set 
up the arrangement for extracting Mexican oil. As Leonardo Maugeri has pointed out, the 
concession arrangements that Pearson agreed upon with Mexico ‘followed the scheme set 
up by D’Arcy in Persia and would set the model for all eventual contracts in Mexico: a 
modest royalty for every ton of oil produced, a tax on surface occupation, no income tax, 
and the direct ownership of subsurface findings.’ 61 However, though Pearson’s Mexican 
oil venture, Mexican Eagle, successfully crafted many of the mechanisms that defined 
that country’s oil industry, he decided, just like D’Arcy in Iran, to merge his company 
with a larger IOC, eventually selling his company to Royal Dutch Shell near the end of 
WWI, which added to the further homogenization of the global oil industry under the 
domination of the major IOCs. 62 
 But for Pearson, profit motivation in selling Mexican Eagle was not the only 
factor. The massive political instability caused by the Mexican Revolution of 1911, and 
the uncertainty in that country’s business climate certainly altered his perception about 
continued investment. The immediate post-WWI oil scramble, nevertheless, made the 
major IOCs more risk averse than their smaller competitors, and thus Royal Dutch Shell’s 
takeover of Mexican Eagle, and the huge potential for profit, rendered its mass entrance 
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into Mexico a worthy gambit. Yet with time, Royal Dutch Shell would experience 
firsthand that even a major IOC with an army of human capital, endless resources, and 
substantial geopolitical clout with the great powers, was not immune to a developing 
country’s alacrity towards concessionary agreements that it felt was imposed upon it by 
an unpopular government in cahoots with a foreign firm. In 1917, though the central 
Mexican government had its heads of states removed intermittently by reason of 
continued political turmoil, the post-Diaz parliament collectively voted to extend the 
central government’s writ over all Mexican resources, including oil. 63 Immediately, the 
IOCs, Royal Dutch Shell being the largest, took notice and fought back against the 
Mexican government. As negotiations reached a deadlock, due to both sides’ 
irreconcilable positions, and fearing that continued instability would make normal 
operations within Mexico very difficult, the major IOCs decided to gradually cut back 
and even halt certain operations in the country, and look south to Venezuela, where more 
hospital conditions prevailed.  As Daniel Yergin has chronicled, the government of Juan 
Vicente Gomez of Venezuela was not only unusually cruel and authoritarian, but more 
importantly, Venezuela under Gomez had very little domestic institutions that were not 
fully controlled by Gomez and his family. 64 Thus, this rendered Venezuela an attractive 
place for IOCs as foreign firms only needed permission from one small segment of the 
country’s elite, as opposed to waiting for parliamentary decision-making or even 
popularly based consensus from the ballot box. 65 And just as Mexico’s Diaz years before 
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him, Venezuela under Gomez, essentially adopted D’Arcy’s Iranian model of concession 
agreements with Royal Dutch-Shell holding the brunt of Venezuela’s oil concessions.  
 With the oil glut of the 1930s however, the home-IOC-host nexus in Latin 
America started to unravel.  Early in the 1920’s, Argentina managed to nationalize its 
own oil industry, but due to the insignificance of Argentinean oil exports to global supply, 
there was virtually no long-term impact to the other host producing countries and little 
reaction from the bourgeoning concession system that the major IOCs were building. 
Mexico was a different case altogether. Before the fall of Mexico’s Diaz and the IOCs 
southern migration into Venezuela, its exports were very substantial for the US and 
global economies. As some semblance of political stability took hold with the beginning 
of Lazaro Cardenas’ presidency, the central Mexican government, once again, sought to 
tighten its control of Mexican oil. Like many developing countries, the impact of the 
Great Depression, particularly on the Mexican oil industry, was very debilitating. Early in 
the Cardenas presidency, as oil workers went on strike to protest for better pay and 
working conditions, the Mexican government overtly supported the workers against the 
IOCs. 66 Buoyed by the prospects of having a Venezuelan alternative to Mexican oil, the 
IOCs hardened their positions. As “tit-for-tat” recriminations were lobbied from one side 
to the other, President Cardenas abruptly nationalized all seventeen companies that were 
operating within Mexico – a move that shocked the IOCs and the global oil industry writ 
large. 67 The IOCs had previously figured that due to the political instability unleashed by 
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Mexico’s revolution, the normal operating conditions that they were accustomed to were 
not present in Mexico, rendering operations within that country more difficult, which 
increased the importance of alternative sources, namely Venezuela. Moreover, as prices 
were at historic lows, the IOCs also assumed that the Mexican government would be far 
more dependent on them for export and pricing, and hence more pliable, as opposed to 
periods where supplies were tight and demand was high. Yet, total state expropriation 
was something that very few expected, especially in such an important producer country. 
Once nationalization became a reality, the majors, both individually and collectively, 
sought help directly from their home governments – a pattern of behavior that would be 
exhibited many more times to come. It was only with the US government’s reaction to 
the Mexican expropriation that acted as the catalyst for the domino cascade of 
concessional revisionism. Based upon his administration’s “Good Neighbor” policy, 
which essentially came to signify a reworking of the US relationship with its much 
weaker neighbors in the Western Hemisphere, 68  President Roosevelt chose not to 
intervene on behalf of American IOCs in Mexico. Without the US backing its firms in 
Mexico, the other IOCs, most notably Royal Dutch Shell was unable to obtain sufficient 
British and Dutch support to challenge Cardenas in a meaningful way.  
Mexico’s nationalization, though successful, came with a heavy short-term price. 
Most of the high skilled engineers and operation managers from the IOCs immediately 
left the country. PEMEX, the new Mexican national oil company, had to rebuild a new 
managing echelon to substitute the tremendous amount of the industrial brain drain that 
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had left.  Nevertheless, the successful nationalization created a powerful and enduring 
precedent for the other producing countries in the developing world. Half-way across the 
globe from the Middle East, the news of Mexico’s nationalization brought intrigue to 
Middle Eastern countries, including to vociferous Iran, whose 1933 ill-fated 
nationalization attempt under the Shah Reza Pahlavi had the left the monarch partially 
humiliated. Just like Mexico, the global economic downturn and the subsequent Great 
Depression dramatically plummeted oil prices, which cause the governments of 
producing countries to agitate for more control over their oil. In the Iranian case, the host 
government was far too weak to stand up to Anglo-Iranian and their British backers. Yet 
for Mexico, the timing was a great contributing factor to its nationalization success, in 
addition to the fact that it was dealing with a more sympathetic US government, as 
opposed to a recalcitrant Britain. Having transpired on the eve of World War II, and born 
out of the same vein of concern, Mexico’s nationalization provoked a new sense of 
caution amongst IOC executives and their home governments.  It was at the height of the 
World War II in 1943, where the fear of a domino effect materialized in Venezuela, when 
the countries oil industry underwent a ‘thorough reorganization’, ‘spurred on by a 
number of different factors of which pressure for higher taxes’ on foreign firms was an 
‘important one.’ 69  Fearing a Mexican repeat, the US actively chose to midwife the 
negotiations, which produced a much more compliant, though determined Venezuelan 
initiative. Throughout the deliberations, the principle Venezuelan concern was the 
readjustment of tax laws, which ultimately made all multinationals liable at 12 percent, 
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crossing all sectors of industry. 70 Coincidentally, the Caracas government was looking to 
implement the same the relationship with foreign multinationals that the U.S. had with 
the foreign firms that leased oil rights offshore or on federal American land. In 
successfully doing so, ‘Venezuela’s sovereign right to set the rate of income tax was 
established’, using its newly acquired power to ‘increase the rate of corporate tax in 1947 
so that the total “government take” of royalties and tax would always be 50% of the 
profits’, while the IOCs would retain the other 50%. 71 This arrangement became official 
in 1948. And while the Caracas government was overthrown in a military coup shortly 
afterward, unlike the Iranian case where oil agreements often vacillated with particular 
regimes, the 50/50 template that was born in Venezuela ultimately remained. 72  
 Whether the Venezuelan case was a result of the original concessional framework, 
the Caracas regime’s adept negotiation skills, or Washington’s fear of an impact on 
global oil supply during a time of war, in all probability, all of the aforementioned 
variables were contributing factors in how a developing state secured its rights from 
powerful multinationals and the world’s great powers by non-violent means. Nonetheless, 
as word of the 50/50 profit sharing arrangement swept the Middle East, it elicited 
different reactions from all parties concerned, with the Americans ambivalent, resigning 
themselves to an inevitable Venezuelan type outcome, the British strongly resisting, 
while each host state attempted to reconcile the Venezuelan precedent in their own 
dealings with the IOCs.  
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The spread of the 50/50 arrangement 
While events in Mexico and later in Venezuela set the precedent for the 50/50 
arrangement between IOCs and host governments, it was WWII, and its immediate 
aftermath, particularly the Korean crisis and the beginnings of mutual antagonism 
between the US and USSR that created the context for its expansion. Just as WWI created 
the major scramble for oil by IOCs, the beginning of WWII resurrected the specter of 
possible shortages and supply disruption to the advanced economies of the major world 
powers. As a result, the IOCs renewed their efforts to secure new sources of supply, 
particularly in the Middle East. For firms left out of concessionary arrangements in the 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), especially American multinationals, such as Standard Oil 
of California (SOCAL) or Texaco, this was a prime opportunity to recoup what they had 
lost when the doors of the IPC closed. As exploratory efforts were underway in the 
Persian Gulf island of Bahrain, US IOCs looked to the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
which in 1933 SOCAL had signed a concession agreement for exploration. In a joint 
venture that produced the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, or CASOC (later to 
become the Arabian American Oil Company, or ARAMCO), SOCAL and Texaco began 
to rapidly expand exploratory efforts, which eventually paid off when oil in commercial 
quantities was discovered in the Kingdom in 1938. 73  
 Furthermore, as the war clouds over Europe loomed once more, US concerns on 
supply and future access to energy were again resurrected, boding well for the 
SOCAL/Texaco venture as Washington once again displayed intense interventionist 
                                                        
73 Citino, From Arab Nationalism to Opec: Eisenhower, King Saud, and the Making of U.S.-Saudi 
Relations, 1-38. 
41 
 
behavior in hopes of keeping the foreign concessions solely for American firms. 74 
Subsequently, to entice the new Saudi government, ‘on the initiative of the State 
Department, supported by SOCAL and Texaco, President Franklin Roosevelt declared 
Saudi Arabia eligible for American Lend-Lease assistance in February 1943’, with a tacit 
quid pro quo offer that, in no uncertain terms, proposed that the joint SOCAL/Texaco 
enterprise ‘would create an oil reserve in Saudi Arabia whose contents would be made 
available to the U.S. government at prices below those on the world market’ in exchange 
for future loans and credit. 75 Nevertheless, Washington’s ostensive involvement had its 
limits, with a failed attempt to create an Anglo-American Agreement, which many feared 
would result in a joint British-American cartel. As a result, the US, like its European 
counterparts, utilized its multinationals as vehicles for the state’s interest.  
As production in Saudi Arabia grew, it was soon realized by the newly formed 
venture that both SOCAL and 
Texaco would need additional 
capital, along with ‘markets 
and political clout’ to 
undertake the successful 
operation in un-tapping the vast 
Arabian Desert. 76 Standard Oil 
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of New Jersey and SOCONY, both firms that were bound to the IPC, were in such a 
position to meet that need, with Jersey chronically suffering from limited access to crude, 
and ‘concerned about being excluded from the richest, lowest-cost concession in the 
world.’ 77 Yet, as both Jersey and SOCONY were bound to the IPC and the Red Line 
Agreement, an overt violation would set bad precedent. Notwithstanding, this did not 
dissuade Washington, and behind the scenes, though with strong objections from the 
French, ‘the terms worked out among the IPC members dissolved the Red Line 
Agreement’, however leaving the skeptical French the right to ‘draw larger shares of oil 
from IPC production than their proportionate holdings in IPC would have allowed.’ 78  
Eventually, what became ARAMCO, a sole multi-party American concession, 
allocated 30% to Standard Oil of California, Texaco, and SOCONY respectively, with 
10% provided for SOCONY. With the end of hostilities in Europe, only to be followed 
by the beginnings of the US-USSR Cold War, the US government took an active role in 
the relationship that American IOCs had with the Saudi government. 79 Fearing Soviet 
designs on Middle Eastern oil, which had been recently manifested in the Azerbaijan 
crisis in Iran, where the Soviet military only grudgingly withdrew from Iranian territory 
by reason of American pressure, 80 the US increasingly became sensitive to the legitimate 
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concessionary grievances from producing countries and the possibility of Soviet 
exploitation of those grievances. And as Francisco Parra has explained, by reason of this 
concern, the US figured that more favorable concessionary arrangements for the host 
governments ‘were desirable and probably inevitable after the adoption of 50/50 in 
Venezuela,’ and thus, the 50/50 arrangement that US IOCs and Saudi Arabia eventually 
agreed upon ‘became a well-orchestrated joint undertaking of ARAMCO, its parent 
companies, the US State Department and the US Treasury, designed to offer to Saudi 
Arabia promptly and voluntarily what many recognized would sooner or later have to be 
conceded  throughout the Middle East.’ 81  This made Saudi Arabia the first regional 
country to adopt the 50/50 profit sharing arrangement, which only a few short years later 
spread to both the Iraq and Kuwait consortiums, despite British reluctance. 82 
Changes in the Imperial roles in the Middle East and 50/50 challenged in Iran  
When news of the 50/50 arrangement that American IOCs, in collaboration with the US 
government made with Saudi Arabia, reached Tehran, it both enraged and emboldened 
the Iranian government. Shah Reza Pahlavi’s ill-fated nationalization attempt in 1933, 
five years prior to Mexico’s, and his 1941 forced abdication of the throne and subsequent 
exile by the British and Soviet invasion of Iran in the midst of WWII, had severally 
antagonized all segments of Iranian society by reason of the constant intervention in 
Iranian domestic affairs, and stringent hold that Britain, through Anglo-Iranian, had on 
Iranian oil.  
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Under these conditions, after decades of attempting to incrementally change the 
structure of the original concession, ‘Iranian resentment against the British oil monopoly 
flared into full-scale confrontation.’ 83  While Iranian methods were reactionary, their 
stipulations were quite banal. Tehran, witnessing the 50/50 paradigm being offered and 
eventually adopted by the major host countries, ‘called for legislation forcing Anglo-
Iranian to split its profits with Iran fifty-fifty, as ARAMCO had recently done across the 
Persian Gulf in Saudi Arabia.’ 84 The initial British reaction was to fully reject the Iranian 
government’s demands, confidant that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who they helped install 
after the forced exile of his father, was able to confront nationalist Iranian politicians 
calling for expropriation. However, as protests only grew, under newly elected Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, just like the Mexican nationalization under Cardenas, 
the oil nationalization issue had evolved to being one of national sovereignty and 
independence. And while the British only later grudgingly accepted terms to negotiate, 
possibly to arrive at the inevitable 50/50 profit sharing arrangement that had become the 
norm in the concessionary system, delays on their part and the mutual recriminations 
from one side to another had already unleashed the desire for full nationalization – just as 
in Mexico.  
Yet, the Iranian expropriation was dissimilar from what Cardenas managed to do 
in 1938, which ultimately rendered a completely different response from the major IOCs 
and their host governments. While both Iranian and Mexican oil had significant impact 
upon global supply and the roots of their respective governments’ nationalization 
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attempts were generally the same, the context in which the nationalization’s occurred 
were very different, ultimately leading to vastly different outcomes. The first important 
difference was the nature of the concessionary system in Iran, as opposed to other host 
states. While in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, along with their Latin American counterparts, 
there existed the presence of several IOCs, often times from differing home countries, 
which allowed the respective host government to varying degrees to play one off against 
another, Anglo-Iranian’s exclusive concession left the Iranian government alone to 
negotiate with a powerful IOC, backed by the dominant British government and her allies. 
Furthermore, as Anglo-Iranian was the sole concession holder in Iran, other IOCs, 
whether the majors or smaller independent firms, were either to weak or unwilling to 
challenge Britain’s prevailing position in Iranian oil. What this eventually created, which 
coincided and was exacerbated by the immense importance that the British Royal Navy 
placed in Iranian crude, was a British dependency on a subdued and strangulated Iranian 
state, with little control over its resources. These concessionary arrangements and the 
dependency that Britain had on Iran did not exist in Mexico from other IOCs or home 
governments.  
The second major difference was timing. Mexican nationalization occurred on the 
eve of WWII, where the major economies were concerned about supply shortages and 
access. Due to this concern, as mentioned previously, the home governments of the IOCs 
operating in Mexico, particularly the US, chose to cautiously approach the Mexican 
nationalization as not to antagonize the government, ultimately accepting the outcome of 
Mexico’s actions and the subsequent Venezuelan initiative that was the catalyst for the 
50/50 paradigm of profit sharing. This helped dampen concerns and avoid the crippling 
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supply disruptions that so many feared. Iranian nationalization, however, both its 1933 
attempt and its successful implementation in 1951, transpired at a time of relative global 
political stability and in eras of low oil prices, where the concerns of supply shortages, 
access, and prices were almost nonexistent. This evoked far less sympathy for the Iranian 
government’s decision by the home governments of the major IOCs. In other words, 
unlike Mexico or Venezuela, Iran had no advocate within the international system. And 
while the US initially attempted to mediate between the two parties, because of Britain’s 
insistence, 85 and the overarching fear that the US had of supposed communist elements 
within Iran, the US ultimately sided with London and Anglo-Iranian. 86 
The third major difference was geographic in nature, in that Iran’s borders with 
the USSR automatically evoked tremendous American and European anxiety regarding 
Soviet designs on Middle Eastern oil – which considering Moscow’s behavior towards 
Iran during the immediate aftermath of WWII, was clearly logical. So deep and pervasive 
was this concern, and heavily influenced by Iranian nationalization in 1951, that the US 
and the UK began to develop a joint policy of “oil denial” in the Middle East, in the event 
that hostile forces, whether intrinsic to the host producing country or foreign in nature, 
such as a Soviet invasion, would attempt to take over oil production in a respective oil 
producing state, chiefly in those states that the US and European IOCs were operating in. 
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87 Under the oil denial agreement, the US and UK had devised sabotage plans for the 
‘removal of key parts, destruction of stocks and demolition of surface facilities …that 
would be usable by an enemy’, in which two ‘variations’ were sketched out: ‘a selection 
of targets for destruction that will render the facilities unusable and un-repairable by an 
enemy for a period of 6-12 months and a selection of priority targets for destruction 
under "crash conditions".’ 88  In destroying or severally debilitating the oil fields’ 
functionality and the equipment for extraction and transport, two main objectives would 
become theoretically feasible: rendering void, at least for the short term, Soviet 
acquisition of key oil wells and reserves in a host producing country and in the event that 
hostile domestic forces in a host producing country would obtain power, acquiring new 
leverage over the new political order. Eventually, the US and UK divided responsibilities 
for these contingent plans, with the former being responsible for the Arabian Peninsula 
while the latter would be responsible for affairs across the Persian Gulf in Iran and Iraq.  
With these in mind, it is important to note that while the UK and US ultimately 
arrived at an agreed approach towards Iranian nationalization, particularly the 
Mossadegh-led government, and their initial individual assessments of the situation when 
nationalization became reality in February of 1951 was vastly different. As Anthony 
Sampson has noted, the US, under the Truman administration, was unsympathetic to 
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Anglo-Iranian’s refusal to even consider what the grievances of their host government, 89 
which partly was a residue of FDR’s approach to Mexico and Venezuela. But with the 
arrival of the Eisenhower administration, the escalation of the US-USSR Cold war 
subsumed any empathy towards the Iranian position, as the home governments, 
particularly the US and the UK, forcefully supported the position of the majors. The 
British response to Iranian nationalization, particularly before a joint UK-US strategy 
could be devised, was to apply a crippling boycott and denial of Iranian oil in the market. 
During this time, Anglo-Iranian’s middle management team in the Abadan oil refinery in 
Iran and in other oil fields in the country had either left the country or stopped working 
altogether. Thus, with the boycott and the severe decline in oil revenues, the Iranian 
government quickly became destabilized and vulnerable to external manipulation. During 
the two-year boycott, particularly near the latter end, the British, in collusion with the US 
as playing the lead role, utilized the growing frustration of the populace against 
Mossadegh’s premiership, as the boycott of Iranian oil was having devastating effect 
upon the Iranian economy. Under the leadership of Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., a CIA political 
action officer, and in collaboration with Iranians loyal to the monarchy’s 
accommodationist position on Iranian oil and its relations with Western powers in general, 
the US and the UK orchestrated Operation Ajax in August of 1953, using largely paid 
mobs to storm the Prime Minister’s office and demanding his resignation. 90  
With public discontent bowling over because of the deteriorating economic 
conditions within the country, and having now faced visible signs of opposition amongst 
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the pro-monarchial elite within the country, with no great power in the international 
system that was sympathetic to his nationalization policies, Mossadegh was forced to 
resign, and spent the remainder of his days in house arrest, permanently exiled from 
politics. Though the ramifications of the coup against Mossadegh would be fully seen 
decades later in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American and British perceptions of 
the events of August of 1953 viewed the “success” of the coup through solely the Cold 
War prism. In his Presidential Diaries reflecting on Operation Ajax, US President 
Eisenhower clearly manifested this perception, while also acknowledging the economic 
reality that Iran faced after the coup, chiefly in the global oil market:  
Another recent development that we helped bring about was the 
restoration of the Shah to power in Iran and the elimination of Mossadegh. 
The things we did were "covert." If knowledge of them became public, we 
would not only be embarrassed in that region, but our chances to do 
anything of like nature in the future would almost totally disappear. 
Nevertheless our agent there, a member of the CIA, worked intelligently, 
courageously and tirelessly… Now if the British will be conciliatory and 
display some wisdom; if the Shah and his new premier, General Zahedi 
will be only a little bit flexible, and the United States will stand by to help 
both financially and with wise counsel, we may really give a serious defeat 
to Russian intentions and plans in that area. Of course, it will not be so 
easy for the Iranian economy to be restored, even if her refineries again 
begin to operate. This is due to the fact that during the long period of shut 
down of her oil fields, world buyers have gone to other sources of supply. 
These have been expanded to meet the need and now, literally, Iran really 
has no ready market for her vast oil production. However, this is a 
problem that we should be able to help solve. 91 
  
While it has conventionally been understood that the British government and 
Anglo-Iranian (BP), came out as “winners” from the 1953 coup against Prime Minister 
Mossadegh, in reality, there were no winners, but varying degrees of losers. The coup 
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was a setback for Iranian democracy, indelibly maligned Britain’s image in Iran and the 
region, began the cycle of mistrust of the US by the Iranian public and a large segment of 
the Iranian elite, and from a material standpoint, dramatically lessened Anglo-Iranian’s 
sway over Iranian exports.  
 After the 
coup, the British essentially 
lost the role they had in 
influencing Iranian domestic 
affairs. This was transferred 
to the Americans, to the 
point that even domestic 
socio-economic issues 
within Iran were now linked 
to US Grand Strategy in the 
Middle East, always 
discussed with the Soviet 
nemesis in the background. 92 
As the new government in Tehran formed, the Americans, being the instrumental party 
behind the coup, negotiated a new consortium in order to prevent a repetition within its 
own areas of interest. This witnessed Anglo-Iranian, now British Petroleum, lose 60% of 
its stake in Iranian crude, forced to share the rest with Royal Dutch-Shell, five US majors, 
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and CFP. 93 Another consequential ramification of Mossadegh’s downfall, and the new 
consortium that was developed under American auspices was the legality of ownership of 
Iranian reserves. As Daniel Yergin has noted, though in other host countries, the 
concessionaries had the legal mandate over the host’s country’s reserves, in Iran, 
dominion over the its underground crude reserves was transferred back to the Iranian 
state. 94 And though weak and highly dependent upon foreign powers, this gave the 
Pahlavi monarchy breathing room to carve out, in modest terms, some modicum of 
independence in its oil dealings with the West, of which would become an important 
factor in both the creation and development of OPEC.  
 This newfound maneuverability, however modest, let to another significant 
outcome from the coup against Mossadegh and the decline of British Petroleum in Iran. 
The post-Mossadegh consortium arrangements in Iran, in dividing the concessions 
amongst the major IOCs, allowed, for the first time, a small window for independent oil 
companies to access the country. Though insignificant in amount, this new dynamic had 
major long-term ramifications. The most important independent oil company at that time, 
although initially seen as a nuisance to the majors, only to evolve into being a threat to 
their cartelization of the global oil industry, was the Italian state-owned Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi (ENI), headed by the ambitious Enrico Mattei. In his search to secure new 
sources of supply for the Italian economy, Mattei’s ENI sought to undercut the majors by 
offering far more favorable profit sharing conditions. After securing a small but 
significant 75/25 profit sharing arrangement with Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, ENI 
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capitalized upon the consortium flux in Iran, and in 1957 signed a contractual agreement 
with the Shah that, as Leonardo Maugeri has stated, introduced a new oil formula that 
officially broke the 50/50 profit sharing precedent, but more importantly created the next 
template for the continuation of the domino cascade that would eventually affect the 
relationships between other firms and producing countries. 95 Under the new terms, Iran 
would be entitled to 50% of ENI’s gross profits in the form of a tax, and then divide the 
company’s net profits by 50%, which in turn, would render that 75% of profits would go 
to the Iranian government. 96 Maugeri also details that under the contractual stipulations, 
the company would ‘cover the initial costs of exploration’ and ‘only after oil was 
discovered would’ the newly formed Iranian National Oil Company (NIOC) and ENI 
equally split the costs of exploration, and would dually manage SIRIP, the joint company 
created by the agreement between NIOC and ENI. 97  Thus, not only was the 50/50 
precedent now officially broken, it for the first time, brought in the host country via the 
newfangled concept of the national oil company, in joint administration of oil production. 
ENI’s move would soon create another remaking of the nature of the oil industry, ending 
one chapter, while beginning another.  
The Birth of OPEC  
Just as the development of the concessionary arrangements within the home-IOC-host 
nexus was not just attributable to market forces, but had consequential geopolitical and 
domestic political determinants behind them, OPEC’s formation and the early years of its 
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institutionalization was also a product of the confluence of these factors. Within this 
Embryonic phase of OPEC’s institutional life, the beginnings of the creation of the 
determinants behind what ultimately OPEC behavior is predicated upon began to emerge. 
 It was at the market forces, intrastate, and then outside actor influence levels (in 
that order) that, taken together, created the context, rationale, and space for OPEC’s 
formation. The convergence of these three factors ultimately produced a unity of purpose 
amongst member states, facilitating inter-member dialogue wherein bilateral or 
multilateral issues at the interstate level (i.e. political differences, regional rivalries, etc.) 
did not impede cooperation and collaboration in the Organization’s creation. This genesis 
can be traced to the alignment of three major trends within the international system that 
correspond to the three determinant levels at work in this Embryonic period: 1.) the 
changing nature of the global oil industry, particularly the supply and demand dynamics 
and oil pricing within the global economy at that particular time 2.) the unique economic 
and security dynamics within OPEC member states in the immediate years before and 
after the Organization’s founding; 3.) the beginnings of the breakdown of the home-IOC-
host nexus and the willingness or incapability of major powers to halt that trend. As will 
be explained, the new dynamics at work at the macro level in the global oil market, 
forced the major IOCs to continuously lessen prices and manipulate exports in order to 
retain their market shares. However, in doing so, the major IOCs brought about 
substantial economic hardships on host producing countries, which at that particular time 
were facing both unprecedented economic and security challenges that could not tolerate 
a diminution in their oil income.  
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 Compounding the new changes in the global oil market and internal dynamics of 
proto-OPEC states was the American-Soviet Cold War, which led to the divergence of 
US geopolitical interests with that of the major IOCs, ultimately sundering the home-
IOC-host nexus. This created the groundwork and the opening for the collusion of 
producing countries, which led to the formation of OPEC, culminating in the 
Organization’s collective nationalization declaration in 1968, and ultimately the 
disintegration of the concessionary system that defined the global oil industry since its 
inception.  
Market forces 
 The immediate pre-OPEC global oil dynamics  
By the 1950’s, 85% of the global oil industry outside the US, Canada, the USSR, and 
China – from dominion over the reserves, extraction and refining to the mid-stream 
activities such as transportation, to marketing and selling at the consumer level – were 
controlled by the major international oil companies that eventually became known as the 
Seven Sisters, 98 in addition to the French CFP. 99 While the earlier discussed 50/50 
arrangement between the host governments and IOCs, with often times the IOCs’ home 
governments acting as backers of their firms’ interests, caused a sea change in the 
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functionality of the oil industry, it eventually established a normative principal of 
operation that lasted well into the early years of OPEC. The success of the 50/50 
arrangement, measured by its longevity, had many factors, but a critical component of its 
durability was the skill of the major IOCs (i.e. the Seven Sisters and CFP) to hold 
together their integrated cartel over the global oil industry, primarily by controlling prices 
and crude oil output into the global economy. However, it was this proclivity from the 
major IOCs to continuously maintain their dominance over the market, that ultimately 
engendered a new cycle in the prior mentioned “domino cascade”, which eventually 
forced the disparate host producing countries into collusion, ultimately ending the 50/50 
paradigm and engendering the collective nationalization declaration by the incipient 
OPEC. The seeds of this new “domino cascade” can be found in the immediate post-
WWII economic environment.  
The same cycle that appeared in the immediate years before WWI, which 
produced the oil scramble in the inter-war years, only to witness new sources of supply 
and increased output enter the market, was replayed in the aftermath of WWII. 100 
Aggravating the supply fears from WWII was the individual privatization of 
transportation in developed countries, as middle class consumers at the individual level, 
for the first time, in Western European countries, Japan, Canada, and more 
consequentially, the United States, obtained the means to possess automobiles. In 
response to the growing consumer demand at the individual level, not just the war-time 
and immediate post-war concerns of the great powers, the major IOCs significantly 
enhanced their profiles in the Middle East and Latin America, and began expanding oil 
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output from their respective concessions. And just as had happened in the inter-war 
period, with time, increased supplies relieved anxieties, ultimately leading to a market 
surplus, which facilitated and even encouraged the rise of the personal ownership of the 
individual’s means of transportation.   
 However, a side effect of this same cycle that transpired in both World Wars and 
their aftermaths was a new constellation of forces that threatened the market-shares of the 
major IOCs like never before. In the first instance during WWI and its immediate 
aftermath, this was either not as apparent or definitely not as decisive. The new threat to 
the major’s dominance came simultaneously from two sources: the rise of the 
independent, small firms that for the first time had the tangible ability to access reserves 
outside the major’s control; and the growing production from the Soviet Union, only to 
be exacerbated by new discoveries in the Soviet bloc. A particular fear of the major IOCs 
was the merging of these two disparate forces, meaning the potential collusion of 
independent firms with accessible, cheap Soviet crude – a reality that was slowly 
beginning to take shape. The major’s, however, recognized how this new constellation of 
new players and new supplies (and even new host countries) could severally erode their 
market dominance, if not decisive action was taken. Therefore, their reaction was to 
manipulate the market in such a way as to drown out competition, by making it 
economically unattractive and even unfeasible for the independent firms to enter or 
sustain themselves in the market.  
 The majors were able to do this because of the peculiarities of how prices and 
global supply were calculated at that. As Bassam Fattouh has catalogued, the majors’ 
control of the upstream, midstream, and downstream aspects of the global oil industry 
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allowed them to manage the ‘rate of supply of crude oil going into the market through 
joint ownership of companies’ that operated in the host countries, which meant that the 
‘vertically and horizontally integrated industrial structure of the oil market’ rendered the 
global crude trade ‘to a large extent a question of inter-company exchange with no free 
market operating outside these companies’  control.’ 101  This dynamic obviated 
significant amounts of “loose crude” to be sold by third parties, ultimately being 
responsible for keeping, for so long, independents firms from breaking into the global 
crude market in any meaningful way. 102 The ramifications of this meant that the ‘host 
governments did not participate in production or pricing of crude oil and acted only as 
competing sellers of licenses or oil concessions,’ which in return, they would acquire ‘a 
stream of income through royalties and income taxes ’ of whatever the majors exported 
from their territories, at whatever price the majors sold their crude for. Yet while the 
majors were concerned with market share protection, they needed a formula to systemize 
this process, in order for the host governments to know how the remuneration for crude 
leaving their territories, based upon the majors’ profits, was being calculated.  
This system of how the majors sold oil in the global economy became known as 
the posted price – again having the binary purpose of cartel-esque protection policies 
while also providing the host governments a structure of how they would be compensated 
for their crude. As Robert Mabro has explained, the logic of the posted price was that it 
publicly conveyed what any entity would accept or offer for ‘a barrel of crude oil or a 
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tonne of petroleum products.’ 103 As the majors controlled most of the infrastructure of 
the global oil industry, the prices they set became the standard on how oil was traded. 
And as Mabro has pointed out, because the host governments did not control any 
significant lever of the oil industry, but were mere bystanders to the IOCs operating in 
their territory, they gradually understood that the posted price matrix, in which they 
would receive a tax from the profit of what the IOCs made from the extraction, shipment, 
and sell of their crude, left no other formulation, ‘such as spot prices or long-term 
contract prices…suitable for the purpose of tax computations.’ 104 In other words, the oil 
export revenues that the host governments, to varying degrees, so depended upon were at 
the whim of whatever posted price the major IOCs set. Thus, when the majors witnessed 
the formation of the independent firms, with the steady rise of cheap Soviet oil, 
potentially threatening their market dominance, the market manipulation policies of 
lowering the posted price in order to undercut new competition had, with time, severe and 
lasting consequences for the host governments, as the latter witnessed the steady decline 
of a major portion of their national revenues. Nevertheless, while the host governments 
were certainly used to the vicissitudes of the majors’ export and pricing policies in order 
to maintain the integrity of their global cartel, the period immediately before and after the 
formation of OPEC proved to be quite unique, eliciting markedly different reactions from 
the host governments and the major powers, most consequentially the US.  
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Intrastate dynamics 
 The Internal Picture of the main proto-OPEC member states     
Though each proto-OPEC economy differed from one another, possessing varying 
strengths and vulnerabilities, all of them heavily depended upon the revenue that they 
received from the taxes of their oil exports. In the immediate pre-OPEC environment, 
however, the gradual decline in revenues, by reason of the majors’ market manipulation 
policies, exacerbated a dangerous economic, political, social, and security reality within 
the host countries. For reasons ranging from severe national security concerns from 
foreign threats, in that additional spending on military hardware was warranted, to 
economic difficulties due to demographic changes, to political upheavals from domestic 
oppositional forces, many of the host governments, simultaneously, found themselves in 
alarming to dire economic circumstances – all of which was happening in the beginning 
stages of the US-Soviet Cold War.  
 In Iran, the massive political and economic instability resulting from the co-
American/British embargo of the country, by reason of Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadegh’s oil nationalization efforts, and the latter’s downfall in 1953, was still 
reverberating throughout the country. Though the US-backed Pahlavi dynasty’s 
dominance was renewed after the coup, as a result of the American and British 
intervention in his favor, the economic deterioration in post-embargo Iran only added to 
the simmering political crisis in the country that never faded by Mossadegh’s ouster. Due 
to Iran’s long border with the Soviet Union and fearing Soviet influence over Iranian 
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domestic affairs, 105 the US apprehension about Iranian internal dynamics forced it to 
undergo a thorough review of its assessment of Iran’s economy and its political dynamics. 
In a report by the US National Security Council, which was completed only a year after 
OPEC’s founding, but was brought to the forefront in the wake of the demise of Prime 
Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami’s first term (the fourth prime minister after Mossadegh), the 
American diagnosis of Iran’s economic and political realities was quite grim: 
The continuing trend toward revolution and chaos in Iran has reached the 
point where the US must take vigorous action. At the present time our 
position in Iran depends upon a regime that is pro-West but fragile and 
increasingly vulnerable to opposition pressures, most of them neutralists 
106. There is a growing chance of domestic strike leading to chaos, or 
coups by rightist or leftist cliques, or Soviet-managed subversion. Any of 
these would probably lead, not to a hard neutralism with which the United 
States could live, but to such weakness and division as to make Iran 
incapable of withstanding Soviet pressures. It is this imminent possibility, 
rather than possible Soviet or Soviet-supported aggression, which is the 
greatest threat to US interest in Iran. 107 
 
The task force went onto recommend that the US use financial and military aid, along 
with political support at the domestic and international level to back the new Prime 
Minister Ali Amini and promote efforts at economic liberalization, infrastructure 
modernization, and the gradual political reform of the Shah’s system. 108 However, as the 
uncertainty in Iran continued, only to be exacerbated by a scheduled end of US aid to Iran, 
which had been planned months prior, Amini’s continuance as Prime Minister became 
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politically untenable, and in similar fashion to his predecessors, abruptly resigned. As 
Amini’s possible resignation was a principal fear of the earlier mentioned NSC study, his 
abrogation of the prime ministership severally affected Washington’s calculus towards 
Iran and the wider region.  
In August of 1961, in an earlier version of second track diplomacy, Time 
Magazine’s C.D. Jackson secured a secret interview with the Shah of Iran and reported 
his findings back to the US government. In his report, Jackson makes several references 
to the scheduled end of US aid to Iran, which after the 1953 coup against Mossadegh had 
markedly increased in both military and economic terms, particularly in the late 1950s. 
109 Within the interview, the Shah explained his country’s financial difficulties to Jackson 
in rather candid form. According to Jackson, Iran’s economy, at the dawn of OPEC’s 
founding, broke down into three sectors: “the military sector; the national improvement 
or national plan sector, which [was] largely financed by the oil revenues; and the normal 
running of the government, which is where [the Shah depended] heavily upon grants in 
aid.” 110 Furthermore, the Shah conveyed to Jackson how Iran’s economic difficulties 
were affecting its defensive military abilities in countering Soviet threats against the 
country. 111 In other words, with the decline in the posted price in tandem with reduced 
aid from the West, Iran’s domestic political and economic climate had severally 
worsened, only to be aggravated by Soviet fears, which pushed the Iranian government to 
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divert dwindling resources for development and government funding towards military 
expenditures, which only perpetuated the internal crisis.  
 In neighboring Iraq, the domestic scene in the country resulting from the 
downward pressure on oil prices and the effects on the government’s revenues was 
severally intensified by the political upheaval and later fallout from the July Revolution 
of 1958, which wiped out the entire infrastructure of the Iraqi monarchy from the 
political scene, only to set up a fragile republic under the stewardship of General Abdul 
Karim Qassim. With the demise of the US-friendly Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, the US 
assessment of Qassim’s hold on power, seen through the Cold War prism, was mixed, yet 
one of foreboding:  
the Communists in Iraq with Soviet advice and assistance have reached a 
serious position of strength. Qassim…has shown no inclination to move 
against the Communists. His open reliance upon Communist support 
strongly suggests either (1) that he is the dupe or willing tool of the 
Communists or (2) that he is fearful that he will be forced to share or 
ultimately relinquish power if he calls upon the army and/or other 
nationalist elements for help in suppressing the Communists… even 
assuming he is not a Communist or dupe of the Communists, we see little 
prospect of Qassim’s moving effectively to stem the growth of Communist 
strength. 112 
 
As a result, the US and other Western power’s assessment of their influence in post-
monarchial Iraq was that it was quite limited, as any overt intervention would possibly 
invite a more robust Soviet presence, with unforeseen consequences. 113 Moreover, the 
meteoric rise of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, particularly the Egyptian union with Syria, 
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in the form of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, dramatically escalated fears in 
Washington on the possibility of the UAR’s intervention in an unstable Iraq. 114 Thus, 
unlike the rise of Mossadegh in Iran, because of what many feared was Soviet penetrative 
contagion in addition to enticements of Pan-Arabism directed towards Arab states, the 
US and Western powers took a very nuanced position towards Iraq, with what the US 
termed as ‘maximum degree of flexibility’. 115 
 Across the Persian Gulf, the intersection between declining posted price and the 
concerns of the Saudi state were far less apparent, but equally as consequential. Unlike 
Iran, Saudi Arabia was not recovering from a systemic boycott of its oil exports and 
dissimilar to Iraq, which was suffering from massive political instability as a result of 
revolution. Yet, like Iran and Iraq, its regional security concerns had major economic 
ramifications on its domestic budget – of which the declining posted price only brought 
additional hardship on the coffers of the Saudi state. Not only had the revolution in Iraq 
escalated Saudi concerns, but as was the case in the region and amongst Western powers, 
the penchant for agitation by Nasser’s UAR, significantly worsened fears in the House of 
Saud. For a conservative monarchy, the elevation of Nasser’s authoritarian republicanism, 
rooted in the concept of Pan-Arabism which fundamentally rejected the concept of the 
Arab client regime backed by Western powers for the latter’s strategic concerns, directly 
threatened not only Saudi influence on Arab affairs, but also gradually challenged the 
House of Saud’s domestic standing. Though this newfound fear of Nasser’s Pan-Arabism 
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drove the Saudis to divert more money into defense spending, it was the Yemen crisis of 
the late 1950s, and the eventual disintegration and civil war in North Yemen that caused 
mass alarm in Kingdom. 116  
 Taken together with the new form of government in Iraq, the rhetorical challenge 
from Cairo and Damascus, and the rapid deterioration of security on the Saudi-Yemeni 
frontier, the House of Saud witnessed a revolutionary Pan-Arab, republican encirclement 
of their strategic environment, partly backed by Soviet political and military might.  
 Though markedly different in nature and scope, the same mixture of internal 
economic disarray, political instability, declining oil revenues, regional flux, and the fears 
of Soviet penetration were also present within the Venezuelan milieu. Being 
democratically elected to his second term as President, after his exile from the country 
during the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Rómulo Betancourt inherited similar 
domestic dynamics of political and economic disorder resulting from the downfall of the 
prior regime, while also witnessing the same pattern of Soviet-sympathetic regional flux 
centered in the new Castro regime in Cuba. Because of the deterioration of US-Cuban 
relations after the Cuban revolution, and fearing Soviet political and military infiltration 
near American borders due to the creation of an avowedly pro-Soviet government in 
Cuba, the US not only attempted to confront the rise and strength of the Castro regime, 
but also to contain Cuban and Soviet influence within Central and Latin America. For 
this, they initiated a similar reassessment of the region, in similar fashion to what had 
simultaneously been transpiring in US policy in the Middle East. Only months after the 
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unsuccessful Bay of Pigs operation, launched to unseat Castro, the US, in its National 
Intelligence Estimate of November of 1961, painted a bleak picture of what the 
Betancourt government and Venezuela faced in the near future:  
The Betancourt administration…is opposed by extreme leftists, including 
the Communists and other Castro sympathizers, and also by rightist 
elements, but with the support of the armed forces, has survived repeated 
coup attempts, including several attempts to assassinate Betancourt. 
Despite the resources available to it, the Betancourt government is beset 
by severe financial problems resulting from (a) the end of the Venezuelan 
oil boom with a consequent decline in the growth of income from the 
petroleum industry, and (b) greatly increased expenditures for politically 
necessary social welfare programs. Its difficulties have been further 
complicated by a serious economic recession and heavy flight of 
capital…Popular dissatisfaction and impatience with the slow rate of 
economic improvement is likely to grow, especially in the congested urban 
areas. This dissatisfaction will provide the Communists and other 
revolutionary leftists with further opportunities for agitation against the 
regime. At the same time, distrust and dissatisfaction in business circles is 
likely to continue, and some rightists will continue to conspire with 
reactionary military elements to overthrow the regime. Thus Betancourt 
will remain under continuing threat from both the left and the right. 117 
 
Furthermore, Venezuela’s economic disorder had only recently worsened as a result of 
American oil import quotas, placed during the end of the Eisenhower administration to 
buttress support for US oil firms, also for the benefit of America’s immediate neighbors, 
Canada and Mexico. In this environment, while Betancourt’s political rule was not 
deemed to be existentially threatened, the myriad of difficulties he faced, most notably 
capital flight, 118 was feared to cause paralysis and obstruction in effective governance, 
                                                        
117 National Intelligence Estimate No. 89–61, 21 November 1961. “The Situation in Venezuela.” Secret. 3 
pp. CIA Files: Job 79–R01012A, ODDI Registry. 
118 Memorandum of conversation, February 20, 1963, between President Kennedy and President 
Bentancourt and other U.S. and Venezuelan officials. Flight of capital from Venezuela. Confidential. 2 pp. 
Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963. 
66 
 
while also limiting his chance to construct any effective post-revolutionary stability for 
his successor and the country writ large. 119 
 Yet, by far, the producing country that would become an OPEC member only two 
years after the establishment of the Organization, which faced the most dire economic, 
political, and security threats was Indonesia. Though not a founding member and not 
instrumental in the creation of OPEC, Indonesia’s importance as a battleground state 
within the wider Cold War went beyond its oil production. The country’s proximity to 
vital shipping lanes for the global economy only added to the natural significance it had 
as being an oil producer. But in the wake of the country’s hard fought independence 
against the Netherlands in 1949, the country’s newfound sovereignty could not be 
secured as parts of the country was ravaged from the independence war, while key 
sectors of its economy was still reliant upon the Dutch, with little indigenous 
manufacturing capability, mass societal poverty, ethnic tensions, and an uncertain 
political future. From the US standpoint, these issues were well known, not only because 
the US was instrumental in brokering the peace negotiations between the Netherlands and 
Indonesia, but due to, as in the aforementioned producing states, the threat of communist 
infiltration. This was clearly spelled out in the US National Security Council Report on 
its policy towards Indonesia in 1955, explicitly stating that the ‘loss of Indonesia to 
Communist control would have serious consequences for the US and the rest of the free 
world.’ 120 As the country was reeling from economic calamity after its war with the 
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Dutch, it reached out for aid to whomever would provide it, and thus, among the several 
political, cultural, and security assistance that the US was contemplating providing 
Indonesia, was assisting the country in ‘meeting its important economic problems and in 
countering attempted Communist economic penetration’.121  
 Amongst the many policies that the US was to pursue, the infusion of direct 
American aid became a staple of its policy towards Indonesia. Furthermore, during this 
period, the US treated the country’s political elite with kid gloves, as the dire economic 
situation in the country, was only made worse by growing ethnic tensions that America 
feared would lead towards the disintegration of the newly formed state. 122 Thus, when 
Indonesia, in the late 1950s, began expropriating critical infrastructure in the country 
from the Dutch, including oil infrastructure, and thus partially nationalizing them, the US 
reaction was very subdued due to the fear of Soviet exploitation of Indonesian anger 
against what the latter would feel was an antagonistic US position. And even in the face 
of an Indonesian administration that often was quite critical of the West, because of its 
history with colonialism, and had political parties in government that were openly 
sympathetic with the Soviet position, the US gradually began to provide Indonesia with 
modest military aid as well. 123 
 From Iran, to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia, to Venezuela, to Indonesia, the summation of 
acute economic, political, and security peril and uncertainty in these disparate countries, 
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ultimately created the conditions where more budgetary liquidity was needed by the host 
countries. This ultimately would become the catalyst for effective collusion amongst the 
significant oil producing countries.  
The Host Countries Act 
 From Collusion to Creating OPEC  
The simultaneous economic and political dynamics within the major oil producing 
countries of that would eventually become OPEC Members caused a systemic 
reassessment to how great powers in the free market economies, most consequentially the 
US, viewed the relationship amongst host governments, major IOCs, and themselves. In 
1960, the four countries of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia accounted for 
approximately 33% of global oil production 124 and synchronous instability within them, 
and the economic and security ramifications for the international system would have 
ranged from the severe to the catastrophic, especially if other important producers in the 
Middle East, such as Kuwait, also became unstable. This reassessment, primarily 
centered in the US, which had become the leader of the free market economies, due to the 
decline of European power after WWII, gradually created the rift in the strategic interests 
of the great powers with the major IOCs. While the latter were solely concerned about 
market share protection and constantly on guard at attempts by nationalist governments to 
appropriate the oil industry in producing host countries, the US, now the sole guarantor of 
the home-IOC-host nexus, had gradually developed other concerns.  
 The economic deterioration in many proto-OPEC states was not only viewed as a 
threat to free market economies, but also a grave security concern in the Cold War rivalry 
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with the USSR. Thus, while the major IOCs could in the past count on some type of 
general home government support, of which the US was the linchpin, to aid and assist 
their foreign operations, mainly because of supply access and market stability, the 
geopolitical contest between America and the Soviet Union and concurrent events in 
several producer states had now changed the formula wherein US policy was devised and 
implemented. 
 The US policy of ‘maximum flexibility’ towards the fallout of the 1958 Iraqi 
Revolution gradually expanded to oil producing countries in general. The host countries, 
though weak individually, understood the latent power of the “domino cascade” in the oil 
industry, especially in light of the 50/50 precedent. Moreover, they implicitly understood 
that regardless of the differences between them, and in the case of Venezuela and Middle 
Eastern producers, the vast distance, their respective interests as it related to greater 
control over their oil exports and remuneration was more readily achieved by collusion 
and unity. Under Betancourt, and partly as a reaction to the US import quotas, Venezuela, 
having never surrendered its ‘legislative prerogatives on taxation’ increased the 
government revenue from all of the country’s oil industry to close to ‘70% of net profits’. 
125  The Middle Eastern producers immediately took notice, and due to Venezuela’s 
preeminent position in the global oil industry at that time, in that the country was the 
world’s third largest crude producer, 126 the possibility of a renegotiation of the 50/50 
arrangement now seemed possible.  
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 A year after Venezuela’s new agitation, in 1959, the important producing 
countries of the Arab world, with the addition of Iran and Venezuela, met in Cairo and 
held what was dubbed the First Arab Petroleum Congress, which essentially was a 
meeting of the minds of host countries in hopes of finding a way to collectively revisit the 
50/50 arrangement that was no longer able to satisfy their domestic budgetary needs. 127 
On the sidelines of that meeting, under Venezuelan insistence and initiative, 
representatives of the five major host producing countries of the world – Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Venezuela, and Kuwait – came to an understanding to systemically collaborate 
with each other in order to change the contours of the profit sharing between the IOCs 
and the hosts.128  Yet, though they signed what was to become the MAADI Pact to 
facilitate collaboration amongst themselves, as the months dragged on, very little, if any 
came of the meeting. There was a simple explanation for this. Alirio Parra, a close 
assistant to Venezuelan Energy Minister, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, one of the 
signatories of the MAADI Pact (who was both instrumental in the early collaborations 
between producing countries and is considered as one of the Founding Fathers of OPEC), 
has stated that Pérez was the only official with his government’s backing and authority 
when that document was signed. 129 According to Parra, it was only after the major IOCs 
in August of 1960, further reduced the posted price, which only worsened the budgetary 
constraints of producing countries that the spirit of the MAADI Pact started to come to 
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fruition. 130 If anything, though the Pact was only a gentleman’s agreement in the months 
after it was signed, it did provide clarity to producing countries on the need for collusion, 
and the simultaneous willingness to do so. In Iraq, the economic pressures on Abdul 
Karim Qassim’s new Republican regime had already forced it to individually challenge 
the 50/50 arrangement with the concession holders of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). 
131 Though Qassim was able to enlarge Iraq’s profit shares to 60%, the fundamental 
problem for Iraq and the other hosts was not just the percentage of profits but also prices 
and the volume of exports, which was totally in the domain of the IOCs control. 
Immediately after the August 1960 posted price reduction by the IOCs, Qassim’s regime, 
already in heated negotiations with the IPC concession holders, decided to capitalize on 
the renewed sense of frustration amongst the host countries, and invited them to Baghdad, 
in hopes of empowering the earlier MAADI Pact into something tangible. Qassim’s 
invitation was particularly striking as the new Iraqi Republican regime was extremely 
suspicious of Iran and had earlier made territorial claims on Iran’s Khuzestan province 
and the whole of Kuwait. Yet, for the sake of expediency, Qassim’s Iraq understood that 
no effective, lasting cooperation between the producing countries could be achieved 
without active Iranian and Kuwaiti participation.    
 A month after the IOCs further reduced the posted price, in September of 1960, 
the 5 top host producing countries – Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait – 
met in Baghdad in hopes of formalizing a collaboration that would halt, and possibly 
reverse the declining posted price. As the representatives initiated what was to become an 
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intense dialogue, the formalization behind their collusion went further than simply an 
outcry by a collection of weak developing host countries. In OPEC’s first two 
Resolutions, I.1 and I.2, of which Fuad Rouhani, OPEC’s first Secretary General, has 
labeled the ‘embodiment’ of the Organization’s ‘constitution or charter’, 132 the Members 
laid out not only their principle complaints of the profit sharing arrangement that was 
fundamentally rooted in the concession system, but more so, what their primary 
intentions were in regards to the future of production. Resolutions I.1 and I.2 had four 
basic principles that once again altered the nature of the relations between producing 
countries and large, technologically advanced oil companies, but more so revolutionized 
the nature of the oil industry as a whole.  133 Firstly, the resolutions drew the direct 
linkage from IOC behavior to the internal economic and security conditions within OPEC 
Member states, in that it specifically stated that Members were simultaneously 
‘implementing much needed development programs’ ‘financed mainly from income 
derived from their petroleum exports’ and thus  ‘must rely on petroleum income to a 
large degree in order to balance their annual national budgets’. 134 The Members further 
stated that that ‘any fluctuation in the price of petroleum necessarily affects the 
implementation of the Member's programs and results in dislocation detrimental not only 
to their own economies, but also to those of all consuming nations.’  135 Secondly, the 
resolutions, for the first time in the history of the petroleum industry, announced a formal 
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declaration of Inter-state policy formulation and regulation of production by host 
countries. For years, the IOCs dealt with individual host countries separately, dividing 
them amongst themselves, playing one off against another, and severally impeding 
collective host state cooperation. Third, the resolutions explicitly sketched out a policy of 
economic protection for all Members in the face of possible IOC sanctioning a particular 
Member. The Members unambiguously stated that if such an event occurred against one 
Member state, the other Members would resist efforts to increase production at the 
detriment of the Member being sanctioned. And finally, the 5 Members of OPEC 
formally announced plans to increase membership with a clause that was tantamount to 
an open invitation to other producing states. With these four aims, the ‘principle aim’ of 
the nascent OPEC became clear: ‘the unification of petroleum policies for the Member 
Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding the interests of 
Member Countries, individually and collectively.’ 136 
Outside Actors 
  
 The US policy of ‘Conscious Indifference’; the fall of the Home-IOC-Host Nexus 
 
The news of formalized collusion amongst the 5 major host producers caused varying 
reactions amongst the home governments of the IOCs and the IOCs themselves, the 
former being dismissive while the latter being bewildered and apprehensive. The US 
Embassy in Baghdad transmitted a perfunctory report of the events in mid-September of 
1960, 137 and a week afterwards, at a meeting of the US National Security Council, 
President Eisenhower, in his last months in office, dismissed the importance of the 
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formation in its entirety, claiming that ‘anyone could break up the Organization by 
offering five cents more per barrel for the oil of one of the countries.’ 138 Because the 
initial impetus behind the Baghdad meeting was the August reduction in the posted price 
by the IOCs, the US drew the conclusion that formalized cooperation between the hosts 
could be nipped in the bud by peeling off one by individualized pricing deals, in order to 
isolate the others, ultimately to split the Organization, rendering its potential for 
effectiveness null and void.  
However, it was not until a few weeks after OPEC’s creation where the reaction 
of the IOCs could be gauged. It was here where the signs of possible divergence of 
perception were seen between the US government and the IOCs.  In meetings between 
the US State Department and certain IOCs on methods of dealing with Soviet oil export 
policies and the meaning of host state collusion under the newfangled OPEC umbrella, 
IOC executives were far more circumspect than the US government assessment. 139 Leo 
Welch, chairman of the board at Standard Oil of New Jersey, stated that OPEC’s 
formation and possible collusion on price and exports had far reaching negative 
ramifications for the oil industry, particularly for the IOCs. Specifically, Welch feared 
‘that the companies will be caught between producer country controls and the demands of 
consuming countries…[and that they] will no longer be able to manage their business in a 
normal way since the governments would take over the determination of oil prices, the 
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amounts of oil to be produced, and the destination of oil shipments.’ 140 Victor De Metz, 
chairman and director-general of Compagnie Française des Pétroles, expressed strong 
opposition to the groups formation for this very reason, due to the possibility that OPEC 
Member states would engage in the pro-rationing of output, 141  the same market 
manipulation scheme that the major IOCs had depended upon to keep intact the integrity 
of their cartel.  
Yet, this apprehension on the possibility of full cooperation was also coupled with 
the conventional IOC assessment of the then-current power of host countries. Pro-
rationing was greatly feared, but according to the IOCs, simply not viable at that time. 
Welch went onto to attest that while ‘OPEC has been set up in a preliminary form, … it 
has basic weaknesses which will prevent the development and administration of a 
restriction program.’ 142 These vulnerabilities had far more to do with not price, but more 
so with an integrated and collective output policy, in that OPEC Members had 
fundamentally differing assessments on how to integrate their oil output with the 
collective Organization’s macro output. Welch speculated that ‘Iran and Iraq would not 
be reliable members since they badly need increased output,’ while the other Members 
were strictly concerned about an increase to their falling royalties. 143 He went onto 
subscribe to Eisenhower’s policy of Member division early on, stating that the IOCs 
‘could work out arrangements with individual countries to meet their most pressing 
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problems.’ 144 However, Standard Oil of New Jersey evinced increasing concern about 
the future enlargement of the Organization, particularly as it related to Libya. During his 
meeting with the State Department, Welch revealed that Jersey executives were now in 
Libya ‘attempting to convince Libyan officials that they would have much to lose by 
joining OPEC’, claiming that as a result of becoming a Member, Libya ‘will have low 
cost oil favorably situated for the European market.’ 145    
Thus, IOCs recommended that the US government use its vast political influence 
to urge OPEC Members ‘to go slowly in completing the OPEC organization and 
implementing its program’, 146 and as Harold Wilkinson, Managing Director of Shell 
exhorted, ‘to convey to the appropriate governments concerned the thought that it would 
not be in their interest to unilaterally force private companies to act against their will.’ 147 
Yet, with this admonishment came also a threat. The IOC concession holders noted that 
in the event that they were forced to act against their economic interests in the host 
countries, not only could this affect ‘the whole climate of private investment’ 148 but also 
could engender retaliatory measures from ‘a bloc of powerful consuming countries’ while 
the IOCs would be forced to set free new supplies from untapped oil reserves, hence 
further weakening OPEC Member states. 149 
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However, as the US weighed its options, it quickly understood that its calculations, 
particularly in light of the emerging Cold War dynamics, were far more complicated than 
the IOCs assessment. Moreover, the lack of an effective Soviet response, for or against 
the creation of OPEC, caused even more confusion. Had the Members collusion simply 
played in the hand of the Soviets, there would have invariably been the same reaction 
from both IOCs and their host governments, as the Soviet Union was considered a 
detriment to the Western government’s strategic interests, while the increasing Soviet oil 
in the global economy was accurately viewed as a threat to the market dominance of the 
IOCs. Yet, OPEC’s creation have could have gone either way for the Soviet Union. The 
USSR could have hypothetically become a member of the newfangled Organization, as 
there would have been clear advantages for the Soviets to do so. Nevertheless, the latter 
could have equally have looked at OPEC as a rival to new markets, as the Soviet Union 
was looking to enhance its share of Europe’s consuming market – an intention they 
announced at the Second Arab League Petroleum Congress in Beirut only a few weeks 
prior, in October of 1960. 150 After all, it was the inclusion of new, Soviet oil in the 
market that caused the IOCs to continuously decrease the posted price, which is what was 
causing major damages to the economies of the host governments. Aggravating this was 
the fear of how economic and political calamity in the host countries, due to the lowering 
of the posted price, could lead to the downfall of various host governments, which, in the 
mind of many officials in the West, could easily lead to communist takeovers, and 
severally upgrade and enhance the strategic profile of the Soviet Union. As formalized 
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collaboration was happening at the international level, at the bilateral level, the US 
witnessed the governments of host countries, either directly or indirectly, ask for aid from 
Washington – all of which derived from the same economically based maladies, with 
subsequent security and political ramifications.  
In late November of 1960, after weighing the viewpoints of some major IOCs, the 
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armen Meyer, conveyed a thorough 
review of OPEC’s formation and the subsequent policy options that the US could 
reasonably pursue. Though Meyer conceded that the catalyst that triggered OPEC’s 
creation was the major oil companies reducing Middle East posted prices for crude oil, 
and to possibly ‘establish some form of joint pro-rationing,’ the weaknesses within the 
Organization, in line with the IOC assessment, rendered this aim ‘almost impossible to 
realize.’ 151 An underlying problem, according to the US perception, that plagued OPEC 
was that it did not have strength in numbers, particularly the absence of Libya and 
Algeria, not to mention other important producers. Meyer’s report essentially dismissed 
the possibility of Libyan and Algerian integration into the Group, as both were 
‘preoccupied in becoming major oil producers,’ meaning they needed private investment 
and could not afford to risk antagonizing the same sources of technology in terms of 
extraction and shipping, let alone the possessors of market access. 152  Furthermore, 
though Meyer cautioned that it would be extremely difficult for the US to publicly 
criticize OPEC's future pro-rationing of oil when the US engages in the same practice 
domestically, the ability for OPEC Members to engage in such pro-rationing policies was 
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not given, as there were ‘many obstacles in the way of parceling out each country’s share 
of the world’s oil market unless all producer and consumer countries are members of the 
same organization.’ 153 Nevertheless, Meyer cautioned that based upon the economic and 
political uncertainty in OPEC Member states, along with the persistent mistrust 
concerning Soviet intention concerning OPEC Member state dynamics and their own oil 
export policies, US policy options were more limited and constrained than in past eras: 
When the OPEC becomes a permanent functioning organization, the US 
will have three choices: (1) Support the organization. In the event the US 
should support OPEC, it would probably be necessary for us to revise 
existing antitrust laws to enable American oil companies to consult jointly 
when discussing prices with oil producing countries. It would also seem to 
violate our present policy that international commodity arrangements 
should allow for equal representation between consumer and producer 
countries. (2) Oppose OPEC. Should the US oppose the OPEC by pointing 
out its shortcomings (as suggested by several oil company representatives), 
it would undoubtedly antagonize the oil producing countries that have 
joined the organization. They would view this as unwarranted interference 
and as evidence that the US is working hand in glove with oil monopolies. 
It would probably strengthen OPEC and encourage member countries to 
take further measures to control the operations of the oil companies 
working in their respective countries. There is also the danger that the 
Soviet Union could exploit this antagonism. (3) Remain neutral. By not 
taking sides with regard to the OPEC, the US would be carrying out its 
existing policy of remaining in the background in matters affecting 
relations between oil companies and oil exporting nations and thus avoid 
intervening on behalf of American oil companies except in extreme cases 
involving questions of security of international law. This policy gives us 
the greatest flexibility and allows us to deal with petroleum matters on a 
case-by-case basis. 154 
 
Eventually, Meyer’s third policy option became the leitmotif of how the US would react 
to Organization’s formation, and later institutionalization. This policy of “conscious 
indifference” was further buttressed by the analysis contained within the US National 
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Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1960, where this assessment evolved. Within the broad 
evaluation of Middle East, the NIE forecasted three major trends. The first concerned the 
inevitable collapse of the conventionalized profit sharing arrangement, in that the US 
foresaw that the ‘Western oil companies will be further weakened by erosion of the 50/50 
profit sharing formula and by the joint efforts of the producing countries to control prices.’ 
155 The second trend concerned the fundamental incapability of OPEC Members, in the 
short term, to integrate a cooperative mechanism to fundamentally control prices and 
output – thus threatening major IOCs investment in their countries. The US assessment 
claimed that while ‘greater participation by local governments in the management of the 
oil companies is likely’, ‘large-scale nationalization of industry facilities is [not] 
probable’, hence ‘companies will [not] feel compelled to liquidate their interests in the 
area during the period of this estimate’.  156  US dismissiveness of OPEC was only 
partially due to the collective weakness of the Organization and the individual countries 
of the Group. The US also factored that, at least for the short-term, ‘any effective joint 
action by the producing states’, chiefly as it related to pro-rationing, would not take place, 
primarily ‘because of mutual jealousy and suspicion because of competing economic 
interests’, with the sole exception of the possibility of influencing the IOCs pricing 
arrangement. 157 Nevertheless, the longer term forecast brought much nuance to the US 
position, chiefly concerning the future survivability of the concessionary system that the 
Seven Sisters created: 
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…as the government of the producing countries gain greater influence in 
the management of the oil industry, there will probably be a growing 
number of cases in which their policies and desires conflict with those of 
the Western governments….Over the longer term, even broader problems 
are likely to emerge. The ultimate aim of some Middle Eastern officials 
and leaders is probably an arrangement whereby the present 
concessionary interests of the international oil companies in the area are 
eliminated and Western companies act at most only as agents of the 
producing countries. Such an arrangement would not necessarily preclude 
the supply of sufficient oil for Western Europe and of sufficient revenue for 
the Middle East. It might even alleviate certain political problems, which 
now confront the West in its relations with the producing countries— 
especially those which stem from the close association in the Middle 
Eastern mind of the companies with Western governments. 158 
 
While the US understood that eventually the concessionary arrangements would be 
abolished, it did not view this possibility any longer as a threat to the interests of the West, 
let alone to US interests, so long as ‘a surrender or large-scale withdrawal of Western 
company interests under pressure’ which would be ‘a setback for Western prestige’, did 
not take place. 159 Hence, the host countries gradual exaction of control over the price 
formulation in the short-term, and the measured appropriation of the entire oil industry in 
their countries in the long term, as long as it was not abrupt or humiliating, and did not 
create market instability, was a scenario that the US government, the principle power 
within the free market economies, could live with. And with the arrival of this consensus, 
the home-IOC-host state nexus began the gradual process of disintegration.  
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CHAPTER II • THE INFANCY PHASE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF OPEC 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1961-1969 
 
 
The unique confluence of circumstances in the early 1960s created the space for OPEC to 
be formed without the prior backlash that was visited upon certain individual producing 
countries seeking concessional revisionism. Specifically these were the following: the 
changing nature within the supply and demand dynamics in the global oil industry, the 
distinct economic and security circumstances within OPEC Member States, and the 
beginnings of the breakdown of the home-IOC-host nexus. In the Infancy phase of 
OPEC’s institutional life, many of these same factors that contributed to the 
Organization’s formation carried over, evolving and expanding in their complexity.  
 This rendered many openings for the institutionalization of OPEC, and its 
development into a legitimate international organization that the international oil 
companies (IOCs), major powers, and other important global institutions eventually had 
to take seriously. Though during this period, as Bassam Fattouh has noted, “OPEC acted 
as a trade union whose main objective was to prevent the income of its member countries 
from declining,” 160  it managed to integrate many of the contradictions between its 
Members domestic priorities and inter-Member rivalries with that of the collective 
Organization’s stated objective of price and export collaboration. 
 Within this phase, the determinants that created the conditions for OPEC’s 
formation became fully distinguishable and interactive, affecting both the Organization’s 
behavior and how other actors interacted with it. Pertaining to Market Forces, the same 
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supply and demand dynamics that forced the IOCs to continue to devalue the posted price 
of crude (to keep market share dominance), were creating major ripple effects within the 
international system. As cheap Soviet oil began to expand into the market, complemented 
by the rise of smaller, independent oil firms, which were successful in bringing online 
new sources of crude, the IOCs found themselves devoid of other options than to keep the 
posted prices low. The damage that this was causing to OPEC Member states, and other 
significant producers in the third world, now become fully embedded in the macro 
geopolitical environment of the time, namely the Cold War. Thus, the impact of Outside 
Actors on OPEC, particularly of America as the guarantor of the home-IOC-host nexus, 
underwent a major transformation during this period. The reigning Cold War dynamics 
and the fear of Soviet exploitation of instability within the third world gradually 
broadened the strategic concerns of the West towards political and economic issues. 161 
And in light of the acute economic and security crises that were transpiring within OPEC 
Member states, Washington gradually evolved from its policy of conscious indifference 
to OPEC’s creation, to the inevitable conscious acceptance of the Organization, later to 
be complemented by active engagement with the Group.  
 The gradual divergence that occurred between the major IOCs and the Western 
powers, exacerbated by the internal economic instability within OPEC Member States, 
had a direct impact on the relations with the Organization. The Interstate relations of 
OPEC Members provided much of the rationale for delay and deadlock. However, they 
also led to the expansion of the Group and its formalized institutionalization throughout 
much of the 1960s, in order to collectively challenge what Members felt were the abuses 
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of the reigning concessionary system. This ultimately led to action in the form of two 
tracks of negotiations for more suitable profit sharing arrangements for producers. The 
first track was individual negotiations between Members and the particular consortium 
that operated in their territories – primarily because of the unique traits of each 
concessionary agreement. Later, the negotiations evolved to collective talks with the 
IOCs, as the Organization developed a formalized mechanism to present their demands to 
the major oil firms. A main ramification of this process in the Intrastate dynamics of each 
State was the rise of the national oil companies (NOCs) within individual Member States. 
In the years ahead, they would gradually replace the technical aspects of exploration, 
production, and transit of OPEC crude oil. It was the merging of these four key 
determinants in this period that eventually ended one era in the history of the oil industry, 
while heralding the beginning of another, leaving the IOCs in a much weaker and isolated 
position. This process was visible in negotiations between OPEC Member states and the 
IOCs throughout the 1960’s, culminating in the Organization’s collective declaratory 
nationalization in June of 1968, to be implemented at the beginning of the next period of 
OPEC’s institutional life. 162  
Market Forces:  
 The IOCs fight to save their market dominance 
 
From the beginning of the 1960s, the IOCs found themselves between two irreconcilable 
trends that were threatening their short-term market share dominance, with the potential 
to erode their power over the very global industry they helped create. As cheap Soviet oil, 
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in addition to the new sources of supply from the independents, gradually crept into the 
market, fostering a much less regulated, free market, the IOCs were forced to expand 
output in hopes of drowning out competitors, while also keeping the posted price of crude 
at low rates. Already, by 1960, the IOCs had witnessed their domination over global 
crude oil production outside of Canada, the USSR, China, and the US noticeably decline 
from 85% possession to 72%. 163 Though the increase in production outside the majors’ 
control and the subsequent lowering of the posted price became the impetus behind the 
creation of OPEC, the Organization’s formation was not the only unintended 
consequence of how the major IOCs addressed the problem of new competition. As 
stated previously, while OPEC’s formation caused much alarm to the IOCs and caused 
confusion to Western powers, from a macroeconomic perspective, as Fadhil Chalabi, 
OPEC’s former General Secretary has argued, the creation of the Organization essentially 
slowed the growing instability within the global oil industry. 164 Chalabi makes the case 
that had the “fierce competition of price cuts in a free market not been curbed by some 
form of restrictive regulation, the continued slashing of prices would have led to a level 
of competition harmful to the industry and to the major oil companies themselves.” 165 
Though the Organization would gradually challenge the IOCs in new ways, its initial 
establishment helped stem the tide of continued mass price erosion, which would 
invariably have major negative consequences for both companies and producing 
countries. 
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 Yet, by the time of the Group’s founding, and well into the 1960s, certain trends 
had already begun to take shape that the IOCs would not be able to control in the long-
term. In the year of OPEC’s founding, the share of global oil production from what were 
to become the five initial Members of the Organization was 37.58%, which was wholly 
controlled by the Seven Sisters, plus the French Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP). 
166  Total global oil production in 1960 amounted to roughly 21 billion barrels. The 
market flooding policies of the IOCs, with the steady increase in Soviet output and that of 
the independents caused the world to witness an unprecedented surplus, so that by the 
end of the decade, in effect the end of the Infancy period, global production was almost 
double that of 1960. 167  
 Despite the fact that the IOCs were successful at keeping their competitors at 
bay, they were also in a race against time, for the short-term achievement of their output 
policies in order to keep intact their cartel’s integrity was more of a pyrrhic victory than a 
lasting solution. The 1960 reduction in the posted price, from roughly $1.90 to $1.80 per 
barrel (which being adjusted for inflation in 2013 would be $14.84 to $14.06), 168 could 
not be increased by reason of the new presence of the USSR and the independent oil 
companies.  
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 The IOCs’ responses to new competition, which directly contributed to the 
decrease of the revenues of producing countries at a critical juncture in their economic 
and security development, not only began to build mass resentment within OPEC but also 
led to further unintended ramifications. Though causing much economic pain to OPEC 
Members, the IOCs’ oil war against the USSR and the independents had the converse 
effect of gradually increasing the importance of the Organization’s Member states to the 
global oil industry (See Figure 2.1). During this period, as the IOCs increased output 
volume, much of which came from Member states, OPEC’s collective share of global oil 
production substantially increased from its 1960 figure of 37.58%, – when it had only 5 
Members – to approximately 49% in 1969 – when its membership increased to 9 
Members (See Figure 2.2). 169  
 By the early 1970s, more than half of total global oil output came from OPEC.  
The net result, as will be discussed in the subsequent sections, was to increase OPEC’s 
collective bargaining position vis-à-vis the major IOCs in rearranging both the terms of 
the concessions and the pricing systems. Thus, in challenging the new Soviet and 
independent oil firms for continued market share dominance, primarily at the expense of 
OPEC Member states, the IOCs not only created the impetus for the Organization’s 
formation, but also its internal expansion, increasing the importance of OPEC to the 
global economy, which the Organization later leveraged to its benefit. 
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Figure 2.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Members joined the Organization. 1960-1971 (1000 b/d)  
Source: OPEC Statistical Data . http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Iran (Founding Member) 1,067.7 1,202.2 1,334.5 1,491.3 1,710.7 1,908.3 2,131.8 2,603.2 2,839.8 3,375.8 3,829.0 4,539.5
Iraq(Founding Member) 972.2 1,007.1 1,009.2 1,161.9 1,255.2 1,312.6 1,392.2 1,228.1 1,503.3 1,521.2 1,548.6 1,694.1
Kuwait (Founding Member) 1,691.8 1,735.0 1,957.8 2,096.3 2,301.0 2,360.3 2,484.1 2,499.8 2,613.5 2,773.4 2,989.6 3,196.7
Saudi Arabia (Founding Member) 1,313.5 1,480.1 1,642.9 1,786.0 1,896.5 2,205.3 2,601.8 2,805.0 3,042.9 3,216.2 3,799.1 4,768.9
Venezuela (Founding Member) 2,846.1 2,919.9 3,199.8 3,247.9 3,392.8 3,472.9 3,371.1 3,542.1 3,604.8 3,594.1 3,708.0 3,549.1
Qatar (joined 1961) 177.2 186.2 191.5 215.3 232.6 291.3 323.6 339.5 355.5 362.4 430.7
Indonesia (joined 1962) 453.4 444.0 456.6 480.6 464.6 505.4 600.7 742.3 853.6 892.1
Libya (joined 1962) 182.3 441.8 862.4 1,218.8 1,501.1 1,740.5 2,602.1 3,109.1 3,318.0 2,760.8
UAE (joined 1967) 382.1 496.6 627.8 779.6 1,059.5
Algeria (joined 1969) 946.4 1,029.1 785.4
Nigeria (joined 1971) 1,531.2
Non OPEC Production 13109.8 13887.2 14363.5 15175.5 16053.7 17072.4 18649.4 19747.2 20708.0 21418.3 22981.4 22693.2
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Figure 2.2: Shares of global oil production between OPEC & non OPEC producers: 1960-1971 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data . http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of the US Under Secretaries on Foreign 
Economic Policies in December of 1961. In what was alluded to as the “broad 
international problem” concerning the global oil industry, the participants stated:   
… that not only does the Free World get two-thirds of its oil from the 
Middle East now but that 50 years from now it will probably be even more 
dependent …. From the security standpoint of our longer-term interest in 
the broadest sense, we must consider what kind of arrangements we can 
work out to insure Free World access to Middle East oil. Already we have 
an irrational situation in the Middle East producing and distributing 
situation. It is irrational not only economically but politically. The 
international oil companies within the borders of these countries are in a 
position to dominate completely the political life of the countries because 
the companies are the source of the bulk of the Governments' revenues. 
The companies are earning enormous amounts of money and this is 
resented. This makes them a likely target for the worst kind of attack on 
political and economic grounds. On the other end of the spectrum, the 
companies themselves are faced with all kinds of problems. They are faced 
with the surpluses of stocks and capacity, with increasing competition of 
substitutes, with new oil discoveries which jeopardize their traditional 
markets, with competition from Soviet oil, with having to use their Middle 
East profits to cover costs of explorations elsewhere that prove sterile, 
with the constant demand of the Middle East Governments for a larger 
share of oil revenue, and with no flexibility on prices. These all add up to 
a serious state of tension. As a result our oil companies are handicapped 
in other less developed countries where the Soviets use cheap oil and oil 
exploration to penetrate the countries. Shall Western companies try to 
compete with the Soviets in price?...The companies are in difficulty on 
exploratory concessions. They come in and spend lots of money and if they 
don't find oil, they are faced with the charge that they didn't really want to 
as it would have cut down on their Middle East profits. Then the less 
developed countries say they will ask the Soviets to come in. The 
companies are scared of OPEC because they don't think the people 
running it have a sufficient understanding of the economies of oil. They 
are frightened that the OPEC Governments will put international 
prorationing into effect. Then there is the problem of the European 
countries in connection with the Soviet oil offensive. The average person 
in Italy gets his oil cheaper because Italy is importing Soviet oil. 
Industrialists in Europe can produce at less cost because of Soviet oil. It is 
hard, under those circumstances, to work up resistance to imports of 
Soviet oil. Our argument has to be the danger of dependence on Soviet oil. 
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170 
What Washington realized a year after OPEC’s founding was that cheap Soviet oil in 
addition to alternative supplies from independent firms, were creating new market 
conditions that the majors could no longer control in the long term. This was already 
having consequential geostrategic effects in vital European and developing countries. 
Though the IOCs’ increase in production was helping to keep the Soviets and 
independents at bay, there were still what amounted to be losses in key theatres, 
particularly the growing dependence of some critical markets on cheap Soviet oil and 
other new suppliers.  
The resulting surplus in the market in turn exacerbated the internal economic 
conditions within OPEC Members that were beginning to take shape before the 
Organization’s founding. The IOCs were simply not in the position to increase prices, as 
to offset OPEC Member states’ growing, albeit differing, budgetary liquidity problems. 
And because the US dramatically feared Soviet exploitation in countries that were 
undergoing economic and political instability, evinced by US financial and political 
intervention in post-WWII Europe in the form of the Marshall Plan, 171 its policy of 
neutrality between OPEC and the oil companies became increasingly strained.  
US Aid 
 The beginning of Indirect American influence within OPEC 
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Realizing that the major firms could not fundamentally reverse the price erosion of recent 
years, and being equally aware of the mounting fiscal and security pressures upon OPEC 
Member states, the US began to strategically shift to a more activist policy towards 
OPEC Members and those that would eventually join the Organization. This 
repositioning by the US, culminated in two trends during the 1960s: the beginning  (or 
significant enhancement) of US economic and military aid to some key OPEC Member 
states and later, the gradual, albeit reluctant, role of the US as a silent broker to the 
negotiations between OPEC Members and the IOCs on concessional revisionism.  
 Due to the varying budgetary problems affecting governance matters, and in the 
case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, distinct security threats that required significant state 
resources to address, key OPEC Members, starting from the late 1950s, individually 
began asking the US for economic and security aid. Although it had received significant 
US assistance since the ouster of Prime Minister Mossadegh to buttress its staggering 
economy, the aid that Iran was receiving was set to expire. As the Kennedy 
administration took office in January of 1961, one of the earliest communications that 
President John F. Kennedy received was from the Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, written on the 26th of January 1961, which was a plea for enhanced economic 
and military aid. 172 
  In his communications in the subsequent months, the Iranian monarch 
consistently reminded the US president that his regime was “trying very hard to put 
[Iran’s] house in order,” having “adopted stern measures to achieve a healthy economic 
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and financial situation.” 173 Yet, according to the Shah, “in order to remain under the 
present difficult situation and against the pressure of international communism” Iran 
needed, “both in the economic and military fields…continued American help, or rather, 
in all earnestness, for increasing American help.” 174  
Furthermore, in addition to the challenges within the Iranian economy and the 
threats coming from the USSR, the Shah explicitly mentioned the threat from Soviet-
aligned regional Arab regimes, specifically how they were receiving funding and military 
assistance from Moscow, and their attempted interventions in Iran’s domestic affairs. 175 
To the Shah, both of these processes threatened to tilt the regional security architecture 
against Iran. 176 And though some within the US administration were skeptical about 
continual, let alone enhanced aid to Iran insisting that “through a variety of unpleasant 
measures the Iranian budget can be handled without the crutch of US budgetary 
assistance,” 177 ultimately, the administration relented to the Iranian request.  
The Shah’s repeated pleas was only buttressed by the recommendations of the US 
National Security Council’s Task Force on Iran, sketched out in their report, "A Review 
of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the National Security Council", which 
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recommended a robust economic and military assistance package to blunt the economic 
problems and security threats facing the country. 178  
As a result, the US decided to forgo the upcoming cancellation of aid to Iran, and 
assured the Shah with a five-year aid plan. Though economic aid to Iran steadily 
decreased from the post-coup period, it was only countered by a major increase in 
military aid – which was where the brunt of the Shah’s concerns lay. Indeed, Iran, by far, 
was the highest recipient of US aid to the Members of the Organization from 1960-1970, 
totaling $7.2 billion (in 2011 figures) (See Figures 2.3 & 2.4). This same pattern was 
applied to other Member states. Indonesia, which joined the Organization in 1962, had 
for years been a recipient of US aid. Nevertheless, from the mid-1960s to the end of the 
decade, it witnessed a dramatic increase, totaling $4.2 billion, mostly economic in nature, 
making it the second largest recipient of US assistance in OPEC.    
As in the cases of other Members, Washington’s fear of Soviet exploitation of the 
dire economic and security conditions within Indonesia became the principle driving 
force behind US aid.  179 This was only exacerbated by a strong domestic presence of 
communist political parties and the fact that Indonesia’s Sukarno government was openly 
receiving aid from the Soviet Union, placing Washington in a position where it had to 
compete with Soviets in Indonesia. 180  In addition to assistance, the US played an active 
                                                        
178 National Security Council, 15 May, 1961, folder “Iran: General, 15 May 1961,” Papers of John F. 
Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. (#3), Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library. 
179 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia & Memorandum From Secretary 
of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 22 April 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 
Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia 
180 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 7 March 1961, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia & Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 13 October 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–
95 
 
role on behalf of Indonesia with its dealings in International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
with other important institutions, to facilitate the country’s development plans. 181 
In Venezuela, under the Betancourt administration, and in reaction to declining oil 
revenues, the government also had explicitly asked Washington for aid, 182 and was able 
to secure $1.6 billion in economic and military aid over the decade. Saudi Arabia, with its 
more pressing security concerns as a result of the instability within Yemen, the Iraqi 
Revolution of 1958, and the continuous hostility from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s UAR 
government eventually garnered the “full United States support for the maintenance of 
Saudi Arabia’s integrity, ” 183 with the addition of $1.2 billion in military aid in the same 
period. Even Iraq, whose political elite, after its revolution, had great suspicion towards 
the US and its regional intentions, received, albeit a very small package, a little more than 
$150 million in US aid in the 1960s. In total, US aid to OPEC Member states, from 1960-
1970, was roughly $8.5 billion in the economic sphere and $7.6 billion in military 
assistance.    
Though the rationale behind American aid was initially a stopgap measure to 
stabilize these critical producing countries, and also motivated by concerns regarding 
Soviet intentions towards these states, the purpose of aid eventually evolved. In part, the 
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US realized that as OPEC was beginning to create its internal decision-making organs 
where the diversity of its Members’ policies could be streamlined into a macro 
institutional policy, the possibility of more forceful demands from the Organization on 
the IOCs could not be ruled out. And as negotiations between OPEC and the IOCs were 
beginning to take shape shortly after the establishment of the Organization, albeit on an 
individual basis between the concession holders in a particular country and that 
respective government, collective negotiations through the Organization could possibly 
become inevitable.  
The US could not afford to remain indifferent to such an event, but as stated 
previously, was unable to take an active position, either for or against the Organization.  
Thus, with the aid that was being given to OPEC states, although on a case-by-case basis, 
the US intended to generate some modicum of influence within the Organization. In 
doing so, as was recommended by the Eisenhower administration and some IOCs in the 
year of OPEC’s founding, the US sought to exploit the natural divisions concerning each 
Members’ outlook on the concessionary system, and according to the unique 
vulnerabilities that each state had. Naturally, the Members that would end up receiving 
the most aid and security guarantees from Washington would become the vehicle wherein 
US policy preferences and concerns would appear within the Organization.  
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Figure 2.3: U.S.  Economic Aid to OPEC Member States: 1950-1971 (adjusted to 2011 $ figures) 
*Angola, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE did not obtain Aid during this period. Source: USAID 
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Figure 2.4: U.S.  Military Aid to OPEC Member States: 1950-1971 (adjusted to 2011 $ figures) 
*Algeria, Angola, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE did not obtain Aid during this period. Source: USAID 
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Intrastate Dynamics 
The economic dilemmas facing OPEC Members were not the only internal factors that 
impacted how outside forces would deal with the Organization in the beginning years of 
its institutional life. Gradually, these concerns broadened to exclusively political matters 
as well.  During this period, two major developments within the internal domestic climate 
of OPEC Member states proved to be consequential. The first centered on the political 
typology of OPEC Member States, fundamentally impacting the relationship between 
Member States and outside actors, and the larger international system. The second 
concerned the rise of the National Oil Companies within Member states. The 
governmental entrance in the producing countries production and export policies would 
eventually affect how OPEC would function as a unitary entity vis-à-vis the major 
international oil companies, and how the individual constituents of the Group ultimately 
dealt with the nationalization of their hydrocarbon resources. 
The Domestic Political Landscape  
Up until this period, it was only Iran and Iraq that had consequential domestic 
governance changes: for Iran, the rise and fall of Mohammad Mossadegh and the 
reassertion of the Pahlavi monarchy; for Iraq, the 1958 military overthrow of the 
Hashemite dynasty and the creation of Republican Iraq under military rule. Yet, during 
the 1960s, with the exception of Venezuela that had a stable democratic transition from 
the Betancourt administration (1959-1964) to the Leoni administration (1964-1969), 
which continued the same economic structural reforms as its predecessor, 184 every other 
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Member had far-reaching alterations within the socio-political dynamics of their 
respective countries.  
From 1960-1969, of the nine Member States of OPEC, five experienced change of 
governments via coup d'états – some of which were bloodless (namely Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and Algeria), while others were bloody (namely Iraq and Indonesia).  In time, the 
arrival of new political orders or altered socio-political conditions within Member 
countries had a far-reaching effect on how crude oil production was utilized for the 
economic health of their countries by each respective government, and also their 
respective roles within OPEC. For Kuwait, Qatar, Algeria, and what eventually became 
the UAE, it was in this Infancy phase when their independence as sovereign states was 
established. In many ways, what happened during this period on the socio-political level 
not only laid the groundwork for the future internal and external political behaviors of 
these countries, but also their impact upon OPEC unity, and when the time came, disunity. 
While the domestic political developments in each country were important, both for the 
particular Member state and eventually the Organization, in Iran, Iraq, and Libya they 
proved to be the most consequential for the future of OPEC.  
 In Iran, a reinvigorated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, having secured aid from the US 
but also keen on diminishing any type of threat to his rule, began, in the early 1960s, the 
process of implementing his ‘White Revolution’ in Iranian society. This dramatic plan 
was advertised as an attempt to modernize Iranian society, both socially and 
economically, in which the government would address such issues as woman’s rights, 
economic growth predicated upon the Western capitalist model, and a restructuring of 
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land ownership. 185 To embark on such modernization plans, the Shah heavily relied on 
US aid, which Iran was receiving at that time – chiefly US military aid – which allowed 
the Shah to spend more domestically. However, the practical results of the Shah’s efforts 
was to erode the power of the traditional, land-owning aristocracy, thus lessening the 
likelihood of political competition, creating the conditions where Iran’s urban middle 
class would be politically disarmed by becoming invested in the Shah’s reforms. 186 And 
this would transpire as the Pahlavi regime created a new middle class from Iran’s 
peasantry that would invariably become dependent upon the government. Naturally, 
many within Iranian society protested these dramatic measures. While this process was 
underway, the Shah targeted the domestic forces within Iran that could be characterized 
on the political left, and the small groups that were deemed sympathetic to the USSR. Yet, 
with time, the ramification of these policies, although bringing some tangible material 
benefit to the poor, were essentially to renew resistance to the Shah, and in the process 
create a religious based opposition that would eventually fuse their grievances against the 
gradually authoritarian bent of the Shah’s regime. 187  As we will be discussed 
subsequently, while the Shah would become the moderating influence within OPEC, 
particularly during the negotiations between the Organization and the IOCs, it was this 
very program, along with other modernization efforts, and his desire for a massive 
overhaul of the Iranian armed forces that would eventually reorient his government’s 
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thinking on the profit sharing arrangements with the IOCs, the very continuity of the 
concessionary arrangements, and the overall price of crude oil.  
 In Iraq, the overthrow of the Hashemite dynasty, two years before the creation of 
OPEC, had brought about both confusion and worry among the conservative monarchial 
Middle Eastern governments allied with the West, and for the US itself. Initially, the 
American perception concerning the 1958 Revolution was at best mixed, primarily 
because of the contradictory moves that Iraq’s new post-monarchial leader, General Abd 
al-Karim Qasim, made during the first few months. The US preliminary assessment was 
not that he was fully aligned with the Soviet Union, although with his arrival, Iraq did 
leave the Baghdad Pact and ostensibly warmed relations with the USSR. The American 
discernment of Qasim’s move was viewed as either being domestically forced upon him 
to adjust his foreign policies or an unwillingness or inability to stand against those 
looking to balance relations vis-à-vis the US and the Soviet Union. 188 However, on a 
regional level, the assessment of Republican Iraq quickly deteriorated, though Baghdad 
had initially reached out to regional countries that would eventually become OPEC 
Members and even hosted the first OPEC conference. Qasim’s continuing annexation 
threats against Kuwait, which came to a head in the wake of the latter’s independence in 
1961 (forcing Kuwait to ask for British military assistance), and his territorial claims 
against Iran’s Khuzestan, gradually created enmity towards Iraq among differing, and at 
times rival regional actors. Moreover, the domestic balancing act that he was forced to 
undertake in order to pacify the coalition of disparate constituencies in Iraqi society 
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ultimately proved paralyzing to his rule. And his inability to solve the country’s 
economic crisis, by extracting more concessions from the major IOCs that held the 
consortium in Iraq further undermined his rule. With time, the US not only became 
gradually suspicious of his rule, but also eventually reached out to domestic forces within 
Iraq that sought to remove Qasim, who at that time was the Prime Minister.  
When the Ramadan Revolution of 1963 took place, initiated by the Baath Party 
within Iraq, there is evidence that while the US may not have been overtly complicit in 
the removal of Qasim (in the same manner that the US and UK engineered the coup 
against Mossadegh), it certainly stood by and did not impede the Baathists as they took 
control over the country. 189 Moreover, immediately afterwards, the US did provide Iraq 
with a modest amount of economic assistance, which included access to US military 
hardware, credits for agricultural surpluses for credit under Public Law 480, and Export-
Import Bank loans. 190  Though not known at the time, the Ramadan Revolution, 
ultimately led to a 5-year interim of national, and often bloody, political turmoil where 
pro-Nasserite and pro-Baathist forces fought for control over the country, culminating in 
the consolidation of the Baathist Party in 1968, led Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his 
ambitious deputy, Saddam Hussein. Needless to say, the latter’s political rise would not 
only change the face of the political and social direction of the country, but would have 
profound ramifications for the future of OPEC’s unity and for the Middle East in the 
years ahead.  
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In Libya, when the coup against King Idris happened in September of 1969, the 
country’s oil production, though modest, was not a major factor in the total OPEC output, 
and certainly not global output. For this reason, at the outset, there were very little 
political reverberations outside Libyan borders. The US’ initial assessment of the young 
military officers behind the coup was that they showed “some moderation”, promising to 
“protect foreign interests, including oil companies.”  191 However, the US understood that, 
similar to the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 – where a monarch was overthrown by the 
military – the political change in the country had “created a precedent which will not be 
forgotten” and that “the moderate posture of the Libyan regime is probably temporary,” 
with caveat being that there were no “good grounds” for forecasting if or when the new 
government would settle into a policy. 192 The CIA specifically based their assessment on 
past military-dominated revolutionary regimes in Arab World, citing that “without 
exception”, the political order after the former regimes tended to be “more leftist and 
extreme with the passage of time.” 193 With this cautious assessment, American leaders, 
along with the British, chose to move towards recognition of the political change in Libya, 
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194 even as some US regional allies were alarmed by the American passivity towards the 
coup. 195 
Yet, weeks after Idris’ downfall, the US perception of the political change in 
Tripoli dramatically worsened. The new regime’s behavior quickly became hostile to 
both Western enterprises and towards American and British military bases within their 
country, changing Washington’s characterization of the “new Libyan government as 
insecure, inexperienced, xenophobic,” and “perhaps divided but as yet without visible 
opposition.” 196 Subsequently, Washington ordered a thorough revision of its policies 
towards Libya, ranging from cutting off of relations to overt acts of economic and even 
military hostility. 197 But even in the American NIE of December of 1969, the US still 
had not developed a clear picture of the changed political order in Libya and particularly 
of Libya’s new young military ruler, Muammar Qaddafi. For Washington, and by 
extension its European allies, the primary issues of concern were the new government’s 
interaction with Western oil firms, most of which were the smaller independents, and its 
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ongoing negotiations with Tripoli concerning foreign military installations. 198 It would 
take a few more months, well into the early 1970s, for the West, fellow OPEC Members, 
and the wider global economy to gauge the real impact of the Libyan Revolution of 1969.  
OPEC as an institution initially viewed what transpired in the disparate domestic 
contexts of these three Member states, as well as others, as solely internal matters. 
Throughout the Organization’s first decade, in its biannual and emergency meetings and 
its resolutions, there was scant mention of domestic political developments. As will be 
discussed in the next section, the negotiations that Member states were involved in with 
the IOCs, later to become collective negotiations, was the main focus of OPEC’s 
organizational concerns in this critical, Infancy period. However, the seeds that were 
sown during this period, particularly within these three countries, would have a lasting 
impact for both the way OPEC would operate in the 1970s and for the long-term unity of 
the Organization.  
The Beginnings of the National Oil Companies  
The second critical internal development within the political and economic dynamics of 
OPEC Member states was the genesis of the National Oil Companies (NOCs). The 
mechanism where host countries would gradually exact ownership of the oil industries 
within their territories, which mostly became institutionalized by reason of their domestic 
laws and later collectively as OPEC policy, is inextricably linked to the development of 
what became the Member states’ NOCs.  While NOCs had very little impact on actual 
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production during this institutionalization period, negotiations between Members and the 
IOCs were laying the groundwork and rationale for creating a national entity that would 
ultimately replace the vital role of the foreign firm in the producing countries. During the 
first decade of OPEC’s institutional life the NOCs were either enhanced from their earlier, 
rudimentary forms (such as the case with Iran and Saudi Arabia), begin the process of 
creation by their respective governments, or established in full (See Figure 2.5).  
The NOCs of each Member State, though differing in the particular contexts in 
which they were born, all had one main driving force behind them: the desire by the 
Member state government for more control over the crude oil that they exported, which 
also affected subsidiary issues such as price and market access.  199  Nevertheless, one 
fundamental distinction became important in both the effectiveness and strength of the 
NOCs to be a viable alternative to the more technologically advanced IOCs and the 
‘acceptance’ of the respective NOC in the global economy. And this had everything to do 
with how the process of state control took place. As Valerie Marcel has noted, the NOCs 
in “the developing world emerged either from nationalization, taking over the 
expropriated assets of the foreign oil companies, or from ‘participation’ agreements in 
which the national oil company gradually filled the shoes of the foreign oil company as 
the state purchased the company’s assets." 200     This fundamental distinction is crucial, 
for it concerns how the respective NOC came about from the larger process of give and 
take with the IOCs during the negotiations of the 1960s for rearranging the profit sharing 
agreements. In other words, what was the climate surrounding nationalization? Was it 
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one in which there was a gradual recognition by both producing country and the majors 
firms that the respective government, in the post-WWII era, for reasons relating to 
prestige, sovereignty, legitimacy, and viability, needed to possess control over their own 
oil resources, and thus a more modern business relationship needed to be established? Or 
was the way in which nationalization implemented by the host government one which led 
to animosity or even material loss for outside enterprises, without compensation. 
While full nationalization came about in the 1970s – with varying specific dates 
for each Member – the conditions for nationalization were set by how each Member’s 
NOC was established. And this latter circumstance fundamentally affected the 
negotiations of the 1960s. Near the end of the 1960s, as talks seemed unable to address 
the main budgetary dilemmas that plagued the producers, thus laying the groundwork for 
OPEC’s collective declaratory nationalization resolution of June of 1968, the Members’ 
NOC began the process of formal institutional collusion – both in relation to the 
Organization and among themselves.     
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Figure 2.5 OPEC National Oil Companies in their developmental stage 
•Est. 1951. Unilateral 
nationalization - 1953.
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in 1975
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Interstate Dynamics 
 Organizational Enlargement and Negotiation  
 
The combination of the reduction in the posted price of crude with the wider 1960s oil 
glut was beginning to turn OPEC into a magnet for other producers to join, especially 
from the Third World. While large, developed economies with hydrocarbon reserves 
most likely either internally possessed or had access to the technology to recover, 
produce, and export their crude oil, developing countries – specifically those that were 
not major producers – had more limited options. A developing country seeking to exploit 
its reserves, even in the 1960s, had essentially three choices: invite one or more of the 
major IOCs to join a consortium agreement, look towards the USSR for assistance (but 
risk engendering American antagonism), or attract the newly arrived independent oil 
companies for assistance (which were far less technologically sophisticated than the 
former two). These choices were particularly stark for newly independent countries with 
little experience exercising sovereignty. However, whatever approach they chose to 
pursue (and many times these approaches were not mutually exclusive), several 
producing countries became attracted to the concept of a large international organization 
run by countries from the developing world, that would, at least in name, become a forum 
where their voices were heard, and more importantly, their economic interests could be 
protected. 
Because for some future Members, as the Organization was older than their 
independence, the decision to join OPEC was one of the first acts of sovereignty that 
some Member states undertook.  Within a year after OPEC’s founding, the tiny Persian 
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Gulf emirate of Qatar, with but modest exports, applied for membership and was 
accepted without delay.201 This was particularly important because Qatar, like the other 
Persian Gulf kingdoms, except for Saudi Arabia, was still in the process of obtaining, or 
in this case, being given independence by the British as they gradually withdrew East of 
Suez. The following year, 1962, newly independent Libya, still in the developmental 
phase of its oil infrastructure, and Indonesia, a country with respectful production figures 
still mired in territorial and concessional disputes with its former Dutch rulers, also 
became Members. 202 In 1967, in the midst of the negotiations with the IOCs, Abu Dhabi 
(to be superseded by the larger United Arab Emirates), in the process of gaining its 
independence from Britain and having virtually no oil production, joined the 
Organization. 203 And in 1969, only seven years after its war of independence against the 
French, Algeria joined OPEC. Similar to Indonesian independence against the Dutch, 
Algeria faced mass capital flight of the technocratic class, nationalizing what the colonial 
power and its private enterprises left behind, the most notable being CFP’s upstream 
facilities, with significant damage to country’s manufacturing base. 204 Yet, with very 
little international support, the Algerian government viewed its Membership in the 
Organization as both a strategic asset and a refuge.  
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Though US economic and military aid, along with certain security guarantees, 
significantly alleviated the internal concerns of the main OPEC producers, there was a 
limit to what US aid could accomplish for other Members. Libya’s entrance into the 
Organization signaled a fundamental change in the power of the IOCs to persuade 
governments into accepting the majors’ preferences for their crude oil exports. Though a 
country like Indonesia, the birthplace of modern Royal Dutch Shell, was still heavily 
dependent on one of the Seven Sisters, the rupture in the home-IOC-host nexus, US 
neutrality in the post-independence negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch, and 
continuous US economic and military support, allowed the Jakarta government to take 
independent measures, like joining OPEC, for eventually more government revenue and 
more control. Libya however was different. Unlike other producing countries, Libyan 
production came online much later, and thus when OPEC was formed, output from Libya 
was virtually nonexistent. And as the possibility of Libyan oil output was still 
hypothetical at the creation of OPEC, this made the Tripoli government far more 
vulnerable to pressures from IOCs and their imposed conditions for discovery and 
extraction of Libyan crude than that of other producers – chiefly because of the glut in the 
oil market.  
 After it gained independence in 1951, Libya’s pre-oil economy, with virtually no 
manufacturing base and a largely decentralized government, was unable to steer the 
country out of its impoverished conditions. Throughout the 1950s, the Libyans were able 
to build only a modest agricultural sector, in addition to garnering crucial US aid – 
keeping in line with established US policy of countering Soviet political and economic 
penetration via economic and military assistance. However, once oil was discovered in 
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Libya in 1958, several oil firms became interested in investing in Libyan oil. It was at this 
moment, as previously stated, where Standard Oil of New Jersey attempted to convince 
Tripoli of not joining OPEC, pushing a scenario where Libyan oil under OPEC would be 
economically unattractive to European consumers. 205   What made matters more perilous 
for the future of Libyan oil was that its assistance from the US was coming to an end. 
Indeed, not unlike other Members, Libya’s economic health in the early 1960’s, in the 
words of American officials, was in “sheer financial chaos”. 206 Under King Idris, Libya, 
like other OPEC Members, had received US aid, albeit in moderate amounts. The aid was 
specifically intended for domestic developmental projects. However, the Tripoli 
government, possibly because of the excitement surrounding the discovery of oil, 
corruption, or mismanagement started to increase development plans – predicated on a 
continuous supply of US aid and the future oil revenue that was too come. However, 
while aid from the US was arriving, it was decreasing with time (See Figure 2.1). 
Additionally, though Libya’s oil had piqued the interest of many of the major IOCs to the 
country, the oil glut of the 1960s provided little incentive for the rapid production of 
Libya’s oil. And though Libya, like other Members, viewed OPEC membership as a 
possible future asset, its reliance upon major IOCs would have allowed the latter to use 
delays in production as leverage against Tripoli joining OPEC.                                                 
 In a US State Department cable in 1962, American officials detailed both the 
extent of Libya’s economic woes, but also their strong reluctance of providing aid to 
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Libya. 207 US officials accused the Libyans of living beyond their means, by profligate 
spending on oil pipelines, housing units, and other developmental projects, which left the 
government with little savings and later a substantial budget deficit, while also making 
commitments to other development projects that they could not afford.  In their criticism 
of Libya’s ‘lax financial and programming controls’, the US advised that the “first job of 
the government of Libya was to put [its] own house in order and exercise fiscal restraint.” 
208  Facing declining US aid and pressure from the major IOCs not to join OPEC, Libya 
discovered that the only means to have both financial security and some modicum of 
independence in its decision-making was to invite smaller, independent firms seeking 
new supplies. Not only did this action eventually provide more maneuverability for the 
Libyan government, but it also allowed Libya’s move towards OPEC membership to 
become feasible. Indeed, it was this action by Tripoli that created one of the first 
templates for producing countries, particularly OPEC Members, to view contracting with 
independent companies as a viable means to obtain better revenue sharing terms. And the 
early image of OPEC providing strength in numbers to the producers was all the more 
reason for additional producing countries to join.  
Building the Organs of OPEC while Individual Negotiations begin  
Simultaneously, other Members were grappling with their own predicaments as it related 
to the future of the oil industry in their territories, and the profit sharing arrangements 
with the IOCs. Yet, though OPEC was viewed as potentially a major asset for 
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hydrocarbon-endowed countries of the developing world, it still did not possess the 
ability to functionally act for the benefit of its Members. Key feasibility issues were still 
unresolved and would take a few to several years to fully address. Specifically, these 
were the following: uniformity in purpose, the ability to streamline each Members core 
national interests as it relates to their oil exports and revenues into a collective, 
organizational strategy, institutional acceptance and recognition in the global economy, 
and, the most important being efficacy for its Members. In the first two years of its 
existence, OPEC managed to establish its internal decision-making bodies, its statutes, 
policies and procedures, and at least in theory, a collective policy to formulate a 
regulation of production and an approach towards negotiations with the IOCs (See Table 
1). This was sketched out in its Resolutions I-II.16.  
However, even as the institution was making headway to put in place the ability 
to act for its members, as it is was slowly gaining some international recognition, the 
issues that the producing countries had with the IOCs still remain unresolved. And as 
previously mentioned, the economic and political circumstances in some Member states 
were only getting worse because of continued and expanded budgetary constraints on the 
respective governments. By far, the most acrimonious struggle between a host producing 
country and the IOCs in the early OPEC years was in Iraq. After several months of 
arduous negotiations to find a new mutually acceptable profit sharing arrangement 
between the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), the consortium umbrella involving the 
major firms within the country, and the State of Iraq, the post-monarchial Qassim 
government chose to dramatically escalate tensions with the passage of Public Law 80 in 
1961. This legislation, with virtually no consultation with the IOCs, allowed the Iraqi 
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government to recover 99.5% of the land granted to the IPC under former concession 
agreements. This portion of the concessions was held by the IPC but the consortium 
either was not actively pursuing upstream activities or had indefinitely delayed them. 
Again, given the oil glut in the 1960s, there was little incentive for the consortium to 
bring new supplies in an already saturated market. The Baghdad government, however, 
saw things differently. It was not unusual for many producing countries in the developing 
world, the overwhelming majority of which depended upon IOCs to export their crude, to 
view market conditions as wholly manipulated by the IOCs, when in fact the new 
conditions of the day (i.e. the entrance of Soviet and independent firm crude) limited the 
consortium’s options.  
 The only areas left untouched by the Baghdad government was the .5% of Iraqi 
land where the consortium was already extracting crude. With this legislation, the Iraqi 
National Oil Company (INOC) also came into existence, as the Baghdad thought that 
possibly new, more advantageous deals could be made with independents or even the 
USSR – partnership with the newly minted INOC. Nevertheless, this move by the Qassim 
government had serious ramifications, both for the future of Iraq but also for OPEC. As 
Fadhil Chalabi has argued, Iraq’s actions (which were tantamount to nationalization) not 
only severally curtailed activities in Iraq, but also greatly benefited Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
209  And even after Qassim’s downfall, the continuing dispute between the central 
Baghdad government and the IPC concession holders over the nature of the profit sharing 
survived. So much so that the US government cautioned US firms in seeking concession 
in areas taken over by the Baghdad government under Public Law 80. Washington feared 
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that if a few US firms would simply accept the new arrangements, and thus cut separate 
deals with Baghdad, the outcome would be perceived as a forced imposition upon 
concession holders. This, they worried, would have wider implications for other 
concession agreements. In a telegram from Washington to the American embassy in 
Baghdad a year after the Ramadan Revolution, the US thinking was that “if other 
companies should bid for concessions without a prior settlement, GOI [Government of 
Iraq] will have good reason to suppose that concession agreements can be terminated 
unilaterally and replaced with contracts with other oil companies under conditions 
dictated by GOI wherever GOI considers that it is in its own interest to do so.” 210 Thus, 
they concluded that other producers could utilize this event as a template, which not only 
would affect OPEC Members but the wider industry of the day. What was a particular 
concern to the US was what producing governments would make of this precedent, which 
would lead them to believe that American firms “are not concerned for legal rights of 
others and are motivated solely by advantages to be derived from access to additional oil 
resources and new profits.” 211 Thus what the US did was to privately dissuade American 
firms from reaching individual settlements with Baghdad (without a resolution to the 
Public Law 80) while undertaking efforts with non-US firms of entering into Iraq while 
the issue remained unresolved. 212 More so, this was done with the explicit knowledge 
that American firms, for the time being, would suffer loss and access to foreign firms. 
Yet for Washington, what they referred to as the “disadvantage of [a] completely passive 
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attitude” by the US government would justify the “risk of possible lost opportunities to 
American firms.” 213 
Nevertheless, the Iraq experience, as Fadhil Chalabi has asserted, proved to be a 
template for OPEC in the later years when collective negotiations with the companies 
were to take place. 214 But at the time, it was a clear example that while the Organization 
had overcome the skepticism of many more powerful global actors, and had made 
headway on establishing itself, it still lacked the ability to fundamentally impact current 
imbalance of power between producers and the IOCs and protect its Members’ interests. 
As negotiations between Iraq and the consortium had reached an impasse, all the 
Organization could do was “express concern” and issue Resolution III.18, which 
explicitly supported Iraq’s position, but “urged foreign oil companies operating in the 
territories of its Member Countries to realize that a spirit of true understanding between 
them and the Member Countries is indispensable to securing…healthy conditions in the 
world oil industry.” 215 Up until Qassim’s ouster by the Baathist-Nasserite coalition in 
Iraq, production in Iraq stagnated, while those of other Members steadily rose.  But even 
after the Ramadan Revolution, the continuing dispute between the IPC and Baghdad 
severally eroded Iraq’s production potential for the rest of the decade.  
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Table 1: Main OPEC Developmental Resolutions  
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I: Announced first collective action of Member states as a unitary Group. Pledge to formulate system to 
ensure the stabilization of prices by the regulation of production. Collective protection of members, if as a 
result of application of any unanimous decision of OPEC any sanctions are employed. No other Member 
shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment. 
I.2: Countries represented in Conference are original Members of OPEC. Invitation for any country with 
a substantial net export of crude petroleum can become a new Member if unanimously accepted by all 
five original Members of the Organization. Pledge to establish regular meeting and organs of OPEC. 
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II.5: The Creation of the Board of Governors, of which each Member will nominate one Governor.  
II.6: The Creation of the Statutes: OPEC having two organs, the Conference and the Board of Governors. 
The development of the departments of these two organs, mechanism of decision-making and authority, 
rules, and meeting intervals.  
II.7: “President of Conference” Title created. “Chairman of the Conference” title abolished.  
II.8: Financial Requirements for the Organizations and Membership dues established.  
II.9: Conference appoints Fuad Rouhani as First Chairman of the Board of Governors.    
II.10: Headquarters established at Geneva, Switzerland.  
II.11: Board of Governors commissions study on the economics of investment in the oil industry by 
concession holding companies, in comparison with investment in other enterprises in different countries.  
II.12: Members shall compile and send to the Board of Governors, a statement concerning its position in 
the matter of determination of prices at which exporting companies, and also concerning the appropriate 
procedure in regard to the settlement of disputes arising on that matter pay for its petroleum.  
II.13: Board of Governors commissions study on a ‘just pricing formula, supported by a study of 
international proration’, of crude oil in the global economy. 
II.14: Conference attempts to coordinate crude import measures with friendly countries that have placed 
import quotas ‘in order to protect their domestic crude production… in order to arrive at satisfactory 
solution and thus promote mutual understanding for the protection of the interests of both exporting and 
importing countries.’  
II.16: Statement of support for individual Members in current negotiations with the IOCs. OPEC 
expressed hope that IOCs concerned will ‘meet such discussions in a spirit of understanding and will 
ensure their prompt and satisfactory conclusion.’  
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III.18: Expression of concern regarding Iraq-IOC negotiations.  
III.19: The Creation of an Information Center in the Secretariat for compilation and distribution of 
industry news and research. 
III.20: Review of the Venezuelan Delegation’s Coordinating Commission for the Conservation and 
Commerce of Hydrocarbons, particularly in preventing the weakening of crude oil prices. Considers 
similar measures of control may prove beneficial to other Members  
IIII.26: Conference directs Board of Governors to conduct uniformity study to better functionality of 
Organization  
III.27: Reaffirmation of Resolution I. 
III.28: Claims that ‘information submitted by Venezuela that crude oil produced in Member Countries 
and elsewhere has been utilized by some oil companies and oil agencies to weaken the price structure, 
resolves that Members conduct a thorough investigation of this matter and directs the Secretariat to study 
the findings.  
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IV.32: First call by OPEC for Members to enter into negotiations with the IOCs to ensure payment on the 
basis of posted prices not lower than those of 8/1960. That Members formulate a rational price structure 
to guide future price policy. price structure to be devised will be the linking of crude-oil prices to an index 
of prices of goods which the Member Countries need to import. 
IV.33: That each Member Country should approach the company or companies within their countries 
with a view to working out a formula where under royalty payments shall be fixed at a uniform rate which 
Members consider equitable, and shall not be treated as a credit against income-tax liability. 
IV.34: Member Countries should take measures to eliminate any contribution to the marketing expenses 
of the IOCs within their territories 
IV.35: Recommendation that Member Countries create of a body entrusted with fulfilling functions 
similar to Venezuelan Coordinating Commission 
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 At OPEC’s 4th Conference in Geneva in 1962, the first session being in April 
while the second session was in June, the Organization took a markedly different 
approach to the negotiations than they had in the past. While previously OPEC had taken 
a back seat to Member states talks with the IOCs, the Organization gradually chose to 
become institutionally invested in the outcome of the negotiations. During the 4th 
Conference, OPEC decided to formally enter into the negotiations by calling its Members 
to fully engage the IOCs to restore the crude oil price prior to August 1960, (Resolution 
IV.32). Furthermore, possibly knowing that the price reduction may have now become 
fixed (at least for the time being), OPEC went further. In Resolution IV.33, OPEC laid 
out its basis for a uniform royalty payment to all Members – apart from the taxes that the 
IOCs were giving to the Members. OPEC’s rationale, again contained in the Resolution, 
was that “under the arrangements at present in force between the Member Countries and 
the oil companies…no compensation is paid for the intrinsic value of petroleum, royalty 
or stated payment commitments being treated as credits against income-tax 
liabilities…and that the right to receive compensation for the intrinsic value of petroleum” 
to OPEC’s Members is “incontestable”. 216  
 Furthermore, in Resolution IV.34, the Organization demanded of its Members 
that they should “take measures to eliminate any contribution to the marketing expenses 
of the companies concerned.” 217 In other words, because producing countries did not 
participate in the any of the marketing operations of the oil companies, and thus did not 
benefit, they should not be held responsible for costs accrued with such activities.  
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 Needless to say, the response by the IOCs and especially the home governments 
showed a new sense of anxiety about OPEC. In its previous statements and resolutions, 
OPEC had come out in defense for its Members position, but this new activist approach 
of collectively trying to change the terms of the profit sharing, uniformly – which would 
set a major precedent for other producers, whether they be Members or not – was 
alarming the companies.  In the most detailed analysis of the negotiations between the 
IOCs and OPEC Members to date, Ian Skeet laid out what was at stake for both sides. In 
implementing a uniform royalty expense (a charge that Venezuela was already doing but 
would now apply to all Members), OPEC would be essentially adding 11 cents to their 
profit share, per barrel of oil. 218 As mentioned earlier, the posted price of crude at the 
time was $1.80, which would amount to be a 6% charge for the IOCs. And had such a 
precedent become the industry norm for dealing with other non-OPEC producers, the 
financial impact to the major consortium participants would be substantial.  
 However, far from OPEC inter-Member discussions and the negotiations between 
Member states and the IOCs was the important role of the US.  It is here where the 
importance of American influential capability on certain Members, exhibited through 
economic and military assistance, clearly becomes evident.  Only days after the 4th 
Conference, the Iranian government privately confirmed to the US that though OPEC had 
adopted these particular resolutions, the Iranian government’s support for them “in no 
way implied [an] attack on [the] oil consortium or suggestion [that the] oil agreement 
should be modified.” 219 The Iranians told the US Embassy in Tehran that the designation 
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of Iran and Saudi Arabia to spearhead the negotiations with the IOCs was “ensuring [a] 
moderate approach”, claiming that the “negotiations need not be completed within [a] 
specified time and that they would be conducted in unhurried and friendly spirit.” 220 
Though the American’s seemed encouraged by the Iranian position, they still remained 
concerned about what they felt was the “fundamental and far-reaching character of 
resolutions”, chiefly the “sharp impact on member companies of [the] oil consortium as 
well as other segments of international oil industry.” 221 
In a closed session meeting between officials from the US State Department and 
Leroy Stinebower and George Pearcy from Standard Oil of New Jersey, the concerns 
over the new OPEC Resolutions were clearly visible. Although Jersey’s executives were 
confidant in the negotiating strength of the IOCs, they also feared mass governmental 
expropriations that in their mind had “no rational counterforce” to them. 222 Recognizing 
the seriousness of the new OPEC stipulations, the US government could not afford to sit 
on the sidelines. However, in its discussions with its European partners, the US stated 
that “it prefers to avoid adding to OPEC's international prestige or position” and thus 
“contacts between OPEC and other organizations, including [the] EEC (European 
Economic Community, the forerunner to the European Union), [should] be avoided or 
minimized.” 223 Additionally, in consultations with the British, both the US and the UK 
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agreed on this position as well. For both, there emerged a “complete unanimity” on the 
“attitude which both governments should take towards OPEC….[agreeing] …that it 
would not be to their mutual interests to undertake discussions with OPEC member 
governments nor with the Organization itself on OPEC matters and that efforts to involve 
the US and UK governments in OPEC negotiations with the oil companies should be 
resisted.” 224 However, as with the US position towards OPEC during the creation of the 
Organization, Washington and London agreed on avoiding any semblance of hostility 
towards the Organization, 225 as that might create unforeseen consequences, particularly 
in the Cold War context with the USSR.  
Throughout 1963, OPEC, led by Secretary General Rouhani, engaged in both 
direct and indirect talks with the Consortium, all in the background of the Organization’s 
continuing development and with constant consultation with the Members. Yet, in 
November of 1963, just prior to the 5th OPEC Conference in Riyadh in late December, 
the representatives of the Consortiums  within the Member states replied with a counter 
offer to OPEC’s Resolution IV.33, concerning uniform royalty payments. The IOCs 
offered 3.5 cents per barrel revenue increase, which OPEC under Rouhani immediately 
dismissed. 226 Rouhani had confidence that this was the official position of all Member 
states, and thus OPEC’s collective position. However, on December 6, 1963, in a State 
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Department meeting with some of the heads of the major IOCs, it was revealed that there 
was a surreptitious effort to break the OPEC consensus on royalty payments.  
The participants were the following: G. L. Parkhurst (Vice President and Director 
of Standard Oil Company of California and a Director of Arabian American Oil Co.) 
William F. Bramstedt (Vice President of Standard Oil Company of California) John 
Noble (Vice President of Texaco, Inc. and Director of Arabian American Oil Co.), 
Howard Page (Director and Vice President of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey and a 
Director of Arabian American Oil Co.) Henry C. Moses (Executive Vice President of 
Middle East Concessionary Interests, Socony Mobil Oil Co. and a Director of Arabian 
American Oil Co.), Garry Owen (Director and Vice President of Arabian American Oil 
Co.), Grady Davis (Vice President of Gulf Oil Co) and Kermit Roosevelt (Vice President, 
Gulf Oil Co.).  At the meeting, Howard Page of Jersey revealed that British Petroleum 
executives had recently received a rejection by OPEC’s Rouhani and that in light of this, 
the upcoming OPEC meeting in Riyadh could possibly witness the Organization using 
sanctions against the IOCs. 227 However, Kermit Roosevelt from Gulf Oil differed with 
his assessment. Roosevelt stated in this private meeting that he had recently spent time 
with the Shah of Iran and that the Iranian Monarch understands why the offer that was 
made to Rouhani “was the maximum which the companies can make”. 228 Roosevelt’s 
history with both Iran and the Shah was quite unique, for a decade prior, it was this same 
Roosevelt, at the time a CIA agent in Iran, who headed and implemented Operation 
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AJAX which led to the coup against Mossadegh and the restoration of the Pahlavi family 
to the Iranian throne. Both men had remained close since that consequential event. And 
though some US officials, even as late as a week prior to OPEC’s Riyadh meeting in late 
December of 1963, feared either sanctions or ‘arbitrary Member government action’ 
against the IOCs, when the time came, Roosevelt’s confidence proved prescient.  229 
As the 5th Conference commenced, it became clear to other Members that the 
Shah had changed Iran’s rejection of the IOCs offer and had firmly refused to go along 
with sanctioning the Consortiums . Though not identical, the Saudi position was also 
similar, but it was clear that the Shah was leading the sudden opposition of what was 
supposed to be collective punitive action against the IOCs. While senior industry experts, 
such as Ian Skeet, surmised that the Shah’s sudden shift was due to suspicions regarding 
other Members’ intentions or even pressure from the National Iranian Oil Company, 230 
in the years since US archives have become declassified, the extent of US intervention, 
albeit indirect, into the OPEC decision-making process of that time has become more 
apparent. What came out of the Riyadh meeting was a fundamental shift in how OPEC 
would continue to negotiate with the IOCs. Resolution V.40 pledged to continue 
negotiations, by way of a Committee consisting of Fuad Rouhani, Iraq’s Abdul Rahman 
Bazzaz, and Saudi Arabia’s Hisham Nazer. 231 Moreover, OPEC explicitly stated that this 
group would negotiate on the Organization’s behalf with the oil companies – for the first 
time, as a collective entity, as opposed to OPEC overseeing several different negotiations 
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happening simultaneously.  The IOCs feared this particular outcome, became some of 
them thought that if OPEC negotiates as a unitary institution (with these three individuals 
leading the effort) as opposed to “representatives of the individual producing 
governments… the next step could be to exclude the companies as bargaining agents in 
favor of governments.” 232  
Notwithstanding, the IOCs’ fear did not materialize in the immediate aftermath of 
the committee’s appointment. Much of this had to do with Iran’s moderation role in the 
negotiation process with the IOC’s. In March of 1964, only four months before OPEC’s 
6th Conference in Geneva, the assessment of Iran’s role was clear to the US: “Iran has 
been successful so far in forestalling unilateral actions by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries against the oil companies.”  233 However, this came at a major cost 
to Iran’s reputation within the Organization. Immediately after the Iranian change of 
position, on the eve of the 5th Conference, OPEC’s first Secretary General, the Iranian 
Rouhani, was no longer able to carry on his role as opposition from Iraq and other 
unilateralist Members grew. Moreover, in April of 1964, it was the US assessment that a 
possible Arab backlash against the Shah could very well take place, leading to the 
expulsion of Iran from OPEC. 234 The only reason given why the unilateralist camp 
tolerated Iran was because OPEC’s foundational principle was based upon strength in 
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numbers, and had a major producer left the Organization in its developmental phase, the 
longevity of the OPEC enterprise would be in doubt. 235 
During its 6th Conference in Geneva, OPEC passed Resolution VI.47, which 
acknowledged that the IOCs did send a revised offer to the Organization (of which was 
only marginally better than that which Rouhani, on behalf of the Group rejected). While 
not accepting the offer, the Organization stated that it was a “suitable basis” to continue 
to find a permanent agreement. And in the 7th Conference months later, OPEC’s 
Resolution VII.49, claimed that five Members (Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia) accepted the latest offer by the IOCs (again only a marginal increase of the prior 
offers), while Iraq rejected the offer, and Venezuela and Indonesia remained critical of 
the offer. 236  Moreover, the Organization stated in VII.49 that because five of its 
Members did accept the offer, each Member should decide acceptance or rejection of the 
Consortiums ’ new proposal individually. But as negotiations would proceed, this 
dynamic, and the roles that each country within OPEC would play, would fundamentally 
change.  
Collective Negotiations with the IOCs 
Whatever positive fiscal contribution the royalty payment fight gave to OPEC Members, 
237 it paled into comparison with the looming economic and security dilemmas that were 
all the more exacerbated by stagnated crude prices and creeping non-OPEC competition. 
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The posted price of crude remained $1.80 from 1960-1971. 238 After an uneventful 8th 
Conference, OPEC met in Tripoli in July of 1965 with a plan to “adopt as a transitory 
measure a production plan calling for rational increases in production from the OPEC 
area” to meet the estimated increase in world demand. 239 There were, however, three 
main problems with this approach. Firstly, the IOCs still possessed production control 
over the OPEC area, despite the increasing technical efficiency of OPEC NOCs. The 
second problem was discipline among Members. For this ‘soft' pro-rationing to work 
(although OPEC did not view this plan in those terms), there needed to be strict 
guidelines on how much each Member could produce (or under-produce), in order for 
prices to gradually rise again. And finally, the production from the non-OPEC area was 
simply too great to counter.  
 Besides OPEC’s support for the passage of a peculiar law by the Libyan 
government implemented, via Royal Decree, that among other things made much more 
headway on royalty payments than the actual Organization had done, OPEC’s 10th 
Conference in December of 1965 did not address the fundamentals of the Member’s 
dilemma with the IOCs. Yet roughly at the same time, there was progress in another area: 
a marked shift in both the US, and by extension, the Western approach to OPEC. From 
late 1965 to early 1966, the US was in discussion, both internally, and with its allies, on 
the need to have more of an activist position regarding the Organization. Ever since 
OPEC’s 5th Conference, there had been an impasse on how to move forward with 
sustainable resolution on profit sharing. The market conditions not only had matters 
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worse, but by this time, there had been criticism of the lack of movement by all Members 
of the Organization. The American reasoning was summed up in a State Department 
communiqué to the US Embassy in Vienna, OPEC’s Headquarters:  
 The US–UK policy of neutrality and non-commitment towards OPEC … 
has not prevented the OPEC from obtaining recognition from 
international organizations, specifically the ECOSOC and UNCTAD, and 
Austria has granted diplomatic status to the organization and its 
personnel. In light of these and other successes by the OPEC, the USG 
intends to review the present policy towards the OPEC and consider if 
some other policy towards the organization might more usefully serve U.S. 
interests.  240 
 
The US policy officially changed to active engagement in March of 1966, making it 
possible, for the first time, for US officials to officially meet with the OPEC Secretariat 
and to develop a working relationship with the Group. 241 The practical benefit of this 
new approach was that the US no longer needed to rely on OPEC Member States or 
Consortium partners for insights on how the Organization functioned. Moreover, in 
stepping out of the shadows, the American perception was that with the US possibly 
midwifing negotiations, there was a much higher chance that a mutually beneficial 
resolution to the pricing and profit sharing dispute could be reached. 
 However, the American action came far too late, for by the time they entered, in 
an official capacity, the moribund negotiations, other trends had already taken a life of 
their own. The US knew that some Members of OPEC, namely Iraq, Venezuela, and 
Libya, had serious misgiving about any foreign enterprise controlling the oil industries in 
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their respective countries. This was brought to light many times by both Consortium 
members and by officials from these respective countries, in various forums. Moreover, 
even Indonesia, a major recipient of US aid, was also much more forceful in the 
advancing of a wholesale revision of the profit sharing arrangement than what was 
publicly known. However, the first sign that events had progressed into a new phase of 
OPEC’s relations with the Consortium was the change of position in Iran.  
The first instance where the US became aware of this changed position was in 1966. As 
early as January of that year, the Iranian government started airing grievances to both the 
IOCs and their home governments, particularly the US, on stagnating or decreasing 
production. 242 These grievances quickly unearthed many of the Iranian government’s 
frustrations with the concession holders on profit sharing and prices, as the Shah blamed 
what amounted to a 200,000 barrel per day decline in production to the decreased 
revenue Iran was witnessing in weeks and months prior. 243 It was indeed in January of 
1966, where the US began to witness the Shah, for the first time, tie his frustration with 
the IOCs with his strategic partnership with the West overall. At a meeting with the US 
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armen Meyer, the Shah stated bluntly that 
“if oil companies do not provide anticipated growth in revenues, Iran might have to 
reorient [the] ‘philosophy’ which [the] Shah …had espoused ‘during twenty-five years of 
[his] reign’.” 244  
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In subsequent meetings with US officials from, the Shah, much more confident, 
but more in need of capital for both social spending at home, and particularly on military 
spending, expressed varying signs of disappointment and frustration regarding the 
behavior of the Consortium in Iran. 245 By that time, Members had not focused anymore 
on royalty payments bringing the extra revenue that they had hoped for, but major 
producers like the Iranian government, were putting their hopes in expanded production. 
And though while still high, the Shah’s government expressed frustration with American 
officials that the Consortium was not increasing production, but relegating Iran’s status to 
other smaller producers. The driving force behind the Shah’s changing approach to the 
Consortium, as understood by the US was the following: “a mix of need for money, 
desire to establish a position in marketing of oil, belief that Iran should be able utilize her 
own oil assets, and Shah's views that Iran deserves more than its neighboring oil 
countries, that East-West détente makes him less dependent on West and that Iran should 
do more to assert independence.” 246 As stated previously, Iran during the 1960s was the 
largest recipient of US aid, as it geographical positioning made it one of the West’s chief 
allies during the Cold War. As the Shah’s Iran occupied such an important place in US 
strategic thinking against the USSR, US aid, just like American political intervention in 
Iran in the 1950s, had a geostrategic rationale behind it. But by this time, the aid that the 
US was providing along with stagnant revenue from the oil output, proved to be 
insufficient for the exceptional expenses that the Shah’s Iran had. Eventually, the Shah’s 
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monetary concerns would collide with the IOCs strategy, backed by the US, of dealing 
with the transitioning market conditions and negotiations with OPEC.  
As the Shah’s grievances against the Consortium gradually came to light, the 
direction of his anger often increasingly became directed towards US officials. In one of 
the first acts of open defiance to the US, the Shah threatened to rearrange his arms 
purchases away from American companies, diversify purchases from Europe.  This took 
back American officials because it presupposed, on the part of Iranian officials that the 
Consortium in Iran “could have promised greater oil ‘offtake’ had the US applied 
pressure on the American companies who are members.” 247  The US feared that by 
reason of Iran’s frustration with the IOCs, the Shah would become more reactionary, both 
with his relationship to the Consoritum and possibly with the US. 248 For the rest of the 
year, the US and the UK, with collaboration the IOCs, made a serious attempt to address 
the Shah’s concerns as it related to oil revenue. However, American policy was explicitly 
not to become enmeshed in the negotiations so as to perceived in openly taking sides, 
between Iran, which was main strategic ally, and the Consortium, which mostly were 
American firms. 249  The US attempted to reassure the Iranian government the 
fundamental problem vis-à-vis production volume and prices were the market conditions, 
and that the IOCS were “sympathetic to Iran’s problems”. 250 However, by the end of the 
year, according to US officials that had consulted with both the IOCs and the Iranian 
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government, both sides were on a “collision course” as their positions became 
increasingly irreconcilable. 251 Thus, a tentative arrangement on production levels was 
reached (a proposed 11% increase in 1967 and 1968), but to be gradually implemented. 
252  Incidentally, Iran’s production in 1967, because of the Arab Oil Embargo of that year 
(which will be touched subsequently), rose to 20% above 1966 levels.  253 
 Yet, by mid-1967, although Iran’s production significantly rose, the fundamental 
problem concerning revenue, primarily because of the saturated market, still remained. 
During the continued negotiations between Members and the IOCs, the Iranians began 
taking the position of other Members, even though the Shah felt that Iran’s importance, 
both to the global economy and to the Middle East security architecture, was far more 
important – and thus deserving of better privileges from the IOCs. Like other OPEC 
Members, the Iranians also demanded the 6.5% OPEC discount be eliminated, which 
would net Iran about 10 cents per barrel of oil, and if the “discount were completely 
eliminated by January 1968, Iran would get about $200 million extra in the next five 
years.” 254 Above these demands was the Shah’s constant insistence that the Consortium 
increase Iranian production. Yet, the IOCs consistently said that they would be unable to 
increase Iranian output without cutting back Arab production, which most surely would 
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provoke additional Arab hostility towards the Consortium. 255 The new Iran question as it 
relates to the OPEC negotiations came to a head in December of 1967 in another private 
meeting with Armen Meyer and the Shah. Meyer reported:  
My audience with Shah turned out to be one of most unpleasant of my tour 
here. He was obviously smoldering over devaluation shortfall issue with 
which he had been preoccupied earlier in day. Using terms such as 
“robbery,” “thieves” and some unprintable epithets, [the] Shah professed 
to be completely disgusted with consortium's behavior. At one point in 
discussion, Shah said if companies wanted war they could have it. This 
time it would not be with a Mossadegh but with a united Iran behind Shah 
himself. When I noted consortium believes it has legal basis for its 
position and perhaps arbitration might be one possibility for solving 
devaluation problem, Shah said arbitration is totally unacceptable. As for 
matter being legal issue, Shah said GOI would take care of that once and 
for all by immediate passage of legislation, which would insure GOI un-
depreciable payments. …Shah went on to berate consortium for its 
continual maltreatment of Iran, despite Iran's exemplary behavior in 
comparison with other countries. My efforts to point out that Iran has in 
fact been treated very well fell on deaf ears. Shah once again contended 
that consortium is sitting astride Iran's vast reserves and he cannot permit 
such restraining influences on Iran's welfare. I pointed out problem is one 
of marketing. In this connection, I suggested Iran may be trying to carry 
water on both shoulders…Shah argued such competition is infinitesimal 
compared with bonanzas greedy oil companies are throwing to countries 
like Libya. When I pointed out geographic factor which places Libya in 
favorable situation with Suez closed, Shah said what really infuriates him 
is companies' lifting large quantities from sheikhdoms like Kuwait and 
Abu Dhabi when Iran with its 26,000,000 people needs funds to maintain 
its progress and play its role in Mideast security. Shah also asserted that 
Saudi Arabia's production will soon move up to 4,000,000 barrels per day. 
Since geographic factor a la Libya cannot be applied vis-à-vis Saudi 
Arabia, this further demonstrates he said, how companies 
discriminate…Shah once again mentioned possibility of legislation which 
would enable GOI to have oil at well-head for clients which GOI may 
develop not in competition with consortium. He noted Iraq had long since 
found companies submissive to such measures. My natural response was 
to point to Iraq's sorry plight today and how much better off Iran is. I 
urged Shah “with every bone in my body” not to go down Iraqi 
road….Once again I reminded Shah that GOI's relationship with 
consortium likely be much more productive if it continues as partnership 
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than if it is coercive. Shah readily agreed but said companies seem only 
interested in great profits and fail to take into account broader issues such 
as encouraging a country like Iran which is moving in positive direction 
and which has potential for influencing whole area in constructive way. 
Before closing discussion, I told Shah I had obviously picked a bad day for 
my audience. He managed to permit himself a brief smile, but added that 
on any other day he would feel the same way about the oil companies' 
behavior vis-à-vis Iran. 256 
 
By 1968, the Shah had essentially adopted the revisionist position of other OPEC 
Members, but with more sophistication and without the reactionary behavior of Iraq or 
later Libya. Thus he was consistently able to obtain short-term concessions from the 
IOCs while both would agree to work on a longer term solution. In a CIA assessment of 
1968, entitled appropriately, The Shah's Increasing Assurance, the US perception of the 
Iranian monarch and his regime was that it had overcome most, if not all, the post-
Mossadegh threats to his rule. 257  His main focus now, was buttressing his growing 
military dominance of the Persian Gulf, securing any qualitative military advantage that 
he had over his neighbors, balancing any Soviet threats to Iran, and maximizing oil 
revenue. 258 And because there was no alternative seen to his rule, and more importantly, 
his pro-Western disposition, the US approach to the newly confident Shah was to make 
the best of the situation. In a personal conversation with former State Department official, 
William R. Polk, the Shah was frank about asserting his independence, openly admitting 
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that while he was once “a puppet”, the West now needs him in the Cold War struggle 
against the Soviets.  259 
 Events in other areas in OPEC also seemed to progress more rapidly than both the 
Consortiums and the US had previously thought. In OPEC’s 11th conference, the 
Organization passed Resolution XI.72, which mandated that Members should enforce 
“that no petroleum rights be granted or contracts entered into concerning the exploration 
or exploitation of new areas by Member Countries unless royalty payments and income 
tax liabilities are calculated on the basis of posted or reference prices.” 260 What the 
Organization was doing was ensuring that while they could not retroactively enforce a 
royalty payment they found acceptable, they could stipulate a new royalty payment based 
upon new contracts. IOCs took this with much concern, because while the market was 
saturated at that time, there was no guarantee that the market conditions would remain the 
same – and they did not.  
Subsequent OPEC Conferences, particularly the 13th Conference in Vienna in 
1967, further provided support for the Iraqi and Libyan positions vis-à-vis the 
negotiations with the Consortiums, as the issue of production sharing with OPEC 
Member NOCs had become a critical issue in securing more profit for producers. After 
the 14th and 15th Conferences, another new factor developed in late 1967-early 1968, with 
the creation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). 261 
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The genesis of this Group was initially to gather an Arab voice, not only within OPEC, 
but also amongst other producing countries on oil related matters. However, with the 6-
day war between Israel and her Arab neighbors, and the subsequent 1967 Arab Oil 
embargo, initiated through OAPEC, the West became concerned on possibility of the 
politicization of oil exports because of producer denial methods – even though the 
embargo failed. As we will see later, the fruition of this concern in the 1970s dramatically 
transformed the image of the Organization.  
 Yet, OPEC Members increasingly became convinced that the road they were on 
as it related to incremental negotiations with the Consortiums was leading to nowhere. 
With the principle Western ally having fundamentally altered its position vis-à-vis the 
Consortiums’ role in its oil industry, with OPEC-IOC negotiations deadlocked, while 
other Members were taking matters into their own hands – either by setting up parallel 
organizations or attempting to work around Member consensus, the method that the 
Organization was using for the protection of its Members was clearly failing. In a press 
release in January of 1968, OPEC essentially blamed the “failure to reach a reasonable 
conclusion” on Consortium Members. 262 Yet, without providing any more details, OPEC 
retreated back to its ‘wait-and-see’ posture, which was what many in the West, 
particularly the IOCs, had grown accustomed to. But something was different this time. 
Between the 15th and 16th Conferences, there was a flurry of activity among Members. In 
May of 1968, the Organization held its first Meeting of the Coordination Committee of 
National Oil Companies of OPEC Member Countries. This meeting, in and of itself, was 
very important because it shifted the conversation from equitable profit sharing, to inter-
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Member coordination on indigenous production efforts. Throughout the entire time 
between the two Conferences, there was very little new discussion on differing 
approaches to the impasse from the US, the West, or the IOCs.  
 When the time came for the 16th Conference, many observers figured that while 
OPEC would most likely reaffirm a past Resolution for better profit sharing arrangements, 
or introduce some other type of scheme to obtain additional charges from the IOCs, 
nothing new would come of it. However, what transpired in that June 1968 meeting 
would not only forever change the direction of OPEC, which would forge consensus for 
the years ahead, but would fundamentally end the remaining vestiges of the pre-Cold War 
oil industry. In a lengthy, technically oriented statement, Resolution XVI.90 introduced 
the new OPEC policy as it related to its Members: The Declaratory Statement of 
Petroleum Policy in Member Countries. At the beginning of the Resolution, leaving no 
room for ambiguity, XVI.90 stated that “Member Governments shall endeavor, as far as 
feasible, to explore for and develop their hydrocarbon resources directly”. Furthermore, 
as it related to the current relationship that Member States had with the IOCs, XVI.90 
acknowledged that the “capital, specialists and the promotion of marketing outlets 
required for such direct development may be complemented when necessary from 
alternate sources on a commercial basis.” 263  
While the rest of the Resolution was more technical in nature, not unlike other 
OPEC statements, the meaning was simple: OPEC’s Member States had officially, but 
more importantly collectively, declared their intention to nationalize the entire oil 
industries within their territories – at the same time. The IOCs initially had no response, 
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and it would take a few months to glean reaction from the Western governments. The day 
after XVI.90 was announced, the Consortiums behaved, at least on the surface, as if 
nothing had happened. And while the announcement was clear, it would take at least two 
years for the physical ramifications of this new era in the oil industry to come to fruition. 
Nevertheless, all participants – the producers, the IOCs, the Western governments – knew 
that something had fundamentally changed. 
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CHAPTER III • THE ASCENDANCY PHASE: THE SHIFT OF POWER TO THE 
PRODUCERS, ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION, AND THE POLITICIZATION OF 
PETROLEUM, 1969-1979 
 
 
As OPEC was approaching its second decade of existence, the conditions that led to its 
formation were beginning to dramatically alter. On every level of analysis – geo-
economics, inter-member relations, the influence of outside powers, and the specific 
dynamics within individual Member states – the unique circumstances that initially 
brought the Group together were either no longer existent or beginning the process of 
evolution. In this era, a new set of circumstances was driving the Organization into 
unchartered territory vis-à-vis the negotiations with the international oil companies 
(Companies) and finding its place in the international community.  
 On a macro level, the changes in the global economy regarding crude oil 
production and consumption patterns only heightened the importance of the Organization 
– a carryover from what was already happening after the OPEC’s establishment. Within 
the wider global economy, but more so in the advanced economies of the West, the 
transition and dependence to crude oil had now been largely completed. This was 
facilitated by the mass acceptance of the idea that crude oil was and would remain 
dependably cheap. Although the Companies were the gatekeepers of this concept, having 
significantly contributed to the development of this paradigm within the advanced 
economies, near the end of the 1960s they increasingly became aware that both producers 
and consumers were in a transition period. This was highlighted by the ongoing 
negotiations with OPEC, specifically OPEC’s Solemn Declaration of June 1968, which 
carried enormous ramifications that eventually affected the entire global oil industry, and 
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the wider global economy. But more importantly, leverage was added to OPEC’s 
negotiation strategy with the Companies, while engendering a newfound deference by the 
major powers towards the Group. Subsequently, this facilitated the marked shift of the 
US from being overly sympathetic to the Companies to being pushed into the direction of 
brokering negotiations between the former and OPEC.  
 From an inter-member perspective, Member states were undergoing a learning 
curve of not only how to manage an increasingly important international organization, 
but also how to work with each other vis-à-vis the negotiations and later to 
institutionalize nationalization of their crude. What was markedly different from the prior 
era was that the initial years following its creation and engaging in negotiations with the 
Companies, while attempting to streamline the diversity of viewpoints and strategies that 
each Member had, OPEC developed a sense of maturity and operational functionality. 
Not only had they individually learned what was successful or ineffective in their 
negotiations with the Companies, but also they had begun to understand what it means to 
be a part of a larger collective effort within the Organization. During this period, 
Members would defer to policies that benefited the larger Group as opposed to 
individually based tactical moves that advantaged some states over others. The 
Companies’ early success in halting any major gains by the Organization in the 
negotiations was primarily a result of the inability of Members to find a collective voice, 
but more importantly, implement an agreed strategy. Disunity among such a varied 
Group was natural, but for so long, it debilitated any real movement, up until the end of 
the Infancy period. It was only with the Solemn Declaration that signs of real, tangible 
unity began to take shape, only to be operationally expanded in the Ascendancy Phase.   
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 Subsequently, this facilitated the marked shift of the US from being overly 
sympathetic to the Companies to attempting to broker negotiations between the former 
and OPEC. A complicating factor to what had transpired early in the negotiations was 
how much of American sympathy and her allies lay with the Companies. But as they 
realized that the increasingly untenable position of ignoring OPEC needed adjustment, 
they gradually became invested in the negotiations and ultimately played a public 
facilitating role in the OPEC-Companies negotiations, specifically in the immediate 
aftermath of the Solemn Declaration.  Yet, with the gradual shift that occurred in US 
strategic thinking to a more measured and balanced approach between OPEC and the 
Companies, space was created by the Organization for fundamental gains in negotiations. 
The changing nature of the global economy, consumption trends, and gradual price 
increase in the 1970s would ultimately create the circumstances where the Organization 
could, and did, inflict pressure at the negotiating table. And much of this politicization 
would be witnessed particularly by the Arab producing states (OAPEC) when oil export 
policy would turn into a weapon against the West in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur 
war of 1973. Nevertheless, as power shifted to the producers, the long-held suspicions 
among certain Member states concerning each other would become entangled in how 
outside actors dealt with both the rising power of OPEC in the international system and 
the rising costs of crude. The natural rivalries within the Organization and the infusion of 
great powers into inter-member dynamics would have profound ramifications on not just 
those two levels of analysis, but also the domestic picture.  
 This would eventually lead to how the Ascendancy period in OPEC’s institutional 
life would end, at least in part, by what would transpire in the domestic politics of its 
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founding Members, particularly at the end of the 1970s. While during the Infancy phase 
of its development, Members states were able to stabilize the massive economic and 
security dilemmas they were simultaneously experiencing (in some cases with much help 
from the infusion of US aid), many of the underlying problems reappeared under a 
different form.  It was in the domestic arena where inter-member suspicions would 
gradually fuse with outside power involvement in OPEC in order to equalize the balance 
of power in the Organization, only to have consequential, unforeseen, but lasting 
consequences for the future of its core founding Member states, the wider Middle East 
region, and the global economy.  
Market Forces 
 The changing macro conditions  
 
Near the end of the 1960s, the decade’s oil glut, the resulting cheap crude price, and the 
continued proliferation of individualized means of transportation had already produced 
significant behavioral changes regarding oil dependency to the average resident of an 
advanced economy. And this gradual dependency was not just for transportation purposes, 
but had spread to several aspects of daily life. As Figure 3.1 shows, as global oil 
consumption dramatically increased from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1970s, 
the major drivers of that consumption were the North American and European economies, 
with Japan’s rapidly growing economy, the USSR, and the Eastern bloc playing 
secondary roles.  
 However, as the decade closed, consumption patterns would eventually catch up 
with global production. Most notably, this would eat away at the supply surplus that the 
USSR, the independent firms, and the major Companies had created only a few years 
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earlier. Such was the contradiction of the Companies ’ price war against the USSR and 
the independent firms. Besides creating, albeit indirectly, the conditions where host 
governments reacted angrily to the decrease in price, thus spurring collective action in 
forming OPEC, the Companies efforts at regaining lost market share from the USSR and 
the independents progressively created a dependency effect on cheap crude to consumers 
in advanced economies. In other words, market share protection efforts not only created 
anger in producers, but also helped create the expectancy of cheap supply from 
consumers in the global economy.  
Figure 3.1: Crude Oil Prices, 1950-1981 (US dollars per barrel) Source: BP Statistical Review  
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Figure 3.2: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1965-1981 (Thousand barrels daily) 
Source: BP Statistical Review 
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Figure 3.3: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization, 1970-1981 (1000 b/d) 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Iran (Founding Member) 3,829.0 4,539.5 5,023.1 5,860.9 6,021.6 5,350.1 5,882.9 5,662.8 5,241.7 3,167.9 1,467.4 1,262.8
Iraq(Founding Member) 1,548.6 1,694.1 1,465.5 2,018.1 1,970.6 2,261.7 2,415.4 2,348.2 2,562.0 3,476.9 2,646.4 897.4
Kuwait (Founding Member) 2,989.6 3,196.7 3,283.0 3,020.4 2,546.1 2,084.2 2,145.4 1,969.0 2,131.4 2,500.3 1,663.7 1,129.7
Saudi Arabia (Founding Member) 3,799.1 4,768.9 6,016.3 7,596.2 8,479.7 7,075.4 8,577.2 9,199.9 8,301.1 9,532.6 9,900.5 9,808.0
Venezuela (Founding Member) 3,708.0 3,549.1 3,219.9 3,366.0 2,976.3 2,346.2 2,294.4 2,237.9 2,165.5 2,356.4 2,165.0 2,108.3
Qatar (joined 1961) 362.4 430.7 482.4 570.3 518.4 437.6 497.3 444.6 486.7 508.1 471.4 415.2
Indonesia (joined 1962) 853.6 892.1 1,080.8 1,338.5 1,374.5 1,306.5 1,503.6 1,686.2 1,635.2 1,590.8 1,537.2 1,558.4
Libya (joined 1962) 3,318.0 2,760.8 2,239.4 2,174.9 1,521.3 1,479.8 1,932.6 2,063.4 1,982.5 2,091.7 1,831.6 1,217.8
UAE (joined 1967) 779.6 1,059.5 1,202.7 1,532.6 1,678.6 1,663.8 1,936.4 1,998.7 1,830.5 1,830.7 1,701.9 1,502.3
Algeria (joined 1969) 1,029.1 785.4 1,062.3 1,097.3 1,008.6 982.6 1,075.1 1,152.3 1,161.2 1,153.8 1,019.9 797.8
Nigeria (joined 1971) 1,531.2 1,815.7 2,054.3 2,255.0 1,783.2 2,066.8 2,085.1 1,897.0 2,302.0 2,058.0 1,439.6
Ecuador (joined 1973) 208.8 177.0 160.9 187.9 183.4 201.8 214.2 204.1 211.0
Gabon (joined 1975) 223.0 222.8 222.0 208.7 203.4 175.0 151.0
Non OPEC Production 22981.4 22693.2 23505.4 24194.4 24888.2 25593.8 26452.9 28327.1 30148.5 31534.8 32515.3 33130.2
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Figure 3.4: Shares of global oil production between OPEC and non OPEC producers: 1960-1981  
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm  
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years. Moreover, what exacerbated both the dependency that advanced economies had on 
cheap crude oil and the growing consumption patterns, was that by the time the Arab oil 
embargo arrived in late 1973, roughly 56% of global oil production originated from 
OPEC countries. This in turn, meant that the Arab states of OPEC, by 1973, contributed 
almost 37% of global oil production – of which was denied to the supporters of Israel 
during the embargo. And so, the convergence of these seemingly disconnected factors is 
what led to price of oil being almost quadrupled from 1973’s price of $3.29 ($16.66 in 
2011 figures) to $11.58 ($52.58) in 1974, which became a constant fixture of the global 
economy throughout the 1970s until the next oil shock of 1979. 
 Throughout the 1970s, as economics merged with the politicization of oil 
production and export policies, the price of crude, long a domain of the Companies, 
shifted to producing countries, of which OPEC was the main driving force. As 
nationalization began to be institutionalized – both individually, according to the unique 
circumstances of the particular Member state, and collectively through OPEC – the 
Companies began to realize that the traditional mechanisms that allowed their control of 
crude oil prices were now eroding. The fundamental incapacity of the majors oil firms to 
halt or reverse collective appropriations by OPEC (although by no means was each 
Member State’s case uniform) introduced a new sense of volatility to the global oil 
market. OPEC’s previous motivation of price defense, of which was the central reason 
why the Organization was formed, had now largely been achieved. No longer would 
foreign firms control export volume and subsequently price. But as power shifted to the 
producers, the policy of price reversal, only to be followed and later replaced by price 
increases, gradually became the mantra and the central driving force of Organization. 
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And as the reasons for this dynamic were not purely economic, later to be mostly political, 
as a result, there came about significant short-term and long-term ramifications to 
OPEC’s changed strategy.  
 Regarding the short-term ramifications, the major producing countries tactically 
responded to the market conditions by utilizing oil export policies (i.e. reductions and 
redirections of oil production and exports) for fast-tracking revenue accumulation. This 
was done to not only alleviate any remaining domestic economic shortcomings that they 
had in the 1960s, when many of them relied on US aid, but more so to modernize their 
economies, and in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, to strengthen their respective 
conventional military power. As the Arab states of OPEC, under the OAPEC umbrella, 
politicized exports via embargoes, in retaliation for Western support for Israel in the 6-
day War and in the Yom Kippur War, the power of the oil weapon became infused with 
this new revenue accumulation strategy. Hence, the result was that the OPEC, as a force 
in the international economy, turned into a price maximizer; i.e. attempting to get as 
much revenue for its Member’s oil exports as possible, which was an evolution from its 
founding principle of price defense. This strategy was reinforced by the conventional, but 
ultimately inaccurate, belief in the global economy of that time that crude oil reserves 
globally were becoming exhaustible, thus justifying OPEC’s collective demand for 
higher prices.  
 This tactical policy, by default, had significant long-term ramifications for the 
global oil industry and the global economy. The first was that it eventually drove many of 
the advanced economies, chiefly those that were extremely reliant on crude oil imports, 
to alternatives sources of energy and non-OPEC sources of oil. This was only reinforced 
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by the major Companies, witnessing the irreversible loss of their prior positions, to look 
for newer, and often more expenses sources of supply – both in recovery costs (i.e. the 
extraction and production overhead) and in transportation costs. What followed then was 
a renewed global awareness of conservation and efficiency efforts, which first took hold 
in Japan, and spread to other advanced and developing economies. However, by far the 
most significant consequence was the gradual destruction of any cartel system that, in 
many ways, was the legacy of the Companies’ control over the global oil industry. While 
OPEC inherited the mechanisms and framework that would allow it to theoretically 
become a cartel, its behavior, both as a single actor in the international economy and as 
composite Organization created the conditions market share disintegration, not 
accumulation. Indeed, the notion that OPEC was ever a cartel is fundamentally at odds 
with how it has behaved in the global economy. As Fadhil Chalabi has argued, in this 
period where the initial efforts of price defense evolved into an offensive goal of price 
maximization, any lasting hope for the Organization to keep the market share 
accumulation paradigm that the Companies built was lost – all for the short-term, tactical 
goal of revenue accumulation. 266 Had OPEC discouraged (or possessed the ability to 
discourage) the politicization of exports by its Arab faction in 1973-74 or even attempted 
to stabilize prices by increasing volume post-embargo to the point that would discourage 
consumers to look for alternatives and new supplies, its chance at a cartel would have 
been much higher. But considering that the nature of any cartel is to dominate market 
share, OPEC’s hawkishness on price only encouraged consumers to look for alternatives 
and alter consumption patterns, thus undermining efforts at cartelization. OPEC’s 
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offensive price maximization strategy, by default, eroded its potential at being a cartel. 
As Figure 3.4 shows, the dramatic decline of OPEC’s market share is evident when 
comparing its 1973 figures (56% of global crude production) to that of 1981 (40% of 
global crude production). Therefore, while the Ascendancy era began with the 
Organization finding a dominant, arguably the dominant voice in the global oil industry – 
thus ushering in a new, changed period for the global economy – the end of this era 
would also dramatically reshape the Organization’s functionality and its impact on the 
global oil market. The decisions, Group consensus, and lack of consensus within the 
Organization, often times complicated by inter-member rivalries and renewed domestic 
crises in Member States, ultimately laid the ground work for the free-market based oil 
market that has been an often times, volatile fixture of the global economy since the 
beginning of the 1980s.  
Outside Forces 
 US evolution to active engagement   
 
Yet as the Ascendancy era of OPEC’s institutional life began, the US and many of the 
home states of the major Companies, had by then begun to reach out to OPEC on its own 
terms, meaning bestowing official recognition to the Organization, and eventually going 
beyond that. While the intensification of the negotiations between the Companies and 
OPEC had much to do with this strategic shift, the preeminence of the Middle East region 
to US strategic thinking, due to the massive amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the region, 
its growing importance to the global oil supply, only to be exacerbated Cold War 
calculations vis-à-vis the USSR, played a crucial role in the US decision to actively 
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engage OPEC as entity in and of itself – instead remaining in the position of background 
neutrality . As the core of OPEC producing power resided in the Middle East region, an 
active engagement policy with the Group became central to US grand strategy like never 
before. 
British Middle Eastern Withdrawal and US Twin Pillar Policy  
 In February of 1967, the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in highlighting 
the unique importance of the region to the global economy, advocated that the US 
“should for the foreseeable future, regard the Soviet presence and present Soviet policy in 
the Middle East as the primary threat to vital US interests”. 267  The NIE’s pressing 
concern was a reaction to the coming perceived void that was to be left by the British 
withdrawal East of the Suez. 268 Though London’s decision was driven by a prolonged 
economic decline, coinciding with the gradual curtailing of its geopolitical power, 269 its 
coming absence from the region – chiefly what that would project to the USSR and 
market worries regarding oil supply – became a significant source of concern for the US. 
270 The NIE summarized how the regional flux with the coming British departure would 
affect both US strategic concerns and the perceptions of Soviet decision makers:  
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British withdrawal following World War II was followed by a decade in 
which new governments were taking their first steps, a combination of 
British and American aid and assistance linked with mutual security 
arrangements provided the essential support for early development and a 
degree of stability; the Soviets, concentrating in Europe on consolidating 
their position and at home on recovering from the war, did not pose an 
immediate threat to the area. In the 1958-67 decade, the Soviets, 
accepting for the present the status quo in Europe, have turned south to 
concentrate their major efforts outside of the Bloc in establishing the 
USSR as the dominant Great Power in the Middle East. In this decade" 
British power in the area has all but collapsed; the U.S." never militarily 
strong "East of Suez II, has moved into a period' of retrenchment and 
disengagement based partly on lack of agreement within the United States 
Government on the nature and seriousness of the threat to U.S. interests in 
the Middle East" partly on limited resources and partly on a conscious 
readjustment of policy toward a less militant resistance to the expansion 
of Soviet Influence into the area…. If within the Middle East Region, the 
military balance of power between the revolutionary and moderate forces 
can be established and the Soviets denied and extension of influence 
through Soviet “proxy military bases”, the Soviet threat can be reduced to 
a tolerable level. Stated simply, most of the countries of the Middle East 
region are capable of withstanding the Soviet policy of “peaceful 
coexistence” as it is known in Western Europe; the Middle East cannot 
withstand the combined pressures of “peaceful coexistence” and Soviet 
support of “the liberation struggle” in the Middle East with massive 
Soviet arms aid…. The period 1967-75 will be decisive for the political 
forces contending for control, of the area between Asia and Western 
Europe. Geopolitically, on the availability of resources and vis-à-vis the 
apparent level of current commitment, the advantages rest with the Soviet 
Union. In the absence of any early basic decision by the United States, 
Western Europe and those free Asian countries with interests in the 
Middle East to meet the Soviet challenge there, it appears inevitable that 
the U.S. position as a Great Power in this region can be written off by the 
end of this period. 271 
 
The NIE’s explicit reference to the changing regional environment in light of the British 
withdrawal rested on three realities. The first had to do with a lack of agreement on the 
extent of US physical involvement in the Middle East, meaning what kind of long-term 
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conventional military defense Washington would afford to the region writ large. The 
second was a diagnosis of the region when comparing US influential capability, which 
was undecided and possibly in relative retrenchment, as opposed to Soviet influential 
capability, which at a minimum was constant because of its proximity to the region. The 
American conclusion, as stated above, was that if trends continued, its position as a 
“Great Power” could inevitably be “written off”. 272 But finally, it was presumed that 
while the US could not massively build up conventional power in the region, there was a 
way to balance out Soviet influence by providing support to friendly governments.  
 It was under these circumstances that the rationale of the American Twin Pillar 
policy for the Middle East was developed. Accordingly, Washington would assist and 
oversee the strengthening of Iranian and Saudi military power in the Persian Gulf and the 
wider region. 273  However, the US had to tread carefully. Though this policy was 
designed as a counterweight to the Soviet military threat and political influence in the 
region, the Twin Pillar policy, by extension, was also intended to balance against Soviet-
aligned regional states. The problem though was that some of those very Soviet-aligned 
states were fellow OPEC Members, chiefly Iraq, which by the beginning of the 
Ascendancy era was fully under Baathist control with Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr as 
President. Other states at the time, such as Libya and Algeria were wild cars, having 
become recently independent with severe economic challenges and/or political instability.  
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US pushed into role as de-facto intermediary in OPEC-Companies negotiations  
For most of the 1960s, the US was consciously ignoring OPEC, until in 1966 where both 
the US and UK decided to shift to open neutrality in the negotiations between OPEC and 
the Companies. 274 The importance of the negotiations, the US fear of Soviet exploitation 
of OPEC Member State’s discontent, and any instability resulting from tightening market 
conditions eventually moved the US away from its position of conscious indifference, to 
open neutrality, to a more active brokering role. From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, 
the US took on an open intermediary position concerning the negotiations between both 
sides, while also actively, albeit grudgingly, intervening in the dynamics of the oil 
industry. Washington was no longer just concerned about an abstract peaceful resolution 
to the OPEC-Companies dispute. The details of the negotiations, the ramifications of the 
outcome, and the particular dynamics within the global oil industry were now deeply 
affecting how the US approached the broader issue.  
 Washington’s intervention took place on three, interrelated fronts: playing a 
broker role which often required nudging both sides in what turned out to be a tactical 
compromise; investigating, formulating, and ultimately prescribing its own policies that 
could potentially bring resolution to the broader OPEC-Companies conflict; and lastly, as 
a major energy consumer itself, altering its own domestic policy, via import control 
revisions, in order to increase the market share and revenue of some key OPEC states – 
done to mollify their apprehensions about the negotiations. This pattern was first adopted 
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in relation to disputes with America’s allies within OPEC and their respective concession 
holders. At the beginning of this Ascendancy period, it was the dispute between Iran and 
the Consortium that appeared to be the most worrisome for the US. In April of 1968, the 
Iranian government and the Consortium came to a temporary agreement to enhance the 
time needed to arrive at a more comprehensive resolution to Iran’s request for additional 
control over price, volume, and, more importantly, production-sharing.275 Iran, as other 
OPEC Members, was counting on a certain level of rising revenue to match their 
previously described defense and development costs for the next few years. The US 
government, by that time deeply involved in the negotiations, sketched out what the 
Iranian strategy was vis-à-vis the Companies  – of which was clearly a template that other 
producers were either watching or soon to be mimicking:  
The Iranians would prefer, as the simplest solution (and the only one 
likely to succeed), that the members of the Consortium lift enough oil to 
provide, through the usual royalties and taxes, the desired level of 
governmental revenue…. If the Consortium is unable to do this, it must 
provide the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) with a sufficient 
quantity of oil from the Consortium area at a low enough price so that 
NIOC could make up the shortfall in revenue through its own sales or 
barter arrangements. The oil could be provided by modifying the terms of 
the Consortium's 1966 agreement to make barter oil available to NIOC, 
by turning over to NIOC an already producing field in the Consortium 
area, or by conferring upon the Iranian Government membership in the 
Consortium. The government has indicated that, in case of refusal, Iran 
might take unilateral measures to obtain the oil. 276 
 
Though the Consortium, under American insistence, considered as a possible solution 
additional output, which would increase taxes and royalties to the Iranians, the market 
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conditions in the late 1960s still had not tightened enough to justify such a move. 
However, Iran and other producers increasingly saw the insistence of production sharing 
if additional Companies output was not doable as the next best option – given the 
constraints of the concessionary holders and the market conditions.  
 Major producers had come to believe, that in light of the very modest gains 
regarding the prior fight over royalty payments with the concession holders, and 
considering that the posted price system was still intact (and under control of the 
Companies), that the logic of production-sharing was the most sensible path towards 
more revenue. Though this process was not a novel idea, it was under the OPEC umbrella 
where it gained traction. The simultaneous establishment of the National Oil Companies 
(NOCs) in producing states, some of which were older while others came about in the 
initial years after OPEC’s formation, was the vehicle that host states intended to use to 
enhance revenue. 277 
 Nevertheless, what production sharing essentially amounted to for the Companies 
was a de-facto, arbitrary reduction in the concession agreement within the host country, 
by the respective host government. In other words, it was seen as an indirect first step 
towards nationalization. In the past, Companies were only concerned about other firms; 
some fellow national firms while others foreign, competing for concessions. Though the 
threat of appropriation by varying host governments was a lingering concern, they never 
had to worry about an internal large competitor in the host country controlled by the host 
government, gradually splitting their concessions until nationalization was realized. 
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Moreover, for the Companies, acquiescing to the terms of the producing states, would not 
only lead to a market surplus, as NOCs would gradually saturate the market, but would 
irreversibly collapse the Companies ’ market share.  
 Although each OPEC Member operated under different concessionary agreements, 
their collective experience in gaining only modest revenue increases with the royalty 
payments, and the many unresolved questions about new profit sharing arrangements, 
gradually created a consensus to production sharing. However, though Member States 
were beginning to coalesce around this new approach, it remained largely an aspiration, 
with the sole exception of Iran. It was here where the US government in 1969, noticed the 
beginning of this trend in Member States:  
One of the latest of the numerous issues that have arisen between Middle 
Eastern governments and the holders of petroleum concessions in their 
territories concerns a demand by governments for participation in the 
exploitation of previously granted exclusive concessions…. The principle 
that governments of oil-producing countries have a right to participate in 
the ownership of petroleum concessionaire Companies, even though the 
concession agreement makes no provision for such participation, has been 
publicly sponsored by OPEC…. Presumably, therefore, all the members of 
OPEC endorse this principle and could be expected at some time or other 
to present to the holders of exclusive petroleum concessions in their 
territories a demand for an equity share in the producing company. For 
various reasons, however, it is probable that the first and principal targets 
for that demand, when and if it is made, will be the “Big Four” 
concessionaire Companies—Aramco in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwait Oil 
Company in Kuwait, the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affiliates in Iraq, 
and the Consortium in Iran. So far, no specific demand has been made. 
Iran has threatened unilateral enforcement of participation but only if its 
revenue demands are not met by the Consortium. Public statements on 
participation have been made in some other OPEC countries, but only in 
Saudi Arabia has any government official had even an informal discussion 
with the concessionaire company on the subject. Nowhere have the 
manner, the timing, and the expected results of participation in existing 
exclusive concessions been set forth in more than the vaguest of terms. It 
would appear that none of the OPEC countries, except perhaps Iran, is 
prepared to make a real issue of participation in the near future—possibly 
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not at all as long as governmental oil revenues continue to grow at 
somewhere near the rate governments expect. Iran’s threat to spur the 
OPEC countries into concerted action to gain participation if Iranian 
revenue demands are not met cannot be taken seriously. For more than 
one reason, there is virtually no prospect of concerted action that would 
serve to bolster Iran’s demands, primarily because those demands could 
be met only at the expense of other oil-producing countries. The probable 
results of the acquisition by governments of even a modest equity 
participation in such prolific concessions as those of the Big Four would 
be either (1) an increased per-barrel revenue for the government on oil 
exports, thus putting a further direct squeeze on oil-company profits, or 
(2) the provision to governments of sizable amounts of oil at production 
cost, the sale of which, probably at cut rates, would be likely not only to 
diminish the Companies’ own sales but further erode the crude-oil price 
structure. Since crude oil prices are already gradually falling and 
measures now in force will insure to governments a rising proportion of 
oil export profits over the next five or six years even if no further steps in 
this direction are taken, the concessionaire Companies may be expected to 
dig in their heels on the participation issue. Governments would probably 
have to resort to extremely drastic measures in any attempt to force 
participation on their concessionaires—measures that would be likely to 
leave both sides worse off. We doubt that, with the possible exception of 
Iran, Middle Eastern governments are prepared or will be prepared in the 
next few years to take that risk, barring unforeseen developments that 
would seriously threaten the normal growth of their oil revenues. 278 
 
Though the US was dismissive of collective action, sparked by Iranian attempts to force 
production sharing on its concession holders, or even the Iranian ability to rally other 
Members, its concerns regarding Iran’s own actions against the Consortium was quite 
apparent. And by this period, Iran, by far was the closest ally that Washington had in 
OPEC. The risks of instability that could be set off by Iran’s decision towards forced 
production sharing on the Consortium, and the possibility of that becoming a template, 
regardless of the US dismissal of this prospect, spurned the US, under the Nixon 
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administration, towards a different approach in order to address the revenue of concerns 
of producing states.  
 Due to Washington’s fear and the purported unfeasibility of production sharing 
policies, the US, being the largest consumer of energy, decided to alter its domestic oil 
consumption matrix as to break the paradigm of the conflict between OPEC and the 
Companies. This was to be done by manipulating the American oil import quota system. 
Now the import quota system (i.e. the Mandatory Oil Import Quota Program) initially 
established in 1959 by the Eisenhower administration, 279 was one of the key contributing 
factors in why the Bettencourt administration in Venezuela reached out to Middle East 
producers in the pre-OPEC days. 280 As mentioned previously, this action, in restricting 
Venezuelan sales to the largest economy, only worsened its economic challenges at home, 
leading to collusion amongst the Member States. Amongst the main goals of the 
imposition of the oil import quota system by Washington was straightforward: to help 
buttress the eroding financial wellbeing of domestically based US oil firms that could not 
compete with the major Companies. 281 President Eisenhower justified the system by 
saying that it was designed to “insure a stable, healthy [oil] industry in the United States 
capable of exploring for and developing new hemisphere reserves to replace those being 
depleted” and that its “basis…is the certified requirements of our national security which 
make it necessary that we preserve to the greatest extent possible a vigorous, healthy 
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petroleum industry in the United States.” 282 Moreover, on a security level, the system 
sought to lessen the threat of mass dependence of the US on foreign oil, thus “given 
restricted imports the domestic oil industry would thus be encouraged to locate and 
develop domestic supplies.” 283 
 However, as the 1970s approached, the logic behind of this system no longer held 
up. The tightening market environment not only created the conditions where American 
based firms were no longer threatened by price erosion, but more importantly for the US, 
keeping this system intact was now leading to artificial inflated oil prices at home. As 
early as 1968, to deal with the problem between Iran the Consortium, Washington 
suggested lifting some import controls on Iranian crude. 284 The added benefit would 
mean more crude oil imported from an allied nation, cheaper prices at home, and a 
lessening of the revenue concerns of Iran. Furthermore, this would also ameliorate some 
of the constraints that Iran’s concession holders were placed under, primarily because of 
the market conditions and the OPEC-Companies negotiations.  
 This formula added to the serious debate that was already taking place in the US 
in terms of relaxing certain import quotas. 285 As this debate broadened in the Nixon 
administration, the complications in the import quota system, the purported costs to 
American consumers, and pressure from major foreign-based Companies on the US 
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government pushed forward the possibility for instituting decontrol of oil imports. 286 In 
August of 1969, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a study concerning the 
prospects of American access to global oil supplies for the next 15 years – in accordance 
with the internal debate and in possible anticipation of decontrol.  The primary US 
concern was that if the walls were taken down, and the US market would become 
accessible to foreign oil similar to pre-1959, would the American economy become 
vulnerable to supply disruption – either intended or unintended? After surveying the 
global energy matrix by Companies, regions, and allies, the CIA, in its summary, was 
confident that it would be:  
…highly unlikely that the US would encounter serious difficulties in 
obtaining its foreign oil requirements over the next 10 to 20 years, given 
the assumed termination of import restrictions. There are several major 
reasons for this judgment. Even 10 years from now, US import 
requirements would amount to only about 15 percent of the total amount 
of oil, which, it is estimated, would then be moving in world trade. Given 
the great and growing diversification of major sources of crude oil, supply 
is becoming increasingly invulnerable to disruption—voluntary or 
involuntary—by individual countries. Hence, although we would expect 
political upheavals to occur sporadically in various producing countries 
in the years to come, often with the chance of disrupting oil production for 
a time, such instances are unlikely seriously to curtail American access to 
world oil. Moreover, the oil producing states are heavily dependent on 
petroleum revenues. Even another Arab-Israeli war would probably not 
unite the Arab oil producers enough to let them long maintain an anti-US 
embargo. All things considered, the US, with the cooperation of US oil 
companies, would find it relatively easy to overcome the effects of any 
selective embargos that might occur from time to time. 287 
 
The CIA’s assurances notwithstanding, they also factored in that the “most likely source 
of a serious disruption of world oil supplies” that could potentially “affect US access to 
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oil is the Arab world.” 288 Though the market conditions were tightening, there was really 
no way of knowing what the global consumption patterns would become in the 1970s, or 
as will be discussed, how the Arab world’s reaction to the Yom Kippur war of 1973, of 
which was severally discounted by the CIA, would ultimately be. Yet, with these 
calculations in mind, the US began the phased adjustment to its import quota system in 
the beginning of the 1970s. The alterations to the oil import quota greatly benefited 
Canada and Mexico, which had earlier enjoyed what was dubbed ‘hemispheric 
preferences’ but now extended to key OPEC Member Venezuela, which had been denied 
this hemispheric advantage for most of the quota years. 289 Eventually the US would also 
include other its allies in OPEC by offering “special treatment”, namely, Iran, Indonesia, 
and Saudi Arabia. 290 And by 1973, after years of alterations to the import quotas that 
essentially rendered the program hollow, the Nixon administration formally put an end to 
the system.  
Interstate Dynamics 
 Instituting Nationalization  
 
At the same time that the US was adapting policies in reaction towards the OPEC-
Companies negotiations, significant changes were also underway within the internal 
structure of OPEC. Though by the beginning of the 1970s, the Organization’s 
achievements in the negotiations were quite modest, they were enough to pique the 
interest of other minor producers that on their own felt quite vulnerable to their 
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concession holders. To these smaller players, the OPEC umbrella had much to offer. In 
this Ascendancy period, Algeria joined in 1969, Nigeria in 1972, Ecuador in 1973, and 
Gabon 1975. In virtually all of these second generational states that would join the 
Organization, the fundamental dilemma concerning host state’s profit sharing and 
production sharing concerns (i.e. more revenue for the host government) vs. the 
concession holders’ economic priorities (i.e. managing costs in a changing global oil 
industry) were essentially the same. Moreover, as newly independent states crossed the 
threshold from their initial, post-independence instability to finding government models 
with some governance capability, OPEC came to represent an institution battling the 
excesses of developed economies on behalf of the collective rights of the developing 
world. Indeed, it was this phenomenon that pushed the Organization to eventually 
become infused with the larger struggle of third world nations, particularly such 
institutions as the Non-Aligned movement. Thus, it was not only in these very modest 
producing states, as opposed to the major Member producers, that the stalemate in the 
OPEC-Companies negotiations finally broke. But more so, it was with the addition of 
these modest producing nations, particularly from the Arab world, that created the 
conditions for the politicization of the Group in the 1970s. 
The final phase of domino cascade 
 The implementation of Nationalization  
 
As 1970 approached, while the negotiations between OPEC’s major producing countries 
– namely Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela – had somewhat temporarily been alleviated 
due to direct American involvement, the state of negotiations in other smaller producers 
had reached a stalemate. In Algeria, Iraq, and Libya the lack of progress was leading to 
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radical action from each respective state. Algeria’s entrance into the Organization in 1969, 
brought with it the legacy of French occupation of the country, compounded by the rising 
resentment from the Algerian government towards the concessions that French oil firms 
had in that country. 291 In Iraq, the lack of mobility in Baghdad’s negotiations with the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) further emboldened the new Baathist elite that had 
secured power over the country. And in Libya, Muammar Ghaddafi’s new Revolutionary 
system was now looking to the country’s oil industry to pay for the post-revolutionary 
economic programs his regime was attempting to implement in that country.  
 OPEC’s reaction, though accompanied by little capability to physically support its 
Member States, was nevertheless strong in their rhetorical defense, as exemplified in their 
June 1970 Resolutions XX.114 and XX.115, which supported Algeria and Iraq in the 
their negotiations with their respective concession holders. 292  But as the impasse 
continued well into the summer of 1970, the governments of these modest producers of 
OPEC decided to take matters in their own hands. As Ian Skeet has noted, Algeria began 
the trend at unilateral concessional revisionism by retroactively announcing a new posted 
price, of which was almost 80 cents more per barrel than then current price. 293 The 
Algerians did so by making the same arguments of other Members, that the price was 
artificially low and therefore needed a retroactive price adjustment. This time, however, 
they forced the issue on the concession holders. In Libya, since January of 1970, 
Qaddafi’s revolutionary regime had been consistently applying pressure on the country’s 
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concession holders for better profit sharing terms. As Daniel Yergin has chronicled, the 
greatest source of pressure was applied to the American independent firm, Occidental. 294 
So much so that as Libyan pressure forced Occidental to cut back production in Libya, by 
far their largest concession, fears of supply disruption forced the US government to 
intervene with other major Companies, advising them to make up the lost Occidental 
production via Iran. 295 Though Libya’s second tier status, both within OPEC and in the 
global industry, created a sense in Occidental that Libya’s intransigence would soon 
subside, it was ultimately Qaddafi’s threat of full nationalization that forced major 
concessions from Occidental. 296  In the end, Occidental conceded a 20% increase in 
royalties and taxes to Tripoli, a 30-cent increase in the posted price, and more 
consequentially an increase of 5% of Libya’s profit sharing. 297 It was the latter, bringing 
Libya’s profit sharing arrangement to 55% (with 45% for Occidental) that would erode, 
in rapid order, the remaining 50/50 profit sharing paradigm. Soon afterwards, all foreign 
firms in Libya reluctantly accepted this arrangement.  
Unity Achieved 
Events in Libya, and in other second generational countries of OPEC, created not only a 
new precedent that other larger producers had for years attempted to implement, but also 
a new unity of purpose within the wider Organization. The tacit acceptance of 
‘incrementalism’ by the major producers Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, brought 
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about by measured US attempts at mediation, swiftly broke down. The Iranian 
government, the primary major Member that was once behind concessional revisionism, 
only to be pacified by the US temporarily, utilized the Libyan example for its advantage. 
The argument was quite simple; Tehran’s claims was that if a problematic, revolutionary 
government in a modest producing country could secure better revenue sharing 
arrangements with its concession holders, there was no reason why major producers 
should be denied similar arrangements. Furthermore, the Shah’s unwavering argument, 
both to the US government and the major Companies, was that Iran, being on the 
frontline against the Soviet threat in the Middle East, and being the main pillar of the 
Twin Pillar policy, needed to have special treatment vis-à-vis its oil revenue. Iran was 
just not another oil producer. As Iran was shifting towards radical concessional 
revisionism, Venezuela’s parliament, only weeks before OPEC’s 21st Conference, which 
was scheduled to be in Caracas that year, raised the stakes with the Companies by 
instituting a 60/40 profit sharing arrangement – up 8% from the prior 52/48 arrangement. 
298 
 It was in the fall-winter of 1970-71 were events would come to a head. As OPEC 
celebrated its 10th anniversary, the NOCs of the Member states had begun to prepare for 
what was becoming inevitable: major concessional revision towards full nationalization. 
With the December OPEC meeting approaching, Member States were no longer divided 
between those who were waiting for incremental steps towards revenue reforms vs. those 
who were considered radical. The Algerian and Libyan experiences galvanized the Group. 
In OPEC’s momentous 21st Conference in December of 1970, for the first time, the 
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Organization, as a whole, inherited the position of the so-called radical factions. The 
Algerian and Libyan models were wholly adopted. In Resolution XXI.120, the 
Organization “resolved that all Member Countries adopt…to establish 55 percent as the 
minimum rate of taxation on the next income of the oil companies operating in the 
Member Countries.” 299 In other words, OPEC had collectively taken the initiative behind 
profit sharing. Moreover, the Organization implemented a blanket elimination to any 
existing disparities in the posted price (tax-reference price), with the caveat of 
consideration to any differences in “gravity and geographic location” of Member’s 
specific crude quality. 300 For years, these disparities allowed the Companies to divide 
and negotiate with the Members, usually with tacit cooperation from the US and UK, in 
order to diminish the possibility of mass collective action. Now that had been resolved, at 
least for the time being. OPEC had collectively instituted a direct committee to negotiate 
with the Companies on behalf of the Member states. And lastly, in its 21st Conference, 
OPEC decided to eradicate the allowances that the Companies were given by the host 
states, effective January 1971. 
 After the Conference, the US understood that its efforts in bridging the gap 
between the Companies and OPEC, though successful at delaying, were now shattered. In 
a meeting between the Iranian government and US representatives on December 30, 1970 
in Iran, US representatives were taken aback by the forcefulness of the Iranian 
government’s attitude toward the inevitable price increase that was bound to happen in 
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1971. 301 Moreover, the US increasingly saw the actions of Iran and OPEC as mutually 
reinforcing, a marked change from the past where Iran counted on as holding OPEC to a 
gradualist, moderating position and an ally within the Organization. Simultaneously, 
other Members managed to put aside the particulars of their differences with one another, 
in order to exact whatever coming concessions they could obtain from the Companies.  
 The renewed negotiations were slated to begin in the early days of 1971. Iranian, 
Iraqi, and Saudi representatives headed OPEC’s new unitary negotiating team, while 
Tehran was picked as the venue for what would become transformative negotiations for 
the history of the oil industry and for OPEC. 302 The negotiations would last several 
weeks and would comprise four rounds. Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s former General 
Secretary and a significant figure at the negotiations, stated that both sides remained very 
far apart from their positions, until in February of 1971, after the fourth and final round, 
OPEC offered “a final position that the Companies either ‘take it or leave it’.” 303 Behind 
the scenes, the US was still attempting to move the talks forward by playing the 
intermediary role. Yet the Companies displayed to US officials a deeply entrenched sense 
of mistrust towards the Shah and other Persian Gulf OPEC Members. They cited that no 
“assurance” from them would be “worth very much and that even if agreement reached 
on price, GOI (Government of Iran) will continue to put pressure on Consortium 
members for increased off-lift”. 304  
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 Nevertheless, the sense of unity, determination, and persistence of OPEC 
Members – with the US, and to a lesser extent Western powers, now playing 
intermediaries – rendered the Companies unable to continue the status quo of domination 
of the oil industries in the host countries – whether of price, exploration, or volume. In a 
dispatch from the American embassy in Iran, after meeting with Companies 
representatives, the US assessment was that the “Companies had ‘collapsed’ and met 
virtually all OPEC demands.” 305 The Tehran Price Agreement was the minimum of the 
collective demands that OPEC Members had stipulated from the Companies. Becoming 
effective in mid-February of 1971, the agreement essentially concerned issues of 
retroactive financial adjustments for past revenues for Member States, an increase of 
Persian Gulf revenues in exchange for a pledge by those Members that they will not seek 
to increase prices for 5 years, a new agreed freight premium, and better terms for Libya 
(because of its proximity to Europe and high grade of crude quality). 306 Yet, with the 
Tehran Price Agreement, a noticeable power shift had irreversibly gone to the producers.  
 The Agreement would become one of the most transformative events in the 
history of the oil industry because it marked the official end of the Companies unmatched 
domination of the industry. Though still having immense capital, political clout, and the 
most advanced exploration, production, and transportation technology, the Companies 
would never dominate in the way they had.  Yet, though the Tehran Agreement began a 
process where both sides were to take a step-by-step approach towards an agreed 
resolution on price, and logically to be expanded out to a shared production agreement, 
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that destination was never reached. The official collective negotiations between the 
Group and the Companies became extremely problematic as individual negotiations 
between particular Member States and their concession holders broke down. In Iraq’s 
case, the returning Baathist government, spearheaded by Vice President Saddam Hussein, 
was unable to cope with much of the delays and ultimately the irreconcilable price 
differences that Iraq in particular demanded of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), the 
main concession within the country. As a result, in 1972, Iraq simply nationalized the 
entire industry. 307 In Iran, the Shah, though now clearly pushing for better conditions 
from the Companies and increased with agitation against them, still would not push 
towards full nationalization but adjusted his previous moderation stance within the 
Organization for this new era. 308 Venezuela would successfully follow this piecemeal 
strategy, while Libya and Algeria would continue to agitate for special conditions 
because of their proximity to Europe.  
 Another complicating factor was the fallout from the collapse of Bretton Woods 
Agreement in August of 1971. As the US exit from the increasingly archaic post-WWII 
economic accords depreciated the dollar, Member States agreed among themselves that 
the initial terms set in the Tehran Agreement needed to be revised as it did not account 
for the major variations in dollar exchange rates. No one had anticipated that the US 
would allow the dollar to float. Getting the Companies to agree to revisions to the Tehran 
Agreement, while individual negotiations were happening, was extremely difficult for 
Member States. Fadhil Chalabi even goes as far as to say that the Companies used 
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“delaying tactics, obfuscation with IMF data and general prevarication” to avoid such a 
revision – but ultimately relented to revisit the terms of the Tehran Agreement. 309 
However, this proved to be a futile effort. Though interim arrangements were made 
between both sides in the weeks and months after the collapse of Bretton Woods, by May 
of 1973, negotiations between both sides had broken down by reason of the 
irreconcilability of both sides’ positions. It was ultimately this collapse of negotiations 
between the Companies and OPEC that would eventually become entangled into the 
penchant of certain Arab producers, many of them OPEC Members, to politicize oil 
exports. 
OPEC as a template for the Third World   
From this very long-sought but public battle, OPEC as an institution increasingly saw 
itself (and in some quarters became to be seen) as an important representative voice of 
many in the developing world. Up until that time, it was only the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), created a year after OPEC’s founding, that was the singular 
international organization specifically intended to protect the interests of developing 
countries. 310 Member States and the Organization in general were seen solely through the 
parochial lens of the oil industry and specifically for the protection of their revenue intake. 
Nevertheless, the victory in the negotiations over the Companies, at least in the minds of 
many Member State governments – by virtue that it created a template for other raw 
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material exporting countries – had the potential to enlarge the mandate of the 
Organization.  
 In theory, this dynamic was more under the surface. In subsequent conferences, 
resolutions, and press releases after from the OPEC’s historic 21st Conference and the 
Tehran Price Agreement, there was rarely any mention of any legitimate Third World 
issue. And this was at a time that many African countries (themselves raw material 
exporters), that had recently become independent of European domination, were still 
locked in struggles with their former colonial masters over the production and selling of 
their respective natural resources. To a far lesser extent, this same dynamic was also in 
play in Latin America. OPEC’s succeeding efforts in the weeks and months after the 
Tehran Agreement were directed towards its own issues. These were mainly continued 
institutional development, procedural restructuring, implementing price reforms, 
expanding market research, organizational concerns about the loss of value in the US 
dollar, and monitoring the continued but ultimately futile negotiations with the 
Companies. 311 
 It was at the national, governmental level of certain Member States that issues 
outside of the export and selling of crude oil gradually seeped into OPEC’s 
organizational behavior and made its way into the OPEC forum in general. This is not to 
say that there was an intentional effort by the Organization to politicize exports or 
manipulate prices. However, because for these States OPEC was their only basis of some 
modicum of independence and power within the international system, eventually many of 
their foreign policy priorities would gradually appear in the wider realm of oil production 
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and exports. Moreover, for newly arrived Members, this institution had proven successful, 
at least according to their perception, in slowly rolling back the power and influence of 
the very same forces that had once dominated their economies. It was within this context 
that, underneath the procedural, public face of the Organization (i.e. in resolutions, 
official statements, and conferences), that certain Member States would utilize their 
export policies for non-economic, political reasons. And invariably, the OPEC brand, 
either directly or indirectly, would become attached to their decisions.  
 A forerunner of what was to come was seen in 1967, when the Arab Members of 
OPEC attempted to utilize boycott measures against those states that supported Israel 
during the 6-day War. 312  But due to the market conditions of the 1960s being too 
saturated, the embargo had little effect. More so, oil producers at the time were simply 
unable to muster independent leverage upon powerful consuming countries. The 
concession holders were much too dominant within host countries. The previously 
mentioned 1969 CIA assessment, though having sketched out the scenario of another 
episode of export politicization, were confident that “even another Arab-Israeli war 
would probably not unite the Arab oil producers enough to let them long maintain an 
anti-US embargo.” 313 Yet, by 1973, new market dynamics had dramatically changed the 
environment where that initial analysis was shaped.  The 1969 CIA assessment, which 
was essentially the de-facto position of the West, did not take into consideration the 
abrupt end of Bretton Woods, the ramifications of a ‘floating dollar’, and the direction of 
the negotiations between OPEC and the Companies, which ultimately ended in collapse.  
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 In May of 1973, OPEC, for the first time, officially declared that the talks with the 
Companies were at reaching at an impasse, since in their words, “the oil companies' 
representatives continue to adopt the same negative attitude vis-à-vis the main issue.” 314 
In other words, the fundamental lacuna concerning price and production was still 
unbridgeable, despite the many months that had transpired since the Tehran Agreement. 
However, in the summer of 1973, there seemed to be a tentative breakthrough. Both sides 
had hesitantly reached an understanding regarding further changes to the Tehran 
Agreement because of what OPEC had described as the “world currency turmoil”. 
Previously, they had reached the same level of understanding the year prior, in two 
instances in Geneva. This was to be the final supplemental phase to that agreement which 
would theoretically address the Organization’s concerns regarding the changing currency 
conditions as a result of the end of Bretton Woods, while keeping the Companies bottom 
from being significantly harmed. What it intended to do was amend the formula for 
posted prices; expand the group of currencies (from 9 to 11) that would make it more 
broadly representative of major currency movements against the US dollar; and introduce 
modifications towards price setting, such as recalibration of price formula by month as 
opposed to quarterly. 315 But this arrangement needed to be settled on the new parameters 
of the Tehran Price Agreement, and specifically according to the new conditions on profit 
sharing. Yet, this did not take place, as the production costs to the producers did not keep 
up with the rising profits that the Companies were making on the market. Fadhil Chalabi, 
who has at the negotiations and having commissioned a study to investigate the matter on 
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behalf of the Iraqi government, concurred that 
by mid-1973 the prices of oil products in the main consuming centers were 
rising significantly. After netting back the crude oil price with costs for 
handling, refining and transportation, we reached a free-on-board (EO. 
B.) price in the Gulf that was well in excess of the official price of the $3 
per barrel stated in the Tehran Agreement of February 1971. This meant 
that the government's per-barrel share, according to that agreement, was 
equivalent to considerably less than two-thirds of the netback value of 
crude. In other words, the companies were reaping windfalls from the new 
prices of products without sharing them with the host governments. This 
fact signaled the need for the Tehran-agreed price to be increased at a 
commensurate rate so as to realign the profit-sharing basis, prior to any 
increase in the market price. 316 
 
While there was initially no consensus about once again revisiting the formula for the 
Tehran Price Agreement, as the Fall of 1973 came around, all Members, including still 
cautious Iran, was on board to challenge the Companies  on this matter once again.  
 The Companies , however, refused to renegotiate a formula that they had 
previously assumed was resolved. In meetings from September of 1973, to mid-October, 
OPEC and the Companies  attempted last minute attempts at resolving the issue. 
However, the gap proved much too large.  As Member States were to resume discussions 
among themselves in Kuwait in early October of 1973, to discuss a response to the 
Companies , hostilities broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors in the Yom 
Kippur War. Though the Arab Members of OPEC were still heavily involved in the 
negotiations with the Companies , under the OAPEC umbrella, which was foundationally 
set up as a politicized institution by Arab oil producing countries, some of these same 
OPEC Member States were planning a boycott against all the sources of support for Israel. 
Having the experience of the 6-day War of 1967 fresh in their minds, many in the West, 
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most importantly the US government, expected that the Arab states would at least attempt 
to utilize the oil weapon. In a meeting on the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1973 in October 15, 
1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his cabinet specifically went over the 
possibility of this scenario coming to fruition:  
Mr. DiBona: There are two possibilities. One, the Arabs cut off oil 
supplies from the Arab sources to the US alone. We could handle this, 
with some strain. Second, a total cut-off of Arab oil to all recipients. If we 
should try to equalize the burden, this would mean the US would be 
shipping oil out to Western Europe and Japan. This would require 5 or 6 
million barrels per day from the US—one-third of the US consumption. 
Mr. Rush: The economic impact in this country would be so striking that it 
couldn’t be done. 
Secretary Kissinger: What about the impact of a cut-off in Europe and 
Japan? They would go crazy. 
Mr. DiBona: It would affect their attitude toward the war. 
Secretary Kissinger: To say the least! 
Adm. Moorer: They have already made their attitude clear. They expect 
the US to carry the entire burden. 
Secretary Kissinger: And they have been … unhelpful in the diplomacy. 
Mr. Sisco: The pressures would increase from Europe, but they haven’t 
lifted a finger to help us with the Arabs as it is. It cuts both ways. 
Gov. Love: You would see an almost automatic flow of French and 
German technicians to the Arab countries if there were an oil cut-off. We 
would lose out in the area. 
Mr. Rush: It’s unrealistic to think they would be willing to suffer 
economically for us. 
Secretary Kissinger: How can they avoid it? 
Mr. Rush: By staying with the Arabs and keeping the oil flowing. 
Secretary Kissinger: If they do this, they would be doing us a favor. What 
more could they do for the Arabs than they have already done? There is a 
limit beyond which they can’t push us without losing their NATO 
relationship. There are two alternatives: (1) the Arabs may cut off oil to 
the US only; there would be some resolutions in the Security Council we 
would have to veto, but we wouldn’t be that badly hurt; (2) the Arabs cut 
off oil to Europe. The Europeans would gain nothing, and they couldn’t be 
doing anything worse to us than they are already doing. And if the 
Europeans try to do to us what we did to them at Suez, we could do more 
to them in retaliation. They can’t afford to go into open opposition to us. 
Is that a fair statement? 
All agreed. 
Gov. Love: Any approach to rational thinking on the part of the Saudis 
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will show them that a complete cut-off is not in their self-interest. 
Secretary Kissinger: We have had no indication up to now that they intend 
a cut-off. They have been extremely circumspect. They have never 
threatened an oil cut-off in any official channel. Officially, they have taken 
exactly the opposite tack. 
Mr. Colby: We have an indication that the Saudis are being very cautious 
about this oil country meeting tomorrow.  
Secretary Kissinger: I sent them a letter yesterday telling them about our 
sending supplies to Israel. They replied that we should keep it in a low key 
and blame it on the Soviets.  
Mr. Sisco: This was not from the King, but we think it is official. 
Secretary Kissinger: I’ve been dealing with the oil guy. We have no 
indication that there will be a cut-off. But if there is, I think the President 
will go for the whole program, minus rationing. That would be the best 
way to bring maximum pressure on the Arabs…. 317 
 
Even with the scenarios that were studied, the US, at the eleventh hour, was confident 
that an oil embargo against them and the West was highly unlikely. Moreover, not only 
were they confident that the European reaction would keep the Arab producers from such 
an action, but in this particular conversation, US officials all but admitted that Arab 
producers were aware of US help to Israel in the war. In other words, one of the main 
reasons that the US, along with its partners, thought that they could handle the OAPEC 
embargo was because of its outreach to Saudi Arabia during the Arab-Israeli crisis of 
1973.  
 What they did not expect was how the collapse of negotiations between OPEC 
and the Companies  would amplify the planned OAPEC embargo against the high oil 
consuming free market economies and the rest of the world. 318  And that is exactly what 
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happened. The negotiations that OPEC was having with the Companies’ representatives 
in the fall of 1973 were mainly intended to adjust the profit sharing and production 
sharing provisions of the Tehran Agreement of 1971. From the standpoint of the Member 
States, they were never intended to radically alter the global oil industry, as the existence 
of the sheer existence of the Tehran Declaration was evidence enough that such an 
occurrence had already transpired. However, as talks reached an acrimonious impasse on 
October 8, 1973, Member States convened in both Vienna and Kuwait, ultimately 
deciding to take their demands into unchartered waters. A day after Kissinger’s October 
15th cabinet meeting, OPEC decided to unilaterally impose adjustments to the Tehran 
Price Agreement by declaring sole proprietorship over the price of oil that their countries 
were exporting. 319 For international cover, at least in the realms of international law, the 
Organization decided to frame this decision as being in line with Resolution 90 of June of 
1968, which could broadly be interpreted that OPEC had jurisdiction of not just over 
production, but also over price. But in enacting this unilateral price measure, which 
would put Arabian Light crude to $3.65 per barrel, raising total oil prices from $2.48 to 
$3.29 per barrel (in 1973 prices), OPEC would redefine the architecture of how oil prices 
would be set throughout the decade, only to change in the mid-1980s. In its press 
communiqué on October 16th announcing the decision, the Organization affirmed that the 
12th of October was the last official day that the Companies  were involved in price 
setting. Moreover, they stated that:   
From this day on, actual market prices will determine the level of 
corresponding posted prices, keeping the same relationship between the 
two prices as existed in 1971 before the Tehran Agreement. The correction 
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for changing posted prices upwards or downwards will take place when 
the actual market prices of crude oil exceed or drop below the 
corresponding level of the new announced prices by one per cent.  
 
What this ultimately amounted to was a whole scale revolution in the economics of the 
oil industry, as the Companies  never thought that the Member States would so quickly 
abandon the established posted price system. From the companies’ perspective, doing so 
would risk too much backlash against OPEC. However, the coming together of global 
demand, the shift of power to the producers (in that 54% of global oil output came from 
OPEC), the US and her allies official shift to neutrality, and the cohesion of OPEC 
created the conditions for the posted-price system to be abolished by Member States.  
 The OAPEC embargo against the supporters of Israel merely amplified a trend 
that had been coalescing for weeks. The convergence of these two distinct trends, of 
which OPEC Members’ price disputes with the Companies  was well into their third 
decade, both dramatically altered the economics of the oil industry. As Figure 3.1 shows, 
it increased the price of crude oil astronomically in 1974, with debilitating effects in 
North America, Europe, Japan, and even in some parts of the Third World. However, it 
firmly placed the domain of price control – for better or for worse – in the hands of oil 
producers for the next decade. The OAPEC embargo showcasing of the oil weapon had a 
profound effect on how oil producers, the most important institution being OPEC, were 
viewed by a host of global actors. The US gradually began to understand this fact. In the 
end of November of 1973, US Secretary of State Kissinger, in a meeting with President 
Richard Nixon highlighted this changing dynamic:  
The Europeans and Japan have gone to the Arabs and said “What do you 
want us to do?” This is intolerable. If we give in to this: (1) It encourages 
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the radical elements. (2) It gives an opportunity to the Europeans to 
escalate the proposal. (3) It gives an opportunity to the Soviet Union to 
escalate the proposal. For example, the Africans are now proposing to 
keep the embargo until the United States stops its racist policies. We could 
be faced by blackmail from all raw material producers. We will talk with 
the producers, but not under blackmail. There is some chance they will 
back off the embargo and give negotiations a chance. 320 
  
An emerging outcome from the oil shock of 1973-74 was that it was making oil 
producers, OPEC and OAPEC, in the eyes of the US as independent actors within 
geopolitics, and not just some arena of conflict with the USSR. In other words, the US 
was now seeing that decisions made in these relatively weaker oil exporting states was 
not necessarily compatible in the Cold War binaries of the day, but had a specific genesis 
internally. It was the fallout from the 1973 OAPEC embargo that fundamentally changed 
US strategy towards producers, not only abandoning its efforts of mediation between the 
Companies and OPEC, but more importantly, planning to counter the direct and indirect 
dependence of the advanced economies upon the Organization.  
 This price shock of 1973-1974 is what initiated a changing in relations between 
the US and oil producers, in that traditional alliances and enmities would dramatically 
shift. Initially, the US would hold Saudi Arabia, being the principal actor in OAPEC, 
responsible for the embargo. In a meeting with the US National Security Council (NSC), 
Secretary Kissinger was extremely worried about precedent, and specifically how if the 
US would give into OAPEC’s demands, that a dangerous model would be created for 
others to threaten US national security via the embargo route.  
We think if we yield to the embargo in the sense of bargaining with the 
Saudis on the specific terms for the conference, we will get ourselves on a 
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hopeless wicket. It would take too long. It would make the Saudis 
responsible for every point and their radicals would drive them. The 
British and French would be given an incentive to leapfrog. Every 
producing country would set up its own OPEC for the purpose of 
blackmailing us. Our position with the Saudis is that they have 
demonstrated their power. They have moved us off our position of letting 
things take their natural course. We have assumed a major responsibility 
for the negotiations, which they wanted. Now it is their turn to help.  321 
 
Already, the outlying Members of OPEC, namely Algeria and Libya, were now openly 
declaring how the use of the oil weapon against the US and the West was successful. In 
doing so, they would cite that the oil denial action was not just a response to the Yom 
Kippur War, but also colonial injustices that they had experienced that had emanated 
from the West. This was a tremendous turn of events for countries that only a few years 
ago had gained independence. In an interview in the midst of the embargo, Algeria’s 
President Boumediene stated: 
…that the Arabs have acted in a wise and positive manner, and have thus 
imposed their existence on those who have always thought little of it and 
have overlooked their interest in the Arab world. Those who overlook out 
interest have no right to ask us to safeguard their interests; nor do they 
have the right – when they are supporting the aggression we are subjected 
to – to ask special privileges from us. 322 
 
Moreover, Algeria, like other modest producers, was attempting to divide the positions of 
the US from some of the other advanced economies like Japan. 323 With time, however, 
the US was able to reach an understanding with Saudi Arabia and with most of the 
OAPEC countries to end the embargo that was wreaking havoc on the advanced 
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economies. Though some holdouts, such as Qaddafi’s Libya or Baathist Syria, still 
stressed for the continuation of the embargo, their minority voices could not turn the tide 
of the shifting position of the end of the embargo’s utility. 324  
 However, ending the embargo, which again the US had expected to some degree, 
was not the same enterprise as reigning in price hawks. One of the major geopolitical 
‘side-effects’ of the embargo, besides the panic and damage caused to advanced 
economies that supported Israel, was the creation of a constituency within oil producers – 
price hawks – that now felt that the post-embargo prices was (and should be) the new 
normal in the international economy. In other words, from their perceptions, the years of 
disputes, setbacks, fallback positions, and forced compromises that they had accepted 
from the Companies  and their home governments could now be ‘corrected’. Though 
OPEC as an institution did not participate in the embargo, many producing countries 
within the Group obviously benefited from the elevated prices. Carrying over from its 
gradual changing perception towards the negotiations with the Companies, and the 
subsequent collapse of those talks, Iran quickly became known to be the leader of the 
price hawks. Indeed, this new dynamic halted the return to pre-embargo prices, regardless 
of the US understanding with Saudi Arabia. Well into the embargo, Iran’s very influential 
Prime Minister, Amir Abbas Hoveyda, set out the parameters of their justification for 
higher prices:  
Everyone complains because crude oil costs more, but no one has shed a 
tear over the fact that the price of grain has tripled and the prices of other 
products we have to import have risen at a dizzy rate. It is said that oil 
should not be trifled with because it is a basic product for guaranteeing 
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the development of production and wealth. But grain is still more 
important: It is the stomach’s oil…the time has come to talk to each other 
frankly in the interests of clarifying relations between oil-producing and 
oil-consuming countries. Iran is not in favor of a reduction in the present 
price of crude oil. Saudi Arabia has displayed an initiative in this 
direction but the price has been fixed by OPEC, and there is no reason to 
change the decision. If anything, a new increase should be talked about. In 
the West, the cost of the manufactured products, synthetic fibers, and 
foodstuffs we import is continually rising, This year we will have an 
inflation of 8-10 percent, and it is largely a question of imported inflation. 
You say that your prices follow the laws of the market. Well then, why 
should the same rule not be valid for oil? Because it is supplied by 
underdeveloped countries perhaps? The two problems are interdependent. 
We have friendly relations with Europe, but it’s now time to change the 
bases for international trade. 325 
 
Iran’s reasoning eventually became the leitmotif that other producers would adhere to, 
both within the Organization and without. As Hoyveda explained, the rationale for 
increased prices was not just a Third-world backlash. It had functional purposes, two of 
which were the most important.  
 The first was the vast, albeit flawed belief of the day in the exhaustibility of 
global crude oil, which was the forerunner to the later peak oil theory (i.e. the world is 
running out of oil). In countless public interviews, the Shah of Iran would habitually cite 
this reason behind the support for higher oil prices from the producers’ perspective. This 
belief eventually led Iranian decision makers, and their counterparts in other producing 
countries, to aspire to get the biggest ‘bang out of their buck’, primarily by tapering 
production in order to see prices rise. Though smaller producers, because of sheer market 
dynamics could not hope to influence global prices in that manner, larger producers such 
as Iran and likeminded counterparts (i.e. Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, etc.) could manipulate 
                                                        
325 "Premier Says Opec Front Will Not Be Broken," Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA 1974. 
185 
market dynamics effectively. Incidentally, Fadhil Chalabi, being present during the 
collapse of the OPEC-Companies negotiations, would specifically cite how Iranian 
technicians would report that Iran’s 6 mbpd 326 production was damaging the country’s 
oil wells, and thus a moderate decrease to 4 mbpd production would allow maintenance 
measures to preserve the oil fields. 327 
 The second rationale of the price hawks had to do with how the increase of oil 
prices was the necessary adjustment to the collapse of Bretton Woods, the flotation of the 
dollar, and the subsequent rise of other global commodities because of inflation. Not only 
Iran, but also other governments such as Venezuela had long adopted such a belief. 
Because the OAPEC embargo and the abrupt OPEC price hike had put the governments 
of many Member States on the PR defensive, this line of argument became a constant 
fixture of how diverse governments would respond in public. Venezuela’s Carlos Andres 
Perez made it a priority to point out that not only was the increase in prices a reaction to 
an increase in commodities from the advanced economies, but because of the heavy trade 
imbalance between developed and developing countries, that much of the money that the 
latter would get would return to the former. 328 Even conservative Saudi Arabia, a skeptic 
of the price hawk strategy, would eventually concede the argument on the linkage 
between imported inflation into OPEC Members and the responsive price increase of 
crude. In a wide-ranging interview with Al-Anwar in Beirut before he was crowned King 
of Saudi Arabia, Fahd ibn Abd-al-Aziz directly tied inflation to purchasing power of 
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developing countries: “Inflation reduces the purchasing power of the exports of 
developing countries and is a means of swallowing up the revenues of developing 
countries”. 329 Thus, even after the embargo’s end in the spring of 1974, the increase of 
oil prices was now gradually seen as justifiable by Member States, for both corrective 
purposes in relation to the past and for functional purposes for the present.  
 In the post-1973 environment, the Shah’s urgency for higher oil prices, previously 
exhibited only to officials from the Companies and to the US, was now displayed openly, 
surprisingly often in the Western press.  Following his Prime Minister’s earlier stated 
rationale behind the prices, the Shah would consistently cite the new increase in prices as 
warranted because of his perception (which was shared by most producing countries) that 
crude oil, for the prior 20 years, had been sold at artificially low prices. This was one of 
the main driving factors as to why crude oil prices had not kept up with the rise of other 
commodities. Moreover, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Channel (BBC) in 
late 1974, the Shah emphatically affirmed this position: “We have been saying that you 
have been taking that wealth away from us, for a ridiculous price.” 330 In the interview, 
the Shah specifically compared the historical and rising costs of basic commodities – 
most of which comes from the West or Western corporations – such as wheat, sugar, 
vegetable oil, and other commodities to the price of oil. He stated that Iran and other 
producers simply just “can’t refuse to buy your goods” because of the necessity of those 
commodities. 331 In the same manner, the Shah was telling the advanced economies to get 
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used to the price, just as developing countries adjust to price fluctuations of other 
commodities.  
 Other Member States also shared this sentiment. In an interview in early 1975, 
Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez essentially repeated Iran’s reasoning, but also 
carried the same logic over to manufactured items, of which the West still the epicenter 
of technology:  
Our purpose is to make the great nations of the world understand that a 
global agreement must be reached by means of which the prices of our 
raw materials and our basic products will be in equilibrium with prices of 
the manufactured items we import. There must also be an equilibrium in 
the conditions under which we are given the technology we require for our 
development. In other words, Venezuela wants to use oil – which was the 
first basic product to become independent in the developing world – to 
achieve the independence of our raw materials, of our basic products, and 
thus the economic independence of Latin America.  
 
Perez would further take this argument to what he advocated for, which was a “global 
arrangement” that would result in the “balance between the prices of oil, the other raw 
materials, basic foodstuffs, manufactured goods, capital and technology transfers”. 332 For 
Perez, like most of the Heads of States of OPEC, “the industrialized countries [had] 
imposed their conditions” for much too long, but now oil exports had become “a 
convincing instrument of negotiation”. 333 The fight had broadened out from mere profit 
sharing and production sharing to the larger question how the global economy had 
functioned. For Member States, the desire was clear; in Perez’s words, “We want a 
dialogue leading to a new international economic order”. 334  And for the first time, 
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Member States economically acted on this desire for a changed, more equitable economic 
order. In March of 1975, at the Conference of Sovereign and Heads of State of OPEC 
Member Countries in Algiers, Algeria – by far the most important meeting that OPEC 
had since the Tehran Price Agreement – Members officially pledged financial and other 
types support for other, less developed nations. 335  In doing so, they would end up 
creating the OPEC Fund for International Development, which would facilitate 
deliverance of aid, finance, and other means of support to the least developed countries. 
336 Not only was this possible by the steep rise of oil prices in the post 1973 era, but more 
importantly, OPEC had now set up to win the purported ‘hearts and minds’ of others in 
the developing world. 337 
Outside Forces  
 Recognition of Vulnerability leads to Behavioral changes  
 
The inability of the governments of the advanced economies to prepare for such a new 
reality caused severe strains for them domestically. Virtually, all sectors of both advanced 
and non-oil exporting developing economies would feel the ramifications – from travel 
(both international and domestic), to manufacturing, to defense spending, with most of 
the burden coming hard down on the middle classes of these societies.  And the economic, 
political, and psychological effects upon the advanced economies, and by extension, their 
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decision makers, reverberated throughout the 1970s. 338 The result was ultimately mass 
behavioral changes towards conservation, energy efficiency, alternatives, and diversity of 
crude supply – in both advanced and developing economies, chiefly those highly 
dependent upon crude oil imports. For the US, as early as only a few weeks after the end 
of the OAPEC oil embargo, major decisions were made to deal with America’s energy 
vulnerability, of which the most significant was the creation of the EIA. 339  
 However, singularly focused initiatives in disparate advanced economies were 
simply not enough. The dovetailing of OAPEC’s embargo and OPEC’s price hike, with 
the price hawks led by Iran solidly influencing the Organization’s pricing policy, called 
for a more integrated macro strategy among the advanced economies. Though as 1975 
rolled around, the governments of the advanced economies were still sketching out their 
own, individual responses to their particular energy vulnerabilities, with time, a collective 
approach started to take shape.  
The Advanced Economies React 
It was at the Economic Summit at Rambouillet, France in the fall of 1975, that advanced 
free market economies started to both collaborate with each other regarding the energy 
crisis, but also set forth concrete proposals that they had recently begun. In a highly 
significant meetings in mid-November of 1975 amongst the Heads of States of the US, 
UK, France, Japan, Italy, and Germany, the leaders of these free economies essentially 
decided to mainstream their collective policies to reduce the vulnerabilities of their 
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economies to supply disruption. To do so, not only was conservation methods, new 
supplies via exploration, and alternative sources of energy discussed, but also more 
importantly, OPEC, for the first time, was now targeted by free economies. In an address 
to the group of leaders, US President Gerald Ford, after outlining the new American 
approach towards energy in general, introduced the specifics of what was the American 
initiative towards diversification of energy requirements under an integrated, cooperative 
approach of the free market economies:   
In our opinion, the dialogue should be used primarily (1) to encourage the 
oil producers to develop greater awareness of their own stake in a 
growing and stable international economy, thereby reinforcing the 
moderate OPEC countries on pricing decision, and (2) to set in motion 
effective and cooperative programs by producers and the industrialized 
nations to ease the [lease developed countries’] LDC's economic and 
financial burdens caused by high oil prices. … We do not think the 
dialogue will enable us to negotiate an agreement on oil prices at a cost 
we are willing to pay. The producers are not likely to cede their unilateral 
control over prices or to agree to reduce prices. The consuming nations 
would reap little or no advantage from indexation or any similar 
arrangement that would freeze prices at their current real level. This 
would legitimize current high prices, neutralize LDC and market 
pressures, ratify the gains of the cartel and make cartel management 
easier, and expose political leaders to the charge that they are conspiring 
with producers to drive prices up. Thus, we must continue to deal with 
high and uncertain oil prices with our own energy programs. High oil 
prices cannot be ignored; they have shaken our confidence, diminished 
our ability to deal with our problems, and compromised our economic 
development. There is no easy way to end our vulnerability and regain our 
freedom of action. We each must take the hard decisions necessary to 
implement and sustain strong and effective domestic energy programs, 
whose combined effect over time will be to shift the balance on the world 
oil market. To reinforce our individual efforts and to provide political 
impetus for greater future sacrifices, I hope that at the Summit we will 
pledge our nations to a maximum effort to reduce our dependency on 
OPEC oil imports in order to enhance our own economic well-being and 
to contribute to the long term energy needs of the world… Let me repeat 
what I said. In return for other countries participating in large new 
projects in the US which develop energy that would otherwise not have 
been produced, we will wherever feasible guarantee that a portion of the 
191 
incremental energy production can be exported. Projects will be 
considered on their merits, in environmental, economic and regional 
contexts. 340 
 
Three new factors were now in play. The first was that the US had now officially, in the 
presence of its free market partners, given up as a mediator between OPEC and the 
Companies. Any hope of reverting back to the pre-1973 status quo in that the Companies 
and OPEC, albeit grudgingly, shared price control responsibilities, had now completely 
been abandoned. In admitting to their partners that the US no longer had the significant 
leverage over certain OPEC Member States that it once had, the American sponsored 
integration approach towards diversification became the de-facto policy.  The second 
factor was the initiative itself. For the first time, the US would now integrate its domestic 
energy needs, at least in theory, with the domestic energy needs of its friends and allies. 
To do so, Washington was proposing importing foreign expertise in the US market and 
thus exporting that energy developed in the US back to other free market economies – 
essentially, multinational technology transfer under America’s watch. The third factor, in 
which would become more apparent in the years ahead, was a fundamental, and negative 
shift of the US towards the OPEC enterprise as a whole.  In other words, US animosity 
towards OPEC is now clearly visible in full view. 
 At the same meeting, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger sketched out, for the 
first time that the weakening of OPEC had become the de facto position of the US 
government, although it was never officially articulated in public: 
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Our goal is to reach a point where OPEC loses its unilateral power to 
control oil prices. This cannot occur before the 1980's, and in the next five 
years conditions mentioned by the leaders here will obtain. At the same 
time, we should not talk about OPEC as a monolith. OPEC sets prices 
because it has the power to control production. The multinational 
corporations, as was mentioned, do help it, because it is more difficult to 
get individual countries to cut prices if the multinational corporations, 
which are technically equipped and familiar with the market, manage 
exports for them. OPEC cuts production to achieve set prices. On the 
other hand, cuts in production are not uniform. This is an opportunity for 
us. If the West has the strength to absorb the financial surpluses of OPEC, 
they must export oil in order to import goods. Iran can no longer 
significantly cut production to sustain oil prices. Iran is tempted to 
increase oil to keep up exports. 341 
  
Kissinger’s remarks were quite revealing because it exposed that the Companies had 
effectively relented to OPEC’s control over prices. One of the main reasons for this 
dramatic turn by the Companies is that what they lost in operation control, they were 
gaining in tremendous windfall from the increase in prices – all the while OPEC was 
taking the collective blame for the exorbitant prices. The other Heads of State were in 
fact in full agreement with the diagnosis and the prescription, but had significant 
concerns on the for the short term. UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson brought to the table 
his country’s overwhelming concern on not just oil supply access or price, but on the 
issue of precedent as it relates to other commodities. In his assessment, the Prime 
Minister stated that they was no use denying, from the perception of the advanced 
economies, the now inimical presence of OPEC:  
…we have to face the fact that the OPEC syndrome is catching on. There 
are already phosphates-pecs, bauxite-pecs, banana-pecs and others. But 
we cannot rest on what we have achieved so far. The conditions of the 
developing countries have worsened while the expectations have increased. 
If any of us were importers of oil and other commodities, and faced 
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droughts and the need to import food at existing prices, we would also feel 
extremely bitter. Led by OPEC and other "pecs" they will be 
pressing…There is also a political alliance between the more militant oil 
producers and other developing countries... 342 
 
German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt carried this same logic to the possibility that OPEC 
would somehow create an alliance with other developing countries that would go beyond 
the commodities union precedent that Prime Minister Wilson feared. For Schmidt, the 
advanced economies would need to make the OPEC as an institution wholly responsible 
for the rise of oil prices, of which many of the developing world economies were 
suffering from as well, if not more than the advanced economies: 
The developing countries have suffered worse than us. We have flexibility 
far greater than that of the LDC's. Many of them frequently have to 
depend on one single crop. We must find a way to break up the unholy 
alliance between the LDC's and OPEC. But we cannot say so in so many 
words. We should do this in the CIEC by discussing the balance of 
payments problems of the LDC's and showing how they are being 
damaged by this situation. We can make the point that the newly rich 
countries have to take part in new developmental aid in accordance with 
their new riches. We will also have to convince the LDC's of our genuine 
interest in their well-being, by helping them in the area of raw materials. 
We must find some way to make OPEC more responsible.   
  
Both leaders were not speculating. Indeed, while prior to OPEC’s unilateral price hike in 
1973, solidarity with other raw material exporters were only alluded to, in the post-1973 
era, OPEC as an institution really moved towards this direction. At OPEC’s 47th 
conference in Bali, Indonesia in 1976, Mohammad Sadli, OPEC’s acting president for 
that year, laid out that the Organization was well on its way to find commonality with 
other raw material exporters:  
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One of our principal objectives must be in common with owners of natural 
resources and producers of raw materials in other developing countries to 
maintain the purchasing power of our export revenues. This should be 
regarded as a legitimate aim for developing countries, just as it is 
accepted that organized labor in the West is entitled to defend the 
purchasing power of wages. OPEC should be in the forefront of this 
struggle, but we should be judicious in determining at what level we 
should spring to the defense of our exports. We cannot simply ignore 
market forces and the threat of competition posed by alternative sources 
of energy. In exercising a policy of judicious appraisal, we are, at the 
same time, taking account of the interests of the non-oil-producing 
developing countries and of the rest of the world. The North-South 
dialogue will assume growing significance in the years ahead. The 
developing countries are increasing their efforts to bring about a new, 
more equitable and more progressive world economic order. OPEC must 
use its bargaining power vis-à-vis the industrialized countries to further 
the cause of the Group of 77 nations… 343 
 
Thus, from the European angle, the purported threat that was emanating from OPEC was 
no longer its role as a price maximizer and potential supply disrupter in the free flow of 
oil, but more so its potential to disrupt the traditional access that advanced economies had 
to other raw materials. Accordingly, all of the parties signed onto the US-led initiative of 
integrated diversification strategy to obviate any possibility of the recurrence of the 1973-
1974 crisis. The British were the first to report that their North Sea exploration had begun 
to pay off with modest, yet promising amount of oil that had recently started to flow in 
their domestic energy basket. 344 Moreover, the Japanese unveiled their specific shift to 
conversation, which would explode in not only new, efficient domestic infrastructure, but 
also in auto manufacturing that focused on less waste and more efficiency for the 
consumers of Japanese autos. As for the US, diverse initiatives such as a new energy bill, 
price decontrols, voluntary automobile fuel economy program (which ensured that 
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manufactures would increase efficiency by 40%), new supplies (Alaska), and alternatives 
(nuclear) became the domestic to crisis. 345 
 Yet once this decision was made by all parties to move forward with the 
integrated diversification strategy, not only was the US behavior towards OPEC bound to 
change, but more so, its traditional and long lasting relationship with certain OPEC 
Member States, namely Iran. In other words, the Shah’s consistent push for high prices 
was bound to clash with what the free market advanced economies had agreed to in 
Rambouillet. For Secretary Kissinger, one of the lead architects of this new strategy, 
implementing it meant walking a very tight rope. To do so, what the US, through 
Kissinger’s efforts, was directed towards was the soft disaggregation of OPEC – 
essentially a neo-Eisenhower policy of reversing OPEC unity back to its semi-functional 
or even dysfunctional form. However, it could not be seen as a full forced assault on the 
Organization, because of the message that would portray to other raw material exporters. 
It could backfire and thus instigate for raw material exporting unions, as opposed to 
obviating them. What Kissinger suggested was breaking unity among OPEC Members 
through implied threats and but open inducements, and thus creating the conditions where 
the Organization would be separated from the least developed countries: 
Iran provides the intellectual leadership, not the economic leadership. In 
addition, the countries sustaining oil prices are politically the most 
vulnerable; they cannot politically or psychologically sustain real 
confrontation with the West. We should not give them assurances by 
avoiding confrontation. The military threats from American officials 
several months ago resulted from lack of planning and some bureaucratic 
disputes. But after the initial outburst, and after all our friends had 
disassociated themselves from us, the oil producing countries came to us 
to ask what was needed to prevent this course of action from happening. 
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We should attempt to convey the idea that Saudi Arabia cannot underwrite 
the oil price increases for free without paying an economic and political 
price. I am confident that if one country's attempt to exert pressure for 
lower prices is successful with a particular oil producing country, other 
consumers will jump in and take advantage. The oil prices are being 
maintained by moderate countries in OPEC—those who are most 
psychologically dependent on the US. We can do a lot if we are not 
immediately disassociated by our colleagues. We expect a cry of outrage 
from the producers. We can take that if we are not disavowed by our 
friends. We agree on the need for cooperation with producers. With 
cooperation we can separate the moderates from the radicals within 
OPEC, the LDC's from the OPEC countries, and prevent a lot of other 
"pecs." … Our strategy is to link these energy discussions with 
commodities. We should try to break what the Chancellor correctly called 
the unholy alliance between the LDC's and OPEC. This can happen, and 
we can achieve our results, if they know that their disruptive actions could 
stop discussions on commodities or that they will pay a price in terms of 
cooperation, or military exports. In this way we can combat our 
dependence with a coherent strategy. 346 
  
Needless to say, in singling out Iran as providing the “intellectual leadership”, the 
American task was now to roll back the desire of Iran and of other Member States on 
reliance on post-1973 price increase. Indeed, without addressing the Iran issue, the other 
elements to integrated diversification strategy would simply not work.  
OPEC Unity Challenged, first from within and then from without  
By the time of the Rambouillet Summit, Iranian influence within OPEC was by far the 
most dominant force in decision-making and the future direction of the Organization. 
This was the result of primarily three factors that advantaged Iran more than any other 
Member State within the Organization. The first, which had been earlier alluded to, was 
Iran’s preeminent position in American grand strategy against the containment of the 
USSR. This single fact was what ultimately led to the years of economic and military aid 
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that the US gave to Iran in the 1960s and what would ultimately create the conditions for 
Nixon’s Twin Pillar policy. As the US was winding down its wars in Indochina during 
the end of the Nixon administration and in the Ford administration, a war weary 
American public would not accept the US having any additional large, oversea 
contingencies. In the vital Middle East region, a strong pro-US regime in Iran capable of 
pushing back against Soviet infiltration of the region, and keeping the region stable from 
pro-Soviet proxies made sense to US decision makers. This was clearly exhibited during 
Iran’s military intervention in Oman, where a communist insurgency, until being defeated, 
was threatening the rule of Sultan Qaboos. 347 
 The second reason, which was a natural extension of the first, was that by the 
1970s, Iran was by far the strongest conventional power in the region and in OPEC in 
general. While, as Kissinger had stated in Rambouillet, Iran’s export capacity did not 
make it the economic leader, its place in the wider Soviet containment strategy of the free 
market economies and its conventional strength made it the intellectual leader. The third 
reason was simply what Iran had done for the Organization. While the creation of OPEC 
was essentially a Venezuelan initiative that was significantly helped by Saudi Arabia, it 
was Iran’s signing onto a collective producers’ movement that gave the Organization life 
and legitimacy in the eyes of the Companies and later the great powers. And it was Iran 
that had become the main proponent of higher prices, which was creating huge windfalls 
for other Member States.  Iran’s rationale on prices was convincing enough to be adopted 
by the majority of the Organization, and as explained by Venezuela’s leadership, even 
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defended publicly in both international forums and with other foreign leaders. It was this 
dominance within OPEC decision-making that the US and the rest of the free market 
economies had to deal with when trying to weaken the Organization’s collective resolve 
to continue on the price hikes that they were implementing in the 1970s. 
 However, the rise of Iranian clout within the Organization, the rise of Iranian 
power in the Middle East region, and Iranian influence in other aspects of international 
affairs caused suspicion in what had always been its principle future rival in the region: 
Saudi Arabia. In other words, the rise and substantial strengthening of Iran’s strategic 
profile causing a classic security dilemma for the region, and with time, would bring in 
other regional actors over to the Saudi position. The Saudis understood that the 
continuance of the rise of crude oil prices was not only bad for OPEC’s market share 
domination – regardless of the actual viability of the oil exhaustibility theory – it also was 
creating the conditions for the massive aggrandizement of Iranian power.  
 During this period of high oil prices, the Shah’s government failed to judicially 
spend the country’s oil windfall in a strategic manner, but would fritter exorbitant 
amounts on the latest military technologies, while engaging in ambitious urban renewal 
and modernization efforts of Iran’s infrastructure. The problem, however, was that Iran’s 
rate of spending continuously relied upon high prices, and in some instances continual 
increases in the price of oil. In other words, this was money that Iran did not have in its 
coffers yet, but as new monies came into Iran’s Central Bank, old expenditures would 
clean out much of the reserves, at times resulting in budgetary deficits. In the post-1973 
era, Iran, backed by Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, and at times Iraq, would continuously 
push for higher prices at each OPEC gathering. Conferences of OPEC would basically 
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become export comparisons among Members and price adjustments, with the latter 
usually being an increase. The public rationale was always the same – the inflation 
argument, while privately the Shah’s regime’s ambition became an aggravating force in 
Iran’s behavior within the Organization and towards other countries, particularly the US. 
In the mid-70s, the disagreements with the Saudis became so acrimonious that the Saudis, 
at one time, almost left the Organization because of price disputes with the other 
Members. 348 And because the US needed his regime, fearing what may replace him, the 
Shah, by the mid-70s, had become virtually independent or resistant to US diplomatic 
pleas or pressure. But this newfound confidence was built upon a tenuous set of 
circumstances that was not sustainable. When those circumstances changed, the weakness 
of the Shah’s enterprise became exposed.  
 These circumstances, the changing relationship between the US and Iran, Saudi 
fears of Iranian power, would eventually converge the interests of the US and Saudi 
Arabia together to reign in the Shah. Andrew Scott Cooper was the first scholar to find 
proof of linkage between the Saudi Royal family’s fears of Iranian power with the desire 
of certain aspects of the US government to constrain the Iranian monarch’s ability to 
increase prices. 349 The US desire was very straightforward; lessen the price of oil, if so 
dramatically and neuter OPEC by creating disunity. But to do so would mean to actively 
weaken OPEC, which was now the US goal. Washington would have to fundamentally 
confront the driving force behind OPEC’s unity and organizational decisions, namely 
Iran. The only method that the US could use was to enlist the help of another major 
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OPEC state that had the production capacity to drown out Iranian output; Saudi Arabia 
was the only country that had that ability.  
 Yet, the US goal was never to wage economic warfare on Iran or even threaten 
the Shah’ s hold on power. It is here where Cooper’s research proves so consequential. 
Cooper found that as early as 1974, the year the OAPEC embargo ended, the Nixon 
administration had already sent out feelers to the Saudis for collaboration on oil prices. 
350 However, because of Iran’s dominant position and its persuasive power with the other 
OPEC Members, any voice advocating anything else except for higher prices would 
simply be ignored. Moreover, there was an internal split within Washington, as Secretary 
of State Kissinger explicitly warned against such a move because of the unpredictability 
of what might occur and the Saudi resolve to actually go through with their part:  
I doubt the Saudis would get out in front…I think they are trying to tell us 
— they said they would have an auction — it will never come off. They 
won’t let us live with lower prices but they won’t fight for them. The 
radicals would jump them on if they got in front. The Shah is a tough, 
mean guy. But he is our real friend. He is the only one who can stand up 
to the Soviet Union. We need him for the balance against India. We can’t 
tackle him without breaking him. We can get to him by cutting military 
supplies, and the French would be delighted to replace them. 351 
 
However, though powerful, Kissinger would eventually lose the battle. The advocates of 
such a move in the Ford administration, most prominently Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and Treasury Secretary Bill Simon, would now begin collusion with the Saudis. 
The Saudis role was twofold: vocally protest, as best as possible, the increase of prices in 
organizational conferences and deliberations, all the while increasing production so 
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supply dynamics would eventually decrease the price. From 1976 to the end of the 
decade, the Saudis openly advocated for a reduction in price. Being rebuffed by the 
collective will of most Member States, they decided to overproduce. From 1975 to 1978, 
Saudi Arabia went from producing just above 7 mbpd to 8.3 mbpd. This was at the same 
time that other Members were either stagnating in their output, or even decreasing. Iran, 
during the same period, went from 5.9 mbpd to 5.2 mbpd.  
 The US/Saudi desire for a sizeable drop in the price of oil did not materialize. 
However, the significant increases that Iran was expecting – in that their budget and 
future spending was tied to revenue that would never come in, proved have the most far-
reaching in its impact for Iran in the months ahead. The Saudi bucking of the OPEC trend 
essentially duplicated what the Shah had done for the US within OPEC deliberations a 
decade earlier. With time, as the Saudis, the Organization’s largest exporter no longer 
was willing to go along with the collective will of Member States, OPEC’s ambition of 
radically shifting the collective balance of power between the advanced economies to the 
raw material exporting states of the developing world – or at least creating an equilibrium 
– fell short by reason of the slow fraying of unity among Members.  
Intrastate Dynamics  
The Ascendancy phase began with the convergence of several macro elements in the 
global economy, only to be greatly accelerated by the erosion of any hope of consensus 
between the Companies and OPEC. Larger forces were at work within the global 
economy for years prior this era, of which the most consequential was the supply 
tightening due to soaring demand, the shift to OPEC oil dependence, the collapse of the 
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posted price system, and the political empowerment of OPEC and some of its Member 
States within the international system. Yet, surprisingly, this important era within 
OPEC’s institutional life and that of the global economy would end at the local level of 
intrastate dynamics. Naturally, every Member State experienced significant domestic 
political and economic changes that not only impacted the trajectory of each respective 
country, but also had important affects upon the Organization. Whether it was Qaddafi’s 
consolidation of power within Libya throughout the 1970s (the creation of his oil-based 
welfare state), the consolidation of power in Algeria of its post-independence elite, Saudi 
royal transitions, or the first decade of independence for the UAE or Qatar, all were 
noteworthy.  
 Nevertheless it was the domestic political and economic level of Iran and Iraq that 
would prove to be the most consequential for both the future of these States, but also for 
the long-term trajectory of OPEC as viable and functional international organization. The 
collapse of the Shah’s regime in 1979 and rise of Saddam Hussein in the late 1970s 
would be the most important and far-reaching intrastate event for OPEC during this 
period, and arguably throughout its history, of which the ramifications have reverberated 
well into the 21st century.  
The collapse of the Pahlavi Monarchy in Iran 
As 1976 drew to a close, the oil income that the Shah had counted on from continual 
increases in prices simply never arrived. Revenue stagnated for the Shah, while 
mandatory and discretionary projects remained unfinished. With time, Iran’s booming 
economy, always feared to be overheated, started to dramatically cool down. The Shah 
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was well aware that dependence on oil was his Achilles heel. And there is some evidence 
that at least a sizeable portion of the oil profits were put back into the economy for 
diversification efforts, more education, expanded occupational therapy, and high-tech 
infrastructure. As Mohsen Milani has pointed out, oil revenues’ contribution to gross 
domestic product (as percentage of GDP), though as high as 45% in 1975-1976 was 
down to 31.8% in 1977-1978. 352 Other sectors such as agriculture, industry/mining, and 
services were gradually, albeit painfully filling in the dominant position that oil had in the 
wider Iranian economy. In other words, the Shah’s government was gaining ground on 
diversification of the economy, regardless of the fact that certain organs of his regime 
were corrupt. It was his spending habits with the oil money, and a dangerous reliance that 
on future revenue based upon unrealistic price hikes that created his budgetary deficit in 
the later 1970s – all exacerbated by the dual US-Saudi oil initiative.  
 With the slowdown, the thousands of workers that poured into major Iranian cities 
from the countryside during the boom period gradually became either unemployed or 
underemployed. As Iran’s economy went into crisis in 1977-1978, the contradictions to 
the very rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, which massive US financial, diplomatic, and 
military support was always aimed at masking, now started to unravel. This was a regime 
that regardless of its authoritarian tendencies, which certainly was the norm in the region 
and by many standards far from being the most onerous in terms of human rights and 
political liberties, had one fatal flaw that was never able to overcome. And that flaw was 
that it was re-installed by the US government in the aftermath of the coup against Iran’s 
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democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh – a fact that most 
Iranians were well aware of and never forgot. The Shah never had any genuine 
legitimacy in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of Iranians, not because of his 
authoritarian tendencies, which preceding dynasties such as the Qajars were seldom shy 
about displaying, but because his rule was owed to outside powers.  
 The years of oil profits and the financial windfall that allowed the Pahlavi dynasty 
to buy support, pacify middle class anger at the lack of political freedoms, and build a 
major security and intelligence apparatus for the sake of protecting the regime was never 
able to build a qualitative sense of legitimacy for the Shah. And the Shah was never 
really able to combat this existential problem.  By the time that Iran’s economic woes 
became severe, another new aspect that the Shah’s regime had to face was the newfound, 
and quite stern criticism of his human rights record from a newly elected, and idealistic 
Carter administration. 353 The end of the Nixon-Ford era witnessed the political passing 
of all the Shah’s supposed friends in the US government, chief of which was Secretary 
Henry Kissinger, who both admired the Shah as a political leader but also considered him 
a friend. Compounding the Shah’s domestic problems with what was a bourgeoning 
opposition to his rule was a major miscalculation that his regime did in terms of targeting 
those they felt endangered the Shah’s rule. The Pahlavi monarch and its security organs 
had always targeted the left, whether they were social democrats or even communists. 
The nationalist right was far too fragmented, and in some instances, wholly co-opted by 
the Shah’s ideological affiliation for past Iranian dynasties. Yet, this made the religious 
right in Iran, a segment of the population usually thought to be poor and rural, as the 
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main source of opposition to the Shah. 354 While the Shah had certainly understood that 
the religious right, most notably Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was becoming prominent 
in opposition towards his rule, his assessment was that the Ayatollah could never muster 
the support to challenge the Shah. Khomeini’s exile to Iraq, and then later to France, was 
thought by the Shah as sufficient enough to get rid of what was thought of as a nuisance.  
 With confluence of the economic problems sparked by increased Saudi oil output, 
the pressure for enhanced human rights in Iran by the Carter administration, the 
coalescing of the religious right against the Shah (only to be expanded by the addition of 
other opposition elements), and finally major episodes of workers’ strikes, the most 
important being oil workers in Southern Iran, the Shah’s hold on power was became 
increasingly untenable. Indeed, it was the latter, as spelled out by Iran’s Prime Minister 
Gholam Reza Azhari in one of the last interviews he gave before the government fell, that 
would present the Iran with unprecedented economic challenges, ultimately sending the 
economy in a downward spiral, in which the Shah’s regime was not able to recover from. 
355 The final sign for the Shah was the unwillingness of his armed forces, of which he had 
dedicated so much time and economic support to building up, to support his regime 
during the protests. Indeed many of the higher brass of the Iranian military was either 
indifferent to the Shah’s continual rule or some even openly sympathetic to Khomeini’s 
call for revolution. This was clearly exhibited in a memo, months after the revolution, 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to Dr. Gary Sick from the National Security 
Council: “In the final analysis, the Shah did not command the loyalty of substantial 
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numbers of the Iranian armed forces. The loyalties he did enjoy were confined largely to 
the most senior officers of the several services.” 356 Moreover, by this time, the Shah had 
terminally ill leukemia and thus was increasingly unable to lead in the way that he had 
before. In January of 1979, the Shah and his family finally left Iran for good, leaving a 
country in economic turmoil and political disarray.  
The Rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq  
When the Baathist, after a series of political upheavals in Iraq, in 1968, returned to power, 
again via coup, this time under the leadership of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, their political 
fortunes were much better than their first attempt. Al-Bakr’s tenure as President 
coincided, like his OPEC counterparts, with the shift of power to the producers, the rise 
of oil prices, and the massive increase of oil profits in Baghdad’s coffers. By all accounts, 
under al-Bakr, though certainly not a democrat, the Iraqi state was able to govern under a 
technocratic, albeit one-party elite . Like Qaddafi in Libya, this meant that the 
development of an oil-funded welfare state. During this period, Iraq witnessed an 
increase in education to the population, expanded socialized healthcare, affordable 
housing, and major infrastructural development. One of al-Bakr deputies, a Baathist 
apparatchik that played a marginal role in the first Baathist government, was Saddam 
Hussein. 357 
 With time, Hussein would become the Vice President under al-Bakr. And using 
this position, Hussein would surround himself with political actors and forces inside the 
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country that throughout the 1970s would gradually render him the de facto ruler of Iraq. 
In doing so, as Sandra Mackey has stated, the Baath Party and the State of Iraq would 
become “virtually synonymous” under the al-Bakr-Hussein arrangement, as the Baathists 
subsumed all the organs of the State. 358 Hussein’s aggrandizement of power was also 
made possible, and largely facilitated by al-Bakr’s failing health. Nevertheless, as al-Bakr 
stepped down, or as some have assumed, pushed aside, the Iraq that he left, now under 
formal domination of Hussein, was qualitatively stronger and richer than he had found it. 
With the exit of al-Bakr, and the formal beginning of Hussein’s presidency in July of 
1979, just a few months after the Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah, the domestic 
undercurrents that had dramatically played out in both Iran and Iraq would soon clash, in 
violent ways, shaping both the future of those countries, and the direction of OPEC and 
its viability as an international organization for years to come.  
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CHAPTER IV • THE FRAGMENTATION PHASE: OPEC IN CIVIL WAR, 1980-1993 
 
As OPEC entered the 1980s, its confidence in its own strength and ability to set out an 
independent course of decision-making in the global political economy, and not just 
pertaining to the international oil market, was arguably at its height. In the prior decade, 
OPEC, as an institution, had managed to collectively defeat the once unmatched power of 
the Companies, nationalize (or proceed with the nationalization) of its Member States 
resources, wrest almost total control over pricing, attract many admirers in the developing 
world, and literally strike fear in the hearts of many governments of the advanced 
economies. However, beneath this confidence laid an extremely weak and tenuous 
foundation that in this new era, would precipitously and violently collapses. In the 
Fragmentation Phase of OPEC’s institutional life, the majority of the gains that it 
acquired in the prior years would be lost, much of which never to return. The most 
consequential would be OPEC’s institutional unity, freedom of action and independence 
from Outside Forces, and the ability to think strategically, as opposed to tactical moves 
intended for price defense. 
 In the realm of Market Forces, the 1980s began with what was supposed to be 
another boost to OPEC’s influential power in the global political economy – rising prices. 
The fallout from the Iranian Revolution, particularly the crisis that engulfed Iran’s oil 
exports as its oil workers went on strike (in order to remove the Shah), was initially a 
boon for all producers, not just OPEC (with the exception of Iran of course). But what 
would result from the second oil shock would not lead to any advantage for the 
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Organization but would lead to a series of events that would dramatically weaken its 
power in the global economy, and subsequently in the international system. In the 
immediate aftermath of the second oil shock, the first fruits of the diversification and 
conservation strategies that the advanced economies had embarked on years prior would 
finally appear, minimizing the impact that the Organization would have on markets. 
Though the political instability from the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War sent 
jitters through the markets, resulting in massively inflated prices, these concerns proved 
to be short-lived.  
 The advanced economies eventually would prove that because of their strategies 
in the immediate years after 1973, they, and thus large sectors of the global economy, 
were no longer dependent upon OPEC exports. The Organization made attempts to keep 
their market share, but internal disarray within OPEC and the evolution of the global 
economy to alternatives, conservation, and new production rendered those efforts 
fruitless.  
 The fallout from the Iranian Revolution not only would dramatically transform 
the intrastate dynamics of Iran for years to come, but would also reshape the domestic 
political, social, and even economic undercurrents of other Member States as well, 
specifically the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Though the Arabs of the Persian Gulf, 
long distrustful and fearful of the Shah, initially were relieved by his regime’s downfall, 
the rise of Political Islam in Iran would pose far more of a direct threat to their own 
political stability. Monarchial Iran was seen as a threat via conventional military 
dominance, but not to their respective regime’s hold on power. The overthrow of a 
powerful, pro-Western monarchy, with one of the strongest militaries in the world, by a 
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coalition of forces headed by religious figures, created a precedent which was easily 
replicable in the domestic contexts of many conservative Arab monarchies, specifically 
Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Iraq’s majority Shia population was seen, whether accurately or 
inaccurately, as potentially vulnerable to influence because of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 
and how Iranian Shia clerical establishment lead the revolt that toppled the Shah.  
 This would have dramatic consequences in the interstate relations of OPEC 
Members. The fallout of the Iranian Revolution initially paralyzed any effective decision-
making towards consensus in the Organization. As mutual recriminations escalated 
between Iran’s new Islamic Republic and the newly empowered third Baathist state in 
Iraq (some spawned because of the Revolution while others were based on older 
territorial disputes), conflict became inevitable. Fear of revolutionary exportation would 
quickly lead the Persian Gulf Arabs to side with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. And as the 
tensions between Tehran and Baghdad led to open hostility in the September of 1980, 
OPEC as a unitary force irrevocably split, as two of its founding and influential Member 
States became engulfed in the bloodiest War of the 20th century since WWII.  
 So consequential and transformative was the Iranian Revolution that the 
prevailing Cold War binaries of alliances and spheres of influences concerning key issues 
relating to oil production and the Middle East security architecture withered away as a 
result. The US, having faced international humiliation by reason of the storming of the 
American embassy in Tehran by revolutionary students, with the subsequent hostage 
taking of its personnel, was now fundamentally antithetical to the new Iranian 
government. And this antithesis was all encompassing in that the US would eventually 
use all the levers of its power against its former ally: economic Warfare, diplomatic 
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isolation, intelligence sharing and later alliance building with Iran’s enemies, culminating 
even in several instances of the use of force against the new Iranian government in latter 
stages of the Iran-Iraq War, albeit on a measured basis. Moreover, though in the 
immediate aftermath of the Revolution, many thought that the purported Western ‘loss’ 
of Iran would become a gain for the USSR, in time, the Soviets understood that the 
political transformation in Iran threatened their strategic profile as well – not just in the 
Middle East but also in other key theatres. Like the Persian Gulf Arabs and others in the 
region, the rise of Political Islam brought about untold threats to the Soviet Union, chiefly 
among the millions of Muslims in Central Asia that were always seen as fifth column to 
Soviet rule. Accordingly, the USSR also supported Iraq in its War with Iran.  
 However, what started from the Iranian Revolution did not culminate with the end 
of the Iran-Iraq War. The eight-year War which concluded in 1989 would not only 
consume any hopes of consensus for OPEC during this period, but would ultimately lead 
to the de facto disintegration of the Organization. And while the War ended in stalemate, 
its ramifications would yield more conflict.  
 Though the Persian Gulf Arab States supported Baathist Iraq with billions of 
loans, Hussein’s regime was simply unable to pay back his debt to affluent Kuwait. 
Eventually, as a result, and only months after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq would 
embark on another costly military intervention against Kuwait  - once again because of 
territorial disputes, specifically shared oil fields. This time however, the ramifications of 
such an action would be truly catastrophic for the future of Iraq as state, leading towards 
the near complete destruction of Iraq’s military power, the eventual decimation of its 
civilian population via War and later sanctions, all the while causing ruin to its oil 
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production capacity and export capacity. And as these events were paralleled by the 
continual increase of non-OPEC oil into the global economy enhanced by conservations 
methods and the use or alternative sources of energy, OPEC would reveal the extent of its 
dysfunction, causing many diverse speculations about its actual survivability in the 
international system in the years to come.  
Market Forces 
Throughout the 1970s, OPEC had used the inflation argument to justify higher prices. 
Yet, as mentioned previously, another potent argument, normatively accepted at the time, 
was the environmentally based belief of the exhaustibility of crude oil – essentially the 
forerunner to the peak oil argument popularized at the turn of the 20th century. At the 
time, not only producers, but also environmental activists and even academics were 
constantly Warning about a coming depletion hydrocarbon resources.  The fusion of 
these two intellectually separate premises – the inflation argument which called for 
retroactive corrective measures to balance out crude prices with the rate of manufactured 
goods and commodities with the second argument based on the non-renewable nature of 
crude oil – proved to be a powerful driving force in keeping prices inflated.  
 Yet, the unexpected impact of the political upheaval in Iran changed the ability 
for the Organization to implement measured increases or to keep prices elevated after an 
increase. In the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, prices literally doubled, sending 
shock waves to both developed and developing economies. Iran’s 1978 export figure of 
more than 5.2 mbpd 359 dramatically decreased to a little more than 1.5 mbpd in 1980 
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(See Figure 4.1). This resulted in OPEC fundamentally losing control over prices. As 
panic and speculation led prices from their 1978 figure of $14.02 per barrel ($48.37 in 
2011 figures) to $31.61 per barrel ($97.94 in 2011 figures) in 1979 (see Figure 4.3), 
OPEC was now losing control over the argument over prices. 
 This unprecedented rise in crude oil prices – now referred to as the second OPEC 
shock – for the first time, put the Organization on the defensive. 360 However, though the 
price increase was a product of political upheaval in an important Member State, and 
certainly not because of any decision that OPEC had done collectively, the Group’s 
decision makers felt a need to respond via public diplomacy. All throughout 1979-1980, 
OPEC as an institution, with its higher officials, and officials from its Member States 
gave unprecedented interviews and speeches on this very topic. The Organization felt that 
by explaining their perspective on the issue to diverse audiences, global public opinion 
would not hold them fully responsible for the price hike.  
 Moreover, the way in which OPEC responded to the dramatic rise in prices would 
unearth the deeply flawed premises that both the Organization and its officials had about 
the global economy and the oil industry in the 1980s. It was these series of 
miscalculations that would lead to OPEC’s dramatic weakening over the oil industry, as it 
relates to prices, its export policy, and most importantly, control of market share.  
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Figure 4.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization, 1978-1993 (1000 b/d) 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Iran (Founding Member) 5,241.7 3,167.9 1,467.4 1,262.8 2,420.6 2,441.7 2,032.4 2,192.3 2,037.1 2,297.6 2,478.5 2,814.1 3,135.3 3,406.8 3,431.6 3,425.2
Iraq(Founding Member) 2,562.0 3,476.9 2,646.4 897.4 1,078.4 1,098.8 1,221.3 1,404.4 1,876.5 2,358.7 2,744.5 2,785.8 2,112.6 282.5 526.2 659.5
Kuwait (Founding Member) 2,131.4 2,500.3 1,663.7 1,129.7 824.3 1,054.1 1,163.0 936.3 1,174.3 971.6 1,190.1 1,277.5 858.6 185.3 1,057.2 1,881.8
Saudi Arabia (Founding Member) 8,301.1 9,532.6 9,900.5 9,808.0 6,483.0 4,539.4 4,079.1 3,175.0 4,784.2 3,975.2 5,100.1 5,064.5 6,412.5 8,117.8 8,331.7 8,047.7
Venezuela (Founding Member) 2,165.5 2,356.4 2,165.0 2,108.3 1,895.0 1,800.8 1,695.5 1,564.0 1,648.5 1,575.5 1,578.1 1,747.4 2,135.2 2,286.2 2,345.6 2,326.0
Qatar (joined 1961) 486.7 508.1 471.4 415.2 332.0 269.0 325.3 289.3 305.7 218.9 228.0 320.2 405.6 391.2 423.2 390.3
Indonesia (joined 1962) 1,635.2 1,590.8 1,537.2 1,558.4 1,292.9 1,314.8 1,373.2 1,212.6 1,245.8 1,208.4 1,167.5 1,217.4 1,270.2 1,434.6 1,371.5 1,330.1
Libya (joined 1962) 1,982.5 2,091.7 1,831.6 1,217.8 1,136.0 1,121.1 984.6 997.7 1,308.0 972.5 1,022.7 1,129.2 1,389.1 1,405.9 1,432.7 1,361.0
UAE (joined 1967) 1,830.5 1,830.7 1,701.9 1,502.3 1,248.8 1,149.0 1,069.0 1,009.1 1,128.6 1,242.3 1,323.5 1,593.0 1,762.6 2,027.4 2,235.7 2,159.3
Algeria (joined 1969) 1,161.2 1,153.8 1,019.9 797.8 704.5 660.9 695.4 672.4 673.9 648.2 672.9 727.3 783.5 803.0 756.5 747.3
Nigeria (joined 1971) 1,897.0 2,302.0 2,058.0 1,439.6 1,287.0 1,235.5 1,388.0 1,498.9 1,466.6 1,323.0 1,341.3 1,716.3 1,726.7 1,893.1 1,957.0 1,905.2
Ecuador (joined 1973) 201.8 214.2 204.1 211.0 198.3 237.5 256.1 280.6 256.5 180.9 300.8 278.9 286.1 309.3 320.5 340.4
Gabon (joined 1975) 208.7 203.4 175.0 151.0 155.0 156.8 156.0 166.1 163.8 155.6 169.4 214.1 274.6 289.7 296.6 296.2
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Figure 4.2: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1965-1993 (Thousand barrels daily) 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 
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Figure 4.3: Crude Oil Prices: 1978-1993 (US dollars per barrel) Source: BP Statistical Review 
 
 In a series of speeches made to not only justify the high prices of crude, but also 
to explain the fallout from the loss of Iranian exports, and on the future of production, 
OPEC’s Ecuadorian Secretary General Rene G. Ortiz would continuously highlight the 
binary inflation/depletion argument. In an address to the First Arab Energy Conference in 
Abu Dhabi in early March of 1979, Secretary General Ortiz laid out the thinking of 
OPEC’s production position concerning the next few years:  
The fact that the primary fossil fuels available, and their ultimate 
recoverable reserves, are finite and of a non-renewable nature, points to 
the alarming situation that these exhaustible resources can only be 
secured over a limited time period and hence attention is dramatically 
drawn to the future availability and supply of energy required for the 
anticipated economic development. This fact is particularly acute in the 
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of a real breakthrough in making these sources available at a reasonable 
cost, and in the bulk required, to ensure a smooth transition from the oil 
era to one hopefully based on renewable resources….This prominent 
position of oil in the total energy demand was due mainly to the versatility 
of its use on the one hand and the fact that crude oil prices were 
artificially maintained at an unjustifiably low level on the other….Hence, 
crude oil, which for some Member Countries is the only source of revenue, 
was, for a considerable number of years, undervalued and over-consumed 
as if its supply was unlimited. As a consequence, since the mid-Seventies, 
an important structural change has occurred in the oil industry whereby 
oil production and oil prices began to be administered by Governments to 
whom revenue, compatible with their needs, economic development and 
aspirations, made the production and export of crude a permanent 
national objective to be handled through governmental policy. It is worth 
mentioning here that an artificially low price for petroleum in the past 
prompted over exploitation of this limited depletable resource and the 
continuation of such policy would have proved to be disastrous from the 
point of view of the world economy. Fortunately, OPEC Countries' actions, 
particularly those of the 70s, came just in time, serving as a preventative 
signal before having to face any major crises. Actually, as far as OPEC 
Member Countries are concerned, the policy goes a step further, since it 
covers a dual objective; firstly, that of obtaining an equitable value for 
their resources and secondly, the inducement of the development of 
alternative sources of energy, together with encouraging real 
conservation measures and the prevention of wasteful utilization of oil. 
Additionally, the Organization, while recognizing the vital role of oil and 
gas supply to the world economy, and at the same time committing itself so 
that the essential requirements of the consuming countries are met, 
believes that conservation and the rational use of hydrocarbon resources 
is a fundamental requirement for the well-being of, and national asset to, 
future generations…the issue of the availability of supply of OPEC 
hydrocarbons should account for all the economic, social and other 
constraints compatible with Member Countries' needs and development. 
Thus, these countries should not be expected to produce beyond what is 
economically justifiable. 361 
 
Ortiz’s remarks are very revealing because he openly states that OPEC’s objectives, at 
least at that time, was ultimately to transition to a less oil dependent world. Coming from 
the perspective of the exhaustibility theory, this reasoning, in fact, does make logical 
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sense – even for an institution that depends so heavily on the revenue from its oil exports. 
The Organization had figured that this resource would largely be done away with in a few 
decades, so its finite nature justifies a higher price while the world economy adjusts to 
other sources of energy, and with more conservation methods.  
 But because of the uncertainty surrounding Iranian exports, OPEC’s claim to 
market stabilization was also coming under severe criticism. With the defeat of the 
Companies and the wresting of control over prices, OPEC’s primary argument was that if 
producers actually had a say (or control) over prices, there would be a better stabilizing 
influence in the market, in the event of supply disruption. This argument largely went 
unchallenged throughout the 1970s. However, when supply disruption actually came 
about, this time quite a severe disruption, OPEC’s ability to act for the ‘global good’ was 
found wanting. Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s future Secretary General after Ortiz, understood 
this dilemma for the Organization:  
The real significance of the Iranian oil crisis is that it has suddenly – and 
dramatically changed – previous conclusions on OPEC oil and its role as 
a stabilizing factor in world energy markets. In doing so, however, the 
crisis has merely brought to the surface certain undercurrents which were 
undoubtedly in movement before the crisis, and which, if no appropriate 
measures had been taken, would nevertheless have confronted the world 
with the same issues, if perhaps at a later date. Only six months ago, 
people in the oil industry were still talking about the possibility of a 
sustained OPEC excess capacity in production, excess that would continue 
for years to come. The instability presently characterizing the world oil 
markets would, however, indicate that such conclusions were erroneous. It 
is now obvious that the disappearance of Iranian oil exports has not been 
completely made up by the increase in production from those excess 
capacities. What has happened, in fact, is that most OPEC Countries are 
currently producing at near their full capacity; and those that have 
increased production in order partially to make up for the loss of Iranian 
production cannot continue doing so without jeopardizing their 
production policies. This does not imply that the possibilities of expanding 
capacities in many OPEC Countries do not exist. But the dilemma in 
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which such countries now find themselves is clear: is there sufficient 
incentive being offered to motivate them to undertake the large-scale and 
capital-intensive investments necessary to cope with the increasing 
demand, given the fact that the income derived from the depletion of their 
existing resources is now more than ever needed to meet the pressing 
requirements of economic and social development in their own countries? 
362 
 
Chalabi’s admission laid bare the major contradictions with OPEC’s policy of 
uncontrolled elevated prices in the 1970s, which was dramatically worsened by the 
politicization of the exports from OPEC’s Arab Member States. In focusing on the 
“dilemma” of OPEC Members – namely the producers’ predicament of either investing in 
excess capacity with additional windfall or saving those monies for the “pressing 
requirements of economic and social” needs at home – Chalabi’s statement showed the 
fundamental inability of OPEC to think in strategic terms vis-à-vis their consumers. More 
importantly, it showed that OPEC’s thinking was based upon a reliance of the continual 
increase in demand – of which its inaccuracy would only aggravate by the exhaustibility 
theory. In addressing its possible concerns about Iran’s future production and market 
share, Iran’s new Oil Minister in the provisional government, Ali Akbar Mo’infar, 
exemplified this reasoning, which had been adopted by most of OPEC:  
We are not at all worried about the sale or our oil. Even if this quantity of 
oil were to remain under Iran’s soil, its price would increase day by day 
and would become more expensive and we would not have been worried. 
Therefore, we shall export the amount which we require in order to obtain 
foreign currency. This is our goal, and at the moment our program is to 
keep the present level of production and to sell the same amount as before. 
We have a sufficient number of customers for what we wish to sell. 363 
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Furthermore, this reasoning was not just adhered to by the Organization or other 
producers. Many in the advanced economies also believed that the second oil shock was 
proof of the continual and even rise of the power of OPEC in the decade. 364 It was clear, 
that based upon Ortiz, Chalabi, and other OPEC and Member State officials, that the no 
one really imagined the actual fruition of conservation methods and alternative sources of 
energy. If they were viable, it was thought that they would be years away, for clearly 
OPEC’s production, pricing, and planning policies made little room for them in their 
strategic analysis on the dynamics of global supply and demand.  
 As a result, the Organization entered the 1980s with a major sense of confidence, 
accomplishment, and determination.  Only literally days before the start of the Iran-Iraq 
War, which would fundamentally end OPEC unity and functionality for years, OPEC’s 
September 1980 press release would celebrate its 20th anniversary by proclaiming that: 
The controlling power in the hydrocarbons industry of the OPEC Member 
Countries is now firmly in the hands of the rightful owners, namely the oil 
producing nations. Their governments are now guardians of a substantial 
proportion of the earth's last reserves of a precious commodity and are 
attempting to administer this responsibility with wisdom and moderation, 
taking due account of the national interests of their own countries. 
Production and prices are being governed by consideration of the 
depletability of the oil reserves: in the interests of both producers and 
consumers OPEC is vigorously advocating measures aimed at enabling a 
smooth transition from the oil era to that of alternative forms of energy. 
Conservation, increased investment in existing and new fields, measures 
requiring further exploration and/or enhanced recovery; and the 
development of both conventional and non-conventional alternatives – all 
these needs are constantly being placed in the foreground of discussions 
by this Organization. There are signs that OPEC's policies are coming to 
be recognized for what they are, namely, genuine pointers to the realities 
and the challenge of the energy and economic development of the world. 
Never before has there been such energy-consciousness as there is today. 
And it cannot be denied that OPEC has been the prime mover behind this 
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new awareness, the driving force which has led governments, the media 
and the general public to concern themselves, not only with the 
depletability of oil - although this resource is at present in the foreground 
- but with the whole spectrum of the world's exhaustible natural resources.  
For the industrialized countries this is a concept which they will not find 
easy to adopt, but it is unavoidable if we are not to be confronted in the 
foreseeable future with an energy gap, the economic, social and political 
consequences of which hardly bear contemplation. OPEC has always been 
ready to play its full part in creating a better world for all of us to live in – 
not only through the bridging of the gap between the oil age and that of 
alternatives but also and mainly, through the closing of that other gap 
between developed and developing countries. 365 
 
Blowback from OPEC’s price hikes and the collapse of its market share domination  
Beneath the surface of anxiety and concern regarding the continual tightening and 
sporadic disruption of supply in many advanced economies, all the while OPEC and its 
producer counterparts rested on the inevitability of higher demand and higher prices, 
were forces that would fundamentally alter the nature of the global oil industry. Out of 
the all the countries that had suffered from the 1970s supply disruptions and price 
increases, it was arguably Japan, an island nation with little to no crude oil, that had felt 
the most vulnerable. The predicament surrounding Iranian exports was only the latest 
crisis to highlight Japan’s oil vulnerability. 366 But Japan was not just reacting to events. 
It had engaged in a multi-national effort of energy diplomacy, sending representatives to 
several Latin American and African countries, with a specific emphasis on Mexican 
crude. 367 By 1980, Japan’s energy policy rested on three principles: expand conservation 
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efforts, diversify sources of energy from oil to alternatives such as coal, nuclear power 
and natural gas, and divert dependence from the Middle East to more secure sources of 
supply. 368 Though this was essentially the model that most of the advanced economies 
followed – initially sketched out in 1975 – Japan had by the early 1980s advanced the 
most, primarily because of necessity.  
 However, the second oil shock truly brought about a new phase in Japan’s quest, 
started years prior, to lead in conservation efforts, of which automobiles were the most 
consequential. As Koichi Shimokawa has catalogued, the US automobile market, from 
1980 to 1983, witnessed a major shift in demand for the fuel-efficient and compact 
automobiles, the very same kind that Japan was mastering for the home market.  369 With 
time, spawned by the first and second OPEC shocks, the very nature of personal transport 
had shifted, from the large and heavy gas-consuming automobile, to the smaller, more 
efficient vehicle. It was at this time that demand for Japanese autos skyrocketed, 
penetrating other advanced, free market economies.  
 Compounding this trend was the conservation efforts making headway in North 
America and Europe. As Figure 4.2 shows, North American consumption in 1979 was 
roughly 21.3 mbpd, but for the next decade it would continuously drop. The lowest figure 
came about in 1983 at 17.95 mbpd. By 1993, North American oil consumption was only 
20.6 mbpd, lower than its 1979 figure. Europe’s conservation attempts were even more 
dramatic. Though the continent’s 1979 figures were 24.7 mbpd, by 1993 those figures 
had declined to 20.6 mbpd. And adding to the efficacy of the conservation efforts was the 
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fact that alternative sources of crude was now coming online. Although US production 
was in steady decline (from 10.1 mbpd in 1979 down to 8.9 mbpd), the North Sea, 
Canada, and Mexico made substantial contributions in the West’s alternatives strategy. 
370 Canada’s 1979 figures jumped from 1.8 mbpd to 2.2 mbpd in 1993. In the same time 
frame, Mexico increased from 1.6 mbpd to 3.1 mbpd. The North Sea’s output, mostly 
seen in the British and Norwegian production, was also significant. Britain’s 1979 figures 
went from 1.6 mbpd to 2.0 mbpd while Norway’s 1979 output increased from a modest 
407,000 bpd to 2.4 mbpd. And all of these smaller changes were happening as Iran and 
Iraq were locked in an incredibly destructive conflict that, throughout the 1980s, 
devastated the production capacities of both countries.  
Figure 4.4: Shares of global oil production between OPEC and non OPEC producers: 1978-1993 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
 
 The results – amplified by OPEC’s internal strife (conflict between Iran and Iraq 
while later Iraq and Kuwait) and the Organization’s broader inability to protect its long-
sought after preeminent position in the global economy  – was the massive weakening of 
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OPEC’s market share domination. As Figure 4.4 clearly shows, OPEC’s percentage of 
global oil production dramatically fell from its 1979 figure of 49.71% to 40.44% in 1981. 
And as will be discussed in subsequent sections, the inability of the Organization to 
address the conflict between Iran and Iraq, its further paralysis as conflict led to open 
War between the two founding Member States, and the ramifications of that conflict on 
other Member States (and their relations amongst each other) only further weakened the 
cohesion of the OPEC, and thus its ability to maintain market share control.  
Intrastate Dynamics 
The beginning of the Fragmentation phase began within and remained deeply affected by 
the internal dynamics of three distinct places: Iran, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf Arab 
Sheikhdoms of OPEC, specifically Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE. The collapse of 
the Shah’s regime, the precedent that this event set for other States in the region and 
beyond, and the rise of Political Islam in the shape of the Islamic Republic political 
system both remade the political architecture of the Middle East and changed the internal 
functionality of OPEC. This process of fragmentation within the Organization was not, 
however, in the span of days, but took almost two years to fully become visible, began 
gradually in the immediate aftermath of the Shah’s departure of January of 1979, 
throughout that year and the next, and reaching its official beginning in September of 
1980, as the Iran-Iraq War commenced.   
Revolutionary Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic  
While the most consequential impact of Iran’s political upheaval was ultimately political 
and geostrategic in nature – in that it fundamentally reshaped the security architecture of 
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the Middle East and challenged the Cold War binary of the time by introducing Political 
Islam as a third, alternative political model – it’s initial impact on OPEC and the global 
political economy was economic. This happened primarily in two theatres. The 
Revolution caused a dramatic decline in Iranian oil production at a time when the market 
supply was tight and the potential for market panic on supply disruption was particularly 
vulnerable. The now established concern over exhaustibility was only supplemented by 
new concerns over unintentional supply disruptions. The collapse of the Shah’s once 
powerful regime, in a major producing country, only brought this concern further to 
home.    
 Secondly, one of the first major acts of the provisional government and carried 
through after the official establishment of the Islamic Republic was the full 
nationalization of Iranian oil. This move was later codified under Article 3 of the new 
Iranian Constitution drafted after during the provisional period before the official 
establishment of the Islamic Republic and ratified in 1980. 371  This meant that the 
Consortium – long a thorn in the side of the Shah and effectively sidelined in major 
aspects of Iranian production and price controls during the negotiations – had now 
officially been dismantled by the new Iranian government. Having such a full-scale 
nationalization happen, even when events of state appropriation were no longer novel by 
the early 1980s, still exacerbated the already shaky nerves that diverse markets had 
regarding global supply disruption.  
 But events would gradually take on a far more political and later, security 
significance. The hostage crisis surrounding the storming of the US embassy and taking 
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of American personnel by Iranian students had dramatically and negatively changed the 
image of both Iran’s Revolution and its new government in the eyes of many states, 
particularly those in the West. Though this event greatly assisted in the creation of a 
‘menacing’ and ‘rogue’ revolutionary leadership within Iran, the fundamentals behind the 
major changes in the Iran-US relationship went much than the hostage crisis. Indeed, the 
collapse of Iran-US relations had its roots in the trends that were forming in the decades 
prior to 1979, which by this time were now clashing.  
 The patron-client relationship that had developed in the aftermath of the 1953 
coup against Mossadegh, the contradictory situation of the Shah’s intense need for this 
relationship all the while loathing the existence of it, and the severe and escalating 
differences that the Iranian state, under the Shah, had with the US regarding oil prices, 
created the conditions for the explosion of acrimony between both sides. With the Shah’s 
departure, the weeks and months that passed witnessed the US moving from paralysis 
caused by confusion concerning the Shah’s demise, to tactically recognizing the 
provisional government all the while US policy was in disarray towards Iran, to 
becoming vehemently opposed to the leadership that would eventually become the 
Islamic Republic. And with this new opposition, came the first and continuous signs of 
economic Warfare against Iran, in the form of trade, financial, and other economic 
sanctions and embargoes against Iran. 372  
 The political disarray in Iran, exacerbated by the isolation that the country was 
entering in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, only further weakened Iran’s oil 
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production capacity, thus creating the conditions where other potential rivals would take 
the dominant place in decision-making and leadership that Iran once had within OPEC.  
Persian Gulf Arabs React: From Relief to Fear  
For the monarchies of the Persian Gulf Arabs, Iran’s political upheaval was initially seen 
not as a threat, but cautiously accepted. This was clearly demonstrated in an interview 
that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, then the Crown Prince, made to Al-Hawadith. 373 And as 
King Fahd mentioned within that interview, Iran’s notion of pan-Islamic unity, a marked 
change from the Shah’s rhetoric, was initially welcomed. But more importantly, the 
Saudis and others in the region realized that, at least for the time being, the Revolution 
had weakened Iran and put its economy and military in flux – to the point that they no 
longer, at least in theory, could be seen as a threat to the Saudis and other Persian Gulf 
states.  
 But as the months progressed from the Revolution, gradually, the perception of 
these sheikhdoms dramatically changed towards Iran’s political change and new 
government. Political Islam’s rise in Iran, in the Saudi perception, because it had 
empowered the clerical establishment of the largest Shia Islamic country in the world, set 
a dangerous precedent for countries with sizeable Shia communities in the region. 374 For 
the Arab sheikhdoms, this proved to be a precedent that not only could and eventually did 
cause varying degrees of political instability within their countries, but had the potential 
to threaten the survivability of their regimes. With the perception of the Iranian 
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Revolution now changing from an opportunity to capitalize on Iranian weakness via the 
distractions of upheaval to a threat that no longer could be ignored, there arose an 
integrated strategy that Persian Gulf Arabs embarked upon to keep revolutionary 
instability at bay. The most consequential was the creation of Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), in which security, strategic, and economic policy could be streamlined in a more 
unified position, mainly because of the threat that Revolutionary Iran posed. 375 
The Third Baathist State: Opportunity spurns War 
Within Iraq however, the continuance of Iran’s revolutionary instability was 
simultaneously seen as both an opportunity and a threat, as opposed to devolving from 
one perception to another. On the latter, the newly empowered, and but significantly 
leaner Baath party in Iraq, having been purged of any potential political rivals to Saddam 
Hussein, saw Iran’s political instability as a chance to remake, in Iraq’s favor, the 
territorial and political disputes that Baghdad long had with its powerful Eastern neighbor. 
It’s important to remember that these disputes, particularly the territorial ones, were 
issues that for decades had proven a spoiler in the larger Iranian-Iraqi relationship, some 
of which going back to the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s 1958 Revolution that overthrow 
the Iraqi monarchy. 376  
 Moreover, Hussein’s territorial disputes with Iran, particularly his intermittent 
calls to annex the Iranian province of Khuzestan, had much to do with oil. Khuzestan’s 
oil deposits were and still are extremely vast. Thus, the irredentists claims of the Iraqi 
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Baath had just as much to do with their national perceptions of what constitutes their 
territory, as it did with the significant economic benefits that they would accrue if some 
of these claims actually came into fruition.  
 Yet, what exacerbated the cycle of animosity was the fear from Saddam’s regime 
of the mass political empowerment of the Iraqi Shia, the majority of Iraq, by reason of the 
rise and establishment of the Islamic Republic next door. 377 This was particularly acute 
as the religious bonds between both countries, particularly between the Iranian city of 
Qom and Iraq’s Karbala and Najaf, had traditionally been quite strong. With the arrival of 
the Baath in political power in Iraq, these bonds were initially downplayed, only later to 
be cut. Accordingly, the Iranian Revolution was seen by Saddam’s regime as a threat to 
his rule as well, and eventually far more acute of a threat than the other neighboring 
states of the Persian Gulf.  
Interstate Relations  
Once these assessments from both Iraq and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf fully 
crystallized, the fear concerning Iran dramatically converged their interests and strategic 
approaches to the political realities in Iran and what that would mean for the wider region. 
As 1981 approached, the internal functionality of OPEC – paralyzed since the immediate 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution and its inability to respond to the ensuing pricing 
crisis – would now begin the process of fragmentation, only to completely disintegrate in 
its functionality near the end of the 1980s 
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The beginnings of the Iran-Iraq War  
The September 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran was the first real instance where a Member 
State went to War with another Member State. Though Iraq and Kuwait, in the early 
weeks after OPEC’s founding, did escalate their territorial disputes, potentially leading 
toward open hostilities, the Iran-Iraq War was qualitatively different. By the time the 
Iraqi Baathist government decided to launch the invasion of Iran, the dividing lines, both 
within OPEC, and beyond were already drawn.  
 Sensing the fear that the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies had of revolutionary 
instability penetrating their borders, Saddam’s War plan against Iran, from the very onset 
of hostilities until the end of the War, relied upon significant financial assistance from his 
southern neighbors. In initially citing Revolutionary Iran’s interference in Iraqi affairs, 
specifically as it relates to aid given to Iraqi Kurds, and its purported violations of the 
Algiers Accord both countries signed in 1975, which was intended to resolve their border 
issues, Saddam initiated the war while Iran’s political dynamics, economic position, and 
military posture were chaotic and fluid. 378  Iraq’s opening salvo against Iran was 
successful due to the latter’s inability to foresee the scale of the Iraqi invasion, although 
relations had dramatically worsened by then and throughout the year had seen localized 
instances of border violence. Furthermore, the support garnered by the Baathist regime 
from other significant players in the Arab world, outside of OPEC, added to the 
confidence of Saddam’s regime in his war efforts. With some notable exceptions, such as 
Libya and Syria (with Lebanon’s neutrality) the greater part of the Arab World, the Arab 
                                                        
378 E. Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War (Rosen Pub., 2009), 11-13; F. Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of 
Aggression (University Press of Florida, 1993). Rajaee, The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression, 11-
23. 
231 
League in particular, openly supported and assisted Iraq during the War. In those initial 
weeks of open hostilities, the Iraqi regime had assured itself of a quick victory over Iran. 
If victory had arrived when Baghdad expected it, not only would Iran’s Khuzestan 
province be occupied by Iraqi forces, but the future of Iran’s role in OPEC, and possibly 
that of its political orientation would have been significantly influenced by the Iraqi-
Persian Gulf Arab coalition that had come out so antagonistically against Revolutionary 
Iran.  
The failure of OPEC to broker peace 
While the Iraqi Baath were able to garner the overt support of every Arab OPEC member 
and the brunt of the Arab League, the rest of OPEC’s Member States had no real coherent 
policy or approach to the Iran-Iraq War. The initiation of hostilities between two of 
OPEC’s founding Members and the subsequent polarization within Group, created a 
sense of paralysis amongst other Members. Though the conflict would eventually have 
dramatically negative affects upon the Organization, as any open hostility among 
Members would lead to the weakening of OPEC (which would be deleterious for 
Member States), there was very little public effort made to first acknowledge the conflict 
or even contain it.  Finally, the Organization, in their 59th conference in December 1980, 
did acknowledge what had greatly contributed to the massive crude oil price increase of 
the past few weeks, namely the War between Iran and Iraq:  
The Conference endorsed the sincere and honest appeal made by His 
Excellency the President of the Republic of Indonesia in his inauguration 
speech to the two Member Countries – Iran and Iraq - who are presently 
in dispute, to quickly seek the best possible solution to their conflict 
leading to a peaceful settlement of their differences. 379 
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Yet, with the exception of this acknowledgement, OPEC, as an institution, either 
volitionally or by force, ignored the War. For all of 1981, the Organization, in its 
Resolutions, chose to focus on procedural and personnel matters. As prices began to 
erode that year, only to plunge significantly, not only was OPEC still adhering to the 
exhaustibility theory but also was unable to address the escalating conflict between Iran 
and Iraq. As the War increased, it gradually weakened the influential power of both 
Members within the Organization, as production capacity lessened both States’ influence 
in decision-making. However, for OPEC, the War that would eventually cripple the 
production capacities of these two significant exporters would also become deleterious to 
the Organization’s future.  
 As the War would drag on, OPEC’s capacity to act on behalf of its Members and 
respond to Market Forces would be significantly debilitated, as the loss of collective 
OPEC output would affect the market share that took more than two decades to build. 
The collective inability of OPEC to bring about a halt to the War – particularly in the first 
few months – ultimately created the conditions for the War’s continuance, and significant 
damage it levied on the Organization’s unity, functionality, and place in the global 
economy.  
Outside Powers 
By the time the Iran-Iraq War commenced and well into the first year of hostilities, 
Washington’s animosity towards Iran had largely hardened. The hostage crisis, the “loss 
of Iran” in American grand strategy, and the birth of a new Iranian foreign policy that 
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clashed in direct ways with established US policy preferences for the Middle East and the 
wider oil industry, only worsened the relationship. By 1981, fear of Revolutionary Iran 
and how that would affect the strategic interests of the US moved Washington to 
gradually open up relations with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a relationship that had largely 
remained frozen since the mid-1970s. Baathist Iraq, both under Al-Bakr and then under 
Hussein, remained firmly in the Soviet Camp, relying on Soviet patronage and assistance 
for technical assistance with its oil industry, weapons purchases, and mega infrastructural 
projects. 380  
 However, with the Iranian Revolution, the US found itself supporting the same 
side that the Soviets had long cultivated and endorsed, which Moscow only expanded in 
support in its conflict with Iran. 381 As Adam Tarock has aptly chronicled, the approach 
of the great powers with their respective support to the combatants of this conflict can be 
clearly seen and analyzed by their behavior at the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC). 382 Tarock points out that, in response to the Iraqi invasion of Iran, it took 4 
days for the UNSC to meet, as opposed to what will later be discussed, the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait in August of 1990, in which the UNSC met on the same day. 383  More 
importantly, the UNSC’s adoption of Resolution of 479, which called for a ceasefire 
between both sides, was implemented after Iraq had occupied large swaths of Iran’s 
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Khuzestan province, and yet made no demands to the Iraqi’s to withdraw. 384 The UNSC 
inability to function, as R.P.H. King has argued, was formed by the confluence of its 
Members’ deference to their individual national interests, 385 of which for the US in 
particular was shaped by the Iranian hostage crisis, while for the Soviets it was the 
fundamental aversion to Political Islam. After the Iranian’s rejected the UNSC resolution, 
it would take another two years for the Council to revisit matter.  
 Indeed, the conflict between Iran-Iraq was the first and only major war since the 
beginning of the Cold War that Washington and Moscow not only supported the same 
side, but fundamentally for the same reasons: the containment and eventual extinguishing 
of the revolutionary upheaval that flowed from Iran. The possible ramifications of the 
spread of this political upheaval to other countries – regardless of a particular country 
adopting a political model that took root in Iran – would rapidly erode the binary of 
American and Soviet strategic power in the region. But as the Soviets merely expanded 
the relationship they had with Baghdad to counter Iran’s War making abilities – primarily 
by assisting with weaponry and training – the US position evolved from secret 
communications, to logistical intelligence sharing, to weapons transfers, to official 
recognition and normalization of relations, to full-throated open support for the Iraqi War 
effort. And this process started in earnest only months after the beginning of hostilities.  
Fearing Revolutionary Iran, the US starts recognition and cooperation with Iraq 
 In April of 1981, after completing his first overseas trip as Secretary of State 
(which was to the Middle East), Alexander Haig conveyed a message to Iraq’s Foreign 
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Minister Sa’dun Hammadi in order to test the grounds of any possible convergence of 
interests between the US and Iraq. 386 In his correspondence to Hammadi, Secretary Haig 
highlighted that he would be sending Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper 
to Baghdad for consultations with the Iraq government on a variety of issues. Haig’s 
intention was to convey to the Foreign Minister that both the US and Iraq needed to be 
“able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis”, as there were issues that 
united and divided both sides, but ultimately geared to “come to understand more fully 
the views of one another”. 387 
 Only a few days before Haig’s outreach, the US interests section in Baghdad sent 
an analysis on the possibility for better US-Iraqi relations. In the dispatch, the analysts 
remarked that Draper’s coming visit to Baghdad was the first visit by a senior American 
official since 1977. 388  The US analysts further stated that Washington’s decision to 
embargo Iran, chiefly as it relates to the selling of arms, had been well received and had 
positively shifted the mood of Iraq’s officials about the US. 389 More significantly, they 
remarked that the US had now a “greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any 
time since the Revolution of 1958.” 390  For the US, an upgrading of relations with 
Baghdad, though it would take time, was Warranted, because of the altered regional 
dynamics, of which Iran’s political transformation was the most important. As Iraq’s 
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Foreign Minister returned a cordial yet brief communication to Secretary Haig, 391 the 
stage was set for the gradual improving of relations, which was most importantly 
manifested with senior officials meeting with each other. The most significant was 
William Eagleton’s meeting with the then current head of Iraq’s Revolutionary 
Command Council and future Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, which was highest-level 
meeting with an official from Iraqi government since the collapse of relations in 1967. 392 
 As dialogue intensified between Washington and Baghdad, both sides gradually 
began to talk about Iraq’s acquisition of the more sophisticated US weapons that would 
assist it in the War with Iran. By mid-1981, any hope that Baathist Iraq had about a quick 
victory against Revolutionary Iran had long dissipated. At this point, it was the Iranians 
who were on the offensive, slowly repelling the Iraqis out of Iranian territory. Yet, for the 
US to fundamentally offer and deliver tangible help for the Iraqi War effort, there needed 
to be a normalization of Iraq, by the US, in the international community. In other words, 
Iraq could not be seen any longer as a “rogue” nation but on that had good standing 
among other countries. The reputation that Baghdad had long held was of a Soviet client 
state, a leader of the reactionary Arab states against Israel, and an oil price hawk. Most 
significantly, the US and the West in general, had concerns about Iraqi support for 
terrorist groups, and as such, Baghdad was designated a state sponsor of terrorism.  
 What this meant was that the US government, could not transfer weaponry, aid, 
training for the Iraqi military, or any meaningful interstate security cooperation and 
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commerce with relative ease. More so, the US would be breaking its own laws. But as the 
US would shift towards Iraq, Washington would take the steps to remove Iraq from this 
list. And after a series of negotiations with Baghdad, in early 1982 the US decided to 
ultimately delist Iraq from the list of countries deemed state sponsors of terrorism. 393 
 Although US officials still had deep suspicions about Iraq’s continued 
sponsorship of certain regional militant groups, 394 once this delisting occurred, relations 
broadened on significant political, security, and economic issues. This resulted in more 
frequent communications with very senior personnel of both countries and Iraq’s broader 
access to the American economy and military technology. Near the end of 1982, US-Iraqi 
relations, though not able to be described as an alliance, were now well on its way to 
becoming normalized. But unlike other instances of diplomatic normalization with the 
US government, this process with Iraq was significantly fastracked because of the 
converging concerns regarding Iran. 
Iranian gains in the Iran-Iraq War 
At the same time, the Iran-Iraq War, which in the opening weeks was going well for the 
Iraqis, had by the end of 1982 witnessed several Iraqi setbacks and Iranian victories. 
From the time of the invasion to the end of 1982, a series of Iraqi miscalculations 
regarding Iran’s military strength and its response to the Iraqi invasion, Iraq’s military 
planning as it pertains to offensive strategies, and the ability of the new Iranian 
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government to garner significant military ability to resist the invasion, eventually 
collapsed Iraq’s initial war plans. Hussein’s rational was that Iran would be so consumed 
with political disarray, because of the arduous process of building a functional central 
authority that it could not push back against a well-equipped and cash-laden Iraqi army. 
Furthermore, the severing of Iran-US relations left Iran fully exposed to aggression from 
Iraq and other states, as Iran no longer had a great power to rely upon for military 
hardware, technology, and diplomatic protection.  
 But with time, Saddam’s calculations simply did not materialize. Though the Iraqi 
military, in the opening weeks of the war, was able to push significantly in Iran’s 
Khuzestan province, and threaten surrounding provinces, the Iraqi invasion became far 
more a galvanizing factor to the various political currents in Iran jockeying for power. In 
essence, the war assisted in the bureaucratic centralization of the new government, by 
reason of the war effort being the most significant large-scale project that Tehran had to 
contend with. As the core of the traditional Iranian military became functional again, 
along with the newly created Revolutionary Guard, and the volunteer Basij forces, Iran 
slowly began to restore balance to the dynamics of the conflict. 
 The most important and consequential Iranian victory in the early years of War 
was the liberation of Khorramshahr, a vital Iranian port city on the Persian Gulf that the 
Iraqis had captured in the immediate weeks after their invasion. Iraq’s army lay ruin to 
city and the surrounding areas because the importance of the city to Iran’s overall trade 
with the outside world, both regarding oil exports via shipping and other non-oil 
commerce. The Iraqi Baath believed that with the destruction and occupation of Iran’s 
major ports, the population would suffer extreme hardships because of the lack of trade, 
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and would thus pressure their government to sue for peace under terms favoring Iraq. For 
more than a year and half, Khorramshar was occupied by the Iraqi Baath army. In that 
time, Saddam’s forces looted most if not all of the imported cargo that was destined to 
reach other Iranian cities, and commodities that were meant for export to foreign markets. 
Intermittent shelling of Khorramshahr by both sides destroyed large parts of the city.  
 However, in April of 1982, Iran began the initial phases of a counteroffensive that 
would recapture this vital port city, and turn the tide of war in its favor. By May of 1982, 
Khorramshar was retaken by Iran. Shortly afterwards, the Iraqi military was essentially 
pushed out of Iran, and forced to defend Iraqi territory from an emboldened Iranian 
military, with a determined, albeit inexperienced, Iranian leadership. With the recapturing 
of Khorramshar, Iraq’s military began to make a series of mistakes that further 
advantaged Iran in the War.  
America’s policy shift towards over assistance to Iraq   
From the US position, the prior two years had been dedicated to building it relations with 
the Iraqi Baath. From offering a diplomatic makeover to Saddam Hussein’s regime, to 
providing modest weaponry, to contributing in more robust intelligence sharing, and 
economic normality between the two countries (even before there was political 
normality), the US policy of outreach to Baghdad had largely succeeded. The US and 
Iraq were not only on speaking terms, but now tactically in agreement as it related to Iran. 
However, as Iran’s advanced in its war aims with Iraq – from strictly a defensive posture 
to an offensive strategy – the US increasingly feared the possibility and the ramifications 
of an Iranian victory in the war. After the tide had turned in the expulsion of the Iraqi 
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military from Iranian territory, the US, under the Reagan administration, undertook a 
series of policy revisions that would have consequential and lasting impact on the war, 
OPEC’s functionality, and the political future of the broader Middle East.  
 In early 1983, the US began a series of internal policy reviews on several factors 
as it related to the war, the most important of which was the following: the ramifications 
of an Iranian victory, the ramifications of what a prolonged conflict would have on oil 
prices (which were decreasing at the time), and the ramifications of the regionalization of 
the conflict. Each scenario was seemed highly negative towards US interests and should 
be avoided at all costs. In policy reviews that were conducted by varying American 
agencies, it was agreed upon that the US position of de-facto ‘neutrality’ – as it was 
described by US policy makers (even though the US was slightly assisting one side while 
sanctioning another) – was no longer tenable.  
 In other words, the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war without overt American 
involvement in the substantial aiding of Iraq (which would purportedly end on terms 
favorable to Baghdad) would inevitably lead to either one, some, or all of the above 
mentioned scenarios. The clearest indication of the this strategic shift to overt US 
involvement in the aiding of the Iraqi Baath was a memo written by top diplomat and 
future US Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. In the memo, Eagleburger lays out 
the fundamental US rationale for what ‘neutrality’: 
When the war began three years ago, our poor relations with both 
combatants and concern for our security interests in the Gulf led us to 
reinforce air defenses by the deployment of AWACS to Saudi Arabia and 
to block the use of air bases in the Arabian Peninsula by Iraqi aircraft to 
reduce the threat of expansion of the war. Our neutrality policy evolved 
out of this preventative reaction. Until now, this policy has served our 
objectives and interests well. It has: avoided direct great power 
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involvement; prevented spread of the war beyond the territory of the 
combatants to threaten Gulf oil supplies; contributed to the current 
military stalemate; preserved the possibility of developing a future 
relationship with Iran while minimizing openings for expansion of Soviet 
influence. 395 
 
 However, as Eagleburger sketches out, the strategic environment where that 
policy was developed had now changed dramatically. Behind that change, two critical 
developments lay at the foundation: the extensive improvement of bilateral relations with 
Iraq as relations with Iran continued to “be virtually non-existent” and how Iran’s 
strategy of “bringing about the Iraqi regime's political collapse through military attrition 
coupled with financial strangulation” was “slowly having an effect”. 396 The conclusion 
was broader than the possibility of Iraq being forced to look towards other weapons 
suppliers, thus internationalizing the conflict by bringing in great power competition. The 
real fear that Eagleburger and the State Department characterized as being “seriously 
adverse to [American] interests” was the escalation of the then limited Iraqi campaign of 
targeting Iran’s oil infrastructure, was targeting Iran’s revenue.  
 For the US, the loss of control of these tactics by Baghdad risked an escalation 
that would elicit an Iranian backlash which “could cause Iran to try to prevent through 
force all oil exports” from the Persian Gulf. 397 The US feared that Iraq’s attack on Iran’s 
war making ability (i.e. its oil profits via the selling of crude) would inadvertently lead to 
major supply disruptions, leading to a loss of Iranian, Iraqi, and other Persian Gulf oil. 
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Earlier that year, the Department of Energy released a memo warning about the effects of 
the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the pivotal water way that is the sole exit from the 
Persian Gulf. The Department of Energy concluded that the closure of the Strait could 
lead to a loss of 10 mbpd of the market and advocated for actively reaching out to other 
regional producers, including major OPEC Members, to offset the possibility of this 
supply disruption. 398 The concern over supply disruption from the region was coupled 
with what Eagleburger and the State Department portrayed as the possibility of 
“sustained Iranian pressure” bringing “about Iraq's political collapse.” 399 In other words, 
the US had a heightened assessment of the destructive power of the Islamic Republic 
while fearing the potential weakness of the Iraqi military.  
 With this assessment, the building blocks of the US response to the remainder of 
the Iran-Iraq war were laid down. What the State Department proposed was to assist Iraq 
in three interconnected ways: financial, diplomatic, and militarily, of which the former 
two would become the most substantial. On the financial aspect, the most consequential 
feature of this assistance was the conscious American decision to upgrade Iraq’s oil 
exports, while it was in the process of cutting out Iranian oil from the global economy. 
This overt decision by the US would become the most far-reaching intervention in the 
internal functionality of OPEC since the Organization’s creation.  
 In times past, particularly the 1960s, the US intervention in OPEC’s affairs was 
far more circumspect and behind the scenes. Now, with the proposed upgrading of Iraqi 
                                                        
398 Department of Energy Memo, 26 August 1983, folder “Iraq” Box 4,5,6,7 , William F. Martin Records. 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 
399 Department of State. 7 October 1983. "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of 
Strict Neutrality”.  
243 
exports, while Washington waged economic warfare against Iran, thus targeting Iran’s 
ability to produce and sell, these actions were difficult to deny or ignore. More so, to 
fundamentally cause an upgrading to Iraqi output and excess capacity would be to 
regionalize the conflict with Iran and Iraq, as the latter, as the State Department attests, 
would need active assistance from the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. This was the 
most relevant as it relates to Iraq’s quest for more pipeline distribution across the Arabian 
Peninsula and potentially involving Syria.  
 Diplomatically, the proposition was for the US to continue and possibly expand a 
greater role at the UN in bringing hostilities to an end, while also issuing “more explicit 
statements of support for the territorial integrity of Iraq and the survival of its present 
government." 400  Albeit, this would come at a cost, as it would openly confirm US 
support for Baathist Iraq, a reality not lost on US decision makers. Militarily, though the 
economic warfare against Iran was to continue, it was to be broadened to disrupt the 
foreign military hardware that Iran was managing to still obtain, regardless of the 
sanctions placed on its economy.  
 As Figure 4.5 shows, Iran’s post-revolutionary ability to secure outside military 
technology all but collapsed. With the exception of a few countries, Iran’s access to 
foreign sources of military hardware, technology, and maintenance was solely dependent 
upon the West, chiefly the US. But with the erosion of Iran-US relations in the wake of 
the Revolution, the hostage crisis, only to be exacerbated by the war, Iran found itself 
completely cut off from traditional partners. It was thus forced to purchase lower quality 
hardware with older technology or pay exorbitant fees for what it used to have access too, 
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oftentimes relying on third parties that went through the global black market. 
 At the same time, the US developed a more robust export policy vis-à-vis Iraq. In 
lieu of the US actually committing American forces to fight on behalf of Iraq against Iran, 
it helped facilitate much wider access to military technology. However, it is important to 
note that while there was a modest increase in direct, state-to-state, arms transfers from 
the US to Iraq, it was the financial and diplomatic changes to US policies (i.e. sanctions 
removal, access to cross-border technology, diplomatic normalcy and protection to Iraq, 
etc.) that helped facilitate other countries providing and selling the Iraqis weapons for 
their war effort (see Figure 4.6). Thus, the military aspect of US assistance to Iraq, in and 
of itself, was very minimal. This was because of the many hurdles it took in the early 
months of the war to normalize the Iraqi Baath as a US partner, but more importantly, 
normalize Iraqi-US relations. Only with the normalization of Iraq in the international 
system via its newfound relationship with the US, did access to weaponry increase, 
climaxing in 1984’s arms transfer figures.  
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Figure 4.5: Total Number of Arms Transfers to Iran 1977-1992.  Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
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Figure 4.6: Total Number of Arms Transfers to Iraq: 1977-1992. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
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 In subsequent months, these recommendations would be adopted as official policy. 
In November of 1983, President Ronal Reagan issued a National Security Directive to 
implement these policies – firstly to consult US allied regimes of the Persian Gulf, and 
then other US partners in the wider Middle East:  
I have reviewed and approved the Terms of Reference to govern our 
political and military consultations with our key Allies and the Gulf Arab 
states. Political consultations should begin immediately followed by 
military consultations with those Allies and regional states which express 
a willingness to cooperate with us in planning measures necessary to 
deter or defend against attacks on or interference with non-belligerent 
shipping or on critical oil productions and transshipment facilities in the 
Persian Gulf. In our consultations we should assign the highest priority to 
access arrangements which would facilitate the rapid deployment of those 
forces necessary to defend the critical oil facilities and transshipment 
points against air or sapper attacks. Specific recommendations bearing on 
US plans and force deployments should be submitted for approval 
following the consultations. It is present United States policy to undertake 
whatever measures may be necessary to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to 
international shipping. Accordingly, US military forces will attempt to 
deter and, if that fails, to defeat any hostile efforts to close the Strait to 
international shipping. Because of the real and psychological impact of a 
curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international 
economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with 
actions aimed at disrupting that traffic. 401 
 
What the US would use to convince its regional allies, which spearheaded the increase of 
American intervention in the war, was the specter of supply disruption. This 
apprehension would not only motivate regional producers to come along with US policy, 
but also persuade other global players, as the memories of 1973 and 1979-80 were still 
fresh in the minds of many decision-makers.  
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 As this outreach was beginning, the Reagan administration began upgrading its 
relations with the Iraqi Baath towards full normalization. To do so, it would send a 
seasoned Washington insider from the Nixon and Ford administration, which at the time 
was more in private business as opposed to public life: Donald Rumsfeld. President 
Reagan designated Rumsfeld as a Special Middle East Envoy, primarily because of his 
closeness to several figures in the administration. Rumsfeld’s mandate was not just to 
meet with senior Iraqi officials, but more importantly, have a meeting with Iraq’s Saddam 
Hussein. This meeting would be the highest encounter of a direct envoy of President 
Reagan with the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. 402 Rumsfeld’s message to the Iraqis from 
Washington was meant to unambiguously frame the objectives of Iraq in the war with 
that of US strategic interests:  
President Reagan and the US Government are committed to a sustained 
effort to help end the war which we see as strategy for the combatants and 
detrimental to our interests and those of our friends in the area. The US 
Government recognizes Iraq’s current disadvantage in a war of attrition 
since Iran has access to the Gulf while Iraq does not and would regard 
any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West. 
The US Government … will continue efforts to bring Iran to accept or 
acquiesce in its terms.  403 
 
When Rumsfeld arrived in Baghdad, the first person that he had a substantive meeting 
with was Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. The Foreign Minister consistently referred 
to the “unnatural imbalance” that was purportedly a major cause for instability in the 
region, a phenomenon he described as “giving a country more weight than it deserved”. 
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404 This was a clear reference to Iran, and the economic and military might that the Shah 
had accrued for the country, mostly in the 1970s. Rumsfeld, representing the 
administration, agreed with this assessment, and conveyed to Aziz that the war should 
end “in a way that would not feed Iran’s ambitions”. 405 With Rumsfeld’s meeting with a 
deferential Saddam Hussein, and how the Iraqi leader showed “obvious pleasure” with 
the US approach to Iraq, relations between both countries officially became normalized 
only a short time afterwards, including the exchanging of ambassadors. 406 And within 
days of Rumsfeld’s consequential visit, the American policy of financial assistance to 
Baghdad, with the diplomatic factors that would entail, was now to begin in full effect. 407 
The US broadens its Iraq initiative to its regional allies  
With the structure of the US approach in place, Washington would now need to recruit its 
regional allies in a concerted and integrated strategy to order to help Iraq in its war effort, 
assist in the production and transport of its oil, and in contain Iran. Upon leaving 
Baghdad, Rumsfeld would stop in London to coordinate with Jordan’s monarch, visiting 
London at the time, the upgrading of relations with Iraq. More significantly, the two 
discussed the building of the Aqaba pipeline, which would not only render more financial 
assistance to Iraq, but would diversify Persian Gulf oil so that it would become less 
dependent upon the Strait of Hormuz passageway, and thus less vulnerable to the ongoing 
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war. 408 Indeed, it was this very subject matter that created the urgency for the Iraqi 
regime to upgrade relations with the US. 409 
 For the US, however, the pipeline was part of an overall strategy in utilizing 
global oil export dynamics as a weapon against Iran. In early January of 1984, as 
relations with Iraq were being upgraded to official status, the US National Security 
Council (NSC) released an early memo concerning US strategy to deal with energy issues 
in light of the Iran-Iraq war, which by that time was pushing four years. In the memo, the 
US strategy was to identify countries “likely to have spare capacity” in order to be 
“approached diplomatically – to ensure increased output if possible”. 410  The plan, 
already in place by targeting Iran with a web of sanctions, intended to make its economy 
suffer, dry up its oil revenue, and thus and severally limit its war making ability, was to 
be expanded with the help of other countries. The countries that were to be approached 
were the following: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Nigeria, Venezuela, and other 
OECD countries. This move was simply a natural extension of the policy advocated for 
by Lawrence Eagleburger, which on the surface was meant to upgrade Iraqi capacity, but 
ultimately meant the overt US intervention in OPEC. With the US now openly attempting 
to change the export policies of OPEC Member States, the internal functionality of 
Organization would invariably change dramatically.  
 The most willing participants of the US approach were those that were already 
sympathetic or supporting Iraq’s war effort against Iran: the Persian Gulf Arab 
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Monarchies. Being an outlying Member, Nigeria would ultimately stay neutral and not 
become a significant factor in this proposed export policy. And Venezuela had long 
looked askance on non-Member States, particularly those from highly industrialized 
economies, interfering in the affairs of OPEC. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, in 
signing onto this strategy merely broadened what they had already been doing in 
supporting the Iraqi Baath with direct financial assistance.  
 But as this policy was coming into effect, the nature of the Iran-Iraq war was now 
dramatically changing. The localized attacks on oil tankers by both countries had now 
turned into a full-blown strategy that each country was using. This meant that the threat 
to the wider region was no longer an Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in possible 
retaliation to an Iraqi action. It meant that the war was now regionalized to the point that 
the oil production capacities of all producers, specifically those in the Persian Gulf, were 
threatened. In March of 1984, the US Interagency Intelligence Assessment confirmed 
this: 
We believe that the warning about possible escalation of the Gulf war 
contained in SNIE 34/35-2-83 dated October 1983 remain valid. The SNIE 
predicted a series of intermediate escalatory steps by Iraq in to increase 
military pressure on Iran, possibly culminating in Iraqi attacks on Iran’s 
Khark Island oil terminal or associated tanker traffic an Iranian 
retaliation against oil exports form Arab Gulf states. We believe Iraq 
already has passed through many of the intermediate warning steps 
outlined in the SNIE. The risk of a serous Iraqi effort against tankers or 
Khark Island will increase if, as expected, Iran launches its next major 
offensive, probably within a month. A serious Iraqi effort against Khark is 
particularly likely if the battle goes badly for Baghdad. On paper Iraq has 
the capability to shut down Khark Island though direct military attack or 
attack on tankers calling at Khark. Iraqi willingness to risk heavy losses in 
such efforts in the question….At a minimum, we believe that Iranians will 
employ psychological warfare though the use of Iranian inspired and 
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supported Shia terrorism directed at Iraq’s Gulf supporters as well as US 
personnel and facilities in the region and beyond. 411 
 
The Assessment went onto deduce that with the current trend the war was on, two “risk 
options” would be most likely as it related to Iranian retaliation: a “lower risk” and “more 
serious steps”. 412 On the former, the US concluded that the Iranians would utilize 
harassment tactics against vessels, over flights of the offshore facilities of the Arab 
Monarchies, and possibly attacking Iraqi pipeline exports. However, the higher risk 
scenario is what concerned the US and its Western partners. This would involve direct 
attacks by the Iranian armed forces on the neighboring Arab monarchies of the Persian, 
the main financiers of Iraq’s war efforts against Iran, and the primary players in what 
would turn out to be an oil war against Tehran’s oil export revenues. Furthermore, an 
escalation would logically conclude in the Persian Gulf becoming a no-go zone, due to 
reasons ranging from mining  by the Iranian military to direct naval action.  
 The culmination of these concerns led to the establishment of a US doctrine 
towards the Persian Gulf and the wider region for the remainder of the Iran-Iraq war. This 
was introduced in a white paper that the US State Department put together for the White 
House, entitled “Iran-Iraq War: Elements of U.S. Diplomatic Strategy and Plans”. In the 
paper, the authors sketched out 9 principle goals that would ultimately become US policy 
towards the conflict and the region:  
1. Maintain active U.S. support for a negotiated settlement that will preserve 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Iran.  
2. Take steps to help Iraq avoid defeat by preserving a strategic balance, 
while maintaining U.S. neutrality. 
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3. Strengthen relations with Iraq, urge it to avoid escalation in the Gulf, stop 
using chemical weapons. 
4. Work through third parties to urge restrain by Iran and a negotiated 
settlement.  
5. Urge third countries to cease arms sales to Iran as a means of confronting 
Iranian intransigence. 
6. Emphasize U.S. intention to defend freedom of navigation in Strait of 
Hormuz and international waters of the Gulf. 
7. Obtain agreement from our allies for joint military operations in a Gulf 
crisis. 
8. Strengthen ties with friendly Gulf States and seek combined military 
planning and US/Allied deterrent deployments/exercises.  
9. Counter Iranian terrorism against U.S. and Gulf states. 413 
 
This ultimately led the NSC to update their prior strategy and introduce, at the end of 
May 1984, a memo entitled “Iran-Iraq War National Plan of Action”. The NSC memo 
played out differing scenarios of supply disruption, but ultimately concluded that any 
policy that would blunt the overwhelming negative effects of the stoppage of Persian 
Gulf oil flow would need to be a multinational effort: 
 
Bilateral and multi-lateral discussions with selected IEA/OECD partners 
concerning coordinated stock policies, including special emphasis on: 
need to increase strategic stocks; need to engage in such coordinated 
drawdown as appears appropriate in light of circumstances at time of 
emergency; need to avert overreaction to emergency by governments; and 
need to coordinate public statements of governments to calm unnecessary 
panic behavior of marketplace. 414 
 
The convergence of these varying policy papers would ultimately lead to the US taking 
on an active military posture to not only defend the free flow of oil, but more importantly, 
being an active force against Iran in the wider war.   As Iran and Iraq, by mid-1980s, 
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were now in full-blown tanker war, it was only a matter of time where the US and Iran 
would come to direct conflict. 415 
Interstate Relations  
By the mid-1980s, OPEC’s functionality had greatly eroded. The convergence of the 
downward trend in oil prices, the start of the Iran-Iraq war, the inability of the 
Organization to implement a ceasefire between two of its founding Members had all but 
paralyzed OPEC. Moreover, OPEC’s move towards price defense – the tendency of 
Member States to reduce output to tighten supply, in hopes of halting price erosion and 
increasing prices – only made matters worse for the Organization. Yet, with time, these 
two dangerous trends – the split within the Organization caused by the Iran-Iraq war and 
OPEC’s fundamental inability to react to changing market conditions – would lead to the 
virtual disintegration of the Group as the 1980s ended.  
The collapse of OPEC functionality 
OPEC’s adherence to the exhaustibility theory and its insistence on price defense, as 
prices were significantly decreasing (See Figure 4.3), was one of the main reasons that in 
1981-2, Member States began a series of production cap measures to halt price erosion. 
416 The Organization believed that placing a production ceiling on individual Members 
would halt supply into the market, and thus halt the downward trajectory in price. It was 
thought that with time, a sufficient tightening of the market would eventually raise prices. 
This thinking was part of the legacy of the late 1960s, which consistently was reinforced 
in the 1970s.  
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 Yet, the advanced economies’ efforts at conservation, while new supplies outside 
of the OPEC area came into the market only further eroded the Organization’s market 
share. By 1985, roughly the mid-way point of the Iran-Iraq War, OPEC global production 
share had fallen to its lowest of 29.44% (See Figure 4.4). And though it would rise again, 
primarily because of the twin economic and political decisions made by OPEC’s now 
newly dubbed swing producer, Saudi Arabia, the culmination of what had transpired 
within the global oil market by the mid-1980s was the loss of market share, and more 
consequentially, the loss of price control by the Organization. For its part, OPEC’s 
diagnosis of the price erosion was completely accurate. On its 25th anniversary press 
release, the Organization put out one of its most far-reaching and systemic explanations 
of how OPEC viewed itself in the global economy. In tracing back its history up to the 
end of 1985, OPEC’s perception of the then political economy of the day was very telling 
in how it would approach this period of falling prices:  
 
the rapidity with which these structural changes in the world energy order 
took place, as a result not only of market forces but also of the deliberate 
policy actions of the governments of the consuming countries, created the 
present over-supply and market weakness. The sharp decline in world 
demand for oil through policies of accelerated conservation and fuel 
substitution by consumers, coupled with the dramatic increase in non-
OPEC supplies, led to a sharp and rapid decline in OPEC's share of the 
world's total oil supplies and to the present situation of increasing 
downward pressures on the oil price structure. Oil producers from outside 
OPEC have been systematically undercutting OPEC's prices in order to 
maximize their sales at the expense of OPEC Countries, but, here again, it 
was OPEC's action of reducing production to defend the oil price 
structure that had been behind the relative market stability of oil. Without 
OPEC, the pressure on the market would by now have taken its toll. The 
price structure would have collapsed and real chaos would have prevailed 
in the oil market. OPEC has been able to successfully hold the price 
structure from which other producers are benefiting, but at great sacrifice 
to its Members and at enormous risks to their development projects. 
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Clearly, however, OPEC alone cannot and should not be expected to 
perpetually provide the insurance policy on the stability of oil prices, 
while non-OPEC countries sit back and enjoy the benefits of this 
insurance without paying their share oil the premium. A collapse of the oil 
price structure would be detrimental to all producers of oil, especially 
those outside OPEC, whose cost of production is much higher than that of 
OPEC Countries. Such a collapse would also be detrimental to the 
consuming countries, insofar as the development of alternative forms of 
energy is concerned. It could also adversely affect the economies of the 
industrialized countries and their trade, banking and financial systems. 
Those who adopt an uncooperative attitude to OPEC in favor of short-
term price cutting will discover, perhaps too late, that the economics of 
the short term are also the economics of the short-sighted. Since OPEC 
has proved to be a moderating influence on the international economic 
scene, it is highly regrettable that some oil-consuming and producing 
countries outside OPEC have stood doggedly in opposition, refusing to 
learn from the lessons of history. The loud voices against dialogue with 
OPEC in some major industrialized countries appear to be relying too 
heavily on the present soft market conditions, which cannot continue 
indefinitely. Non-OPEC countries, in maximizing production at the 
expense of OPEC, are depleting their limited oil reserves so fast that they 
will soon have to invest huge and exorbitant capital in order to prevent a 
drastic fall in their production. Conversely, OPEC, which accounts for 
two-thirds of the 
world's oil reserves, is prolonging the life-span of those oil reserves which 
will eventually bring it back to the fore as the future main supplier of oil in 
the world. The reality of today's interdependent world must be appreciated 
and its resources mobilized and utilized for the common good and for a 
meaningful overall world economic development. We are convinced that 
what is needed today, after OPEC's quarter-century of useful service to 
mankind, is the full co-operation of all those involved in the energy 
industry - OPEC, non-OPEC and consumers alike, in order to maintain 
the essential oil price stability that would prevent an undue, sharp and 
disruptive fluctuation in the future world energy situation. It is only to be 
hoped that, as OPEC celebrates its 25th birthday, it can look forward with 
confidence to a future of dialogue and co-operation with all partners of 
the oil and energy trade. 417 
 
The tone of OPEC’s official language had markedly changed from the confidence of the 
1970s. But its reasoning had become quite contradictory. The Organization clearly 
understood who the economic and political forces that have eroded the price structure of 
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crude oil were – and how this process took place. But its premise and prescriptions were 
not only inaccurate, but would continue to worsen its control over market share and thus 
control over price, at least for the short term. Of the several misconceptions that the 
Group had concerning the price erosion, the most harmful to the Organization’s interests 
was the continual and unquestioned acceptance of the exhaustibility theory. 
 It was the continuance of this belief that would lead the Organization to adopt 
production quotas for each Individual Member State, in order to collectively reduces 
OPEC exports. However, the mere adoption of this quota system, was not the main 
reason for OPEC’s inability to affect market conditions. Theoretically, according to 
classic cartel dynamics, OPEC certainly the requisite power and capacity to tighten 
global oil supply. Yet, as Raino Malnes, has noted, would require disciplined collection 
action, which is the main characteristic of a cartel system. 418  But this type of 
coordination amongst the differing Member States never in earnest existed within the 
Group. Collective action was always tactical – whether it was during the early years of 
negotiations with the Companies, nationalizations precedents, or agreements with OPEC 
Member Stats National Oil Companies entered into with the International Oil Companies. 
Collective action, which was synchronized was often agreed, but seldom actually 
followed.  
 More so, the political conditions within the Organization – chiefly because the 
Iran-Iraq war and its indirect consequences – made unanimity of purpose and collective 
action all but impossible. For the quota system to work, Iran and Iraq, and the Persian 
Gulf Arab monarchies would have needed to have amicable political ties. The raging 
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conflict between Iran and Iraq, the polarization that the war created within the 
Organization, OPEC’s inability to halt price erosion, and its subsequent loss over price 
control gradually created an altered image of the Organization. What was once a feared 
Organization by the advanced economies, yet simultaneously respected by many varying 
developing countries, was now seen as a deteriorating relic of the 1970s. It was at this 
time where first scholarly, and then mainstream commentary would notice this change. 
Mohammed E. Ahrari’s OPEC: The Failing Giant was one of the most influential to this 
shifting narrative of the Organization. Though Ahrari’s diagnosis of the maladies that 
plagued OPEC was strictly in economic terms – too much greed at the end of the 1970s – 
his work created the template to change the image of the Organization, from a once 
successful initiative from the developing world to a collapsing institution whose time was 
coming to an end. 419 With Ahrari’s template of a failing institution now constructed, 
though derived in academia, it would, with time, go mainstream – even affecting the 
perception of many influential OPEC officials.   
De-facto Disintegration 
 
 By 1986, it was clear that the quota system then in place had not only failed to 
bring about a reversal to OPEC’s fortunes, but also to halt the steady price erosion that so 
dramatically was affecting the revenues of each OPEC Member State. The belief in the 
efficacy of the quota system, rooted in the principle of exhaustibility, drove the 
Organization’s main producers to ‘punish the market’. But when this policy failed to do 
so, for major producers, like Saudi Arabia, the years that they had dedicated to price 
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defense, by helping to institute the quota system, were wasted years due to its inefficacy 
and how it had indirectly lead to the loss of market share. As OPEC held back its exports 
from the market, in order to create new price dynamics, others just filled in the gap. For 
the Saudis, the only way to counter their decline of influence in the market was to turn 
market dynamics on its head.   
 In 1986, Saudi Arabia, one of the chief architects of the quota system, effectively 
abandoned it, and broke away from OPEC’s established policy by overproducing. 420 
They did this in consultation with some of their key Arab allies, and backed by the 
previously explained American plan to contain the fallout from the Iran-Iraq war. This 
overproduction greatly contributed to the collapse of crude oil prices (See Figure 4.3). 
Riyadh went from producing in 1985 3.2 mbpd to expanding production to 4.8 mbpd in 
1986, and by 1990, 6.4 mbpd. There was, however, an additional geopolitical reason 
behind this move. Saudi Arabia’s flooding of the market was not only a keen opportunity 
to punish its competitors outside the OPEC area, and those OPEC Members that were not 
going along with quota stipulations, but also a way to further erode Iranian oil revenue, as 
it relates to the Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, the Saudis’ decision to abandon their quota to 
protect Saudi market share, coincided with the major economic problems that 
Revolutionary Iran was experiencing in their sixth year of war with Iraq. It’s important to 
remember where this rationale had come from, as that the Saudis had previously utilized 
a similar method against the Shah, which contributed to the Revolution. 421 
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 By 1988, the economies of both Iran and Iraq were devastated. Iran, being the 
sanctioned country, found it both increasingly difficult to acquire weapons (that it could 
not indigenously make) from foreign sources, and more importantly, the revenue to 
purchase those weapons. The price collapse in 1986, with the additional Saudi output into 
the market, created unprecedented pressures for the Islamic Republic; so much so that the 
continuance of the war effort was no longer seen as valuable nor viable. Those in Iran 
advocating for the acceptance of the UN ceasefire agreement argued that Iran’s primary 
objective had been met: the expulsion of Iraqi forces out of Iranian territory and the 
return to the status quo ante, which Iran (both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic) 
was content with. Those advocating for the continuance of the war argued that Iran’s 
objectives were not going to be met until the fall of the Iraqi Baath. Eventually, the 
former won the argument. For Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iran’s acceptance of the 
ceasefire was tantamount to an Iraqi victory, although none of Iraq’s initial objectives 
were met, both territorially and politically. In the end however, the Iran-Iraq war only 
produced two losers. Not only was the war catastrophic for both countries’ civilian 
infrastructure, 422 the impact to their oil production capacities, and dramatic decline in 
their tangible exports severally downgraded the clout of both Iran and Iraq in OPEC. This 
would be significant throughout the 1990s, as Saudi leadership would dominate a 
weakened institution. 
 As the decade closed, OPEC officials were hopeful that with the end of the Iran-
Iraq war, the Organization’s future would return back to the what had transpired in the 
1970s, when OPEC was a unified force in the global economy that actually benefited its 
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Members. In a 1988 Press release, the damage that the market dynamics of the 1980s, 
along with the hostilities between Iran-Iraq caused the Organization, was clearly felt and 
now openly expressed:  
Despite OPEC's many positive achievements, however, the current decade 
has brought with it some very serious problems for the Organization, 
making it perhaps the most difficult period in its history. These difficulties, 
which center around the ways and means of stabilizing the volatile oil 
market at prices that are fair to both producers, within and outside OPEC, 
and consumers, are still very much present today. As so often in the past, 
both depressing and heartening developments for the Organization have 
been witnessed in 1988. The year began inauspiciously, with the impact of 
an oil glut which had become apparent in the second half of 1987 being 
carried over into the new year. Excessive supplies of oil, as well as 
accelerated stock-building by consumers, combined to threaten the price 
stability which OPEC had managed to restore to the market with its return 
to a fixed price regime at the beginning of 1987. As a result, prices, which 
had been climbing steadily towards - and on occasions even exceeding – 
the Organization's reference price oU18 per barrel, began to falter and 
fall back….An historic meeting between OPEC and seven non-OPEC oil-
producing countries in April 1988 represented a milestone in OPEC/non-
OPEC relations, and helped lay the foundation for future dialogue and co-
operation between a large number of oil producers, in an atmosphere of 
mutual trust. All the countries present at this gathering agreed on the 
importance of the meeting, and that a stable oil market was the 
responsibility of all parties engaged in the industry, with the burden - 
consequently - to be shared by all. It was also agreed that such an initial 
meeting should be followed by continued contact to review the agreements 
that were arrived at and to plan future avenues of co-
operation….Undoubtedly, one of the most important developments of the 
year, not only for OPEC but also for the world as a whole, was the 
cessation of hostilities in the Gulf. 423 
 
OPEC’s Secretary General Subroto, on the eve of the 1990s, echoed this sentiment. By 
describing the 1980s as the decade “characterized by confrontation”, the Secretary 
expressed that the Organization looked “forward optimistically” to the 1990s as a 
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“decade of cooperation”. 424 The hope for the Organization was that though Iran and Iraq, 
and the latter’s supporters within the Organization, had deep mistrust and antagonism 
towards each other, the incentives towards cooperation, at least for the time being, would 
subsume the animosity generated in the 1980s. Indeed, it was sheer economic 
enticements that brought together these disparate countries in the first place. And it was 
thought that the same desire for economic gain, specifically in light of the decade of 
economic loss that the Organization had gone through, would motivate Members to once 
again collaborate. 
 As OPEC entered the 1990s, the most pressing issue for interstate relations was to 
repair and overhaul the broken quota system. So ineffective was this system that the 
Organization publicly declared it a failure, but more importantly, made it a benchmark in 
how OPEC would move forward. As each Member was formulating their own policy 
based on parochial national interest and an ad-hoc, tactical reading of short-term market 
trends, unity of purpose within the Group and organizational consensus had long broken 
down. So much so, that OPEC’s institutional leadership, in a press release, openly stated 
that “only strict adherence to quotas, actually verified by the market, will demonstrate 
each country's willingness to restore the price basket”. 425  Thus, for the leadership, 
getting Members to both agree, and more importantly, implement a new quota system 
was the key priority for OPEC in the next decade. 
 But beneath this objective laid the unintended consequences of the Iran-Iraq war, 
of which the Organization was largely ignorant about. For Iraq, the deep fiscal constraints 
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caused by the damage to large swaths of its oil infrastructure, the debts accrued because 
of the war, and with little non-hydrocarbon industries to generate revenue, eventually 
caused desperation within the Baathist regime. The Saudi overproduction indirectly hurt 
Baghdad (a key Saudi ally during the 1980s), just as much as it was directed to inflict 
punishment on Tehran. Subsequently, the years that the Persian Gulf Arab monarchies 
had lent Baghdad financial loans were now coming due. And with crude oil prices in the 
doldrums, Iraq’s capacity to pay back the war debt was increasingly limited. For Baghdad, 
the argument they made to their debtors, particularly the Persian Gulf Arabs, was that 
Iraq had been the front line against Revolutionary Political Islam, which was rooted in 
Iran, and which threatened the political viabilities of the varying governmental systems in 
the Persian Gulf and beyond. 426 Saddam’s argument was that Iraq’s war against Iran was 
on behalf of all Arabs. For its part, whether they bought this argument or not, the Saudis 
wrote off virtually all of the war debt that Iraq had accrued. Kuwait, however, was not so 
generous. 
 As OPEC was attempting to institute a new quota system, the old grievances that 
Iraq and Kuwait had towards each other gradually resurfaced. These were as old as Iraq’s 
claim to the entirety of Kuwait, territorial disputes about oil fields in the Persian Gulf and 
on bordering areas, how shared oil fields would be exploited, and what had triggered the 
renewal of these grievances, the massive debt that Iraq owed to Kuwait. Though 
diplomatic means were tried, particularly by the Kuwaitis, in order to stave off conflict, 
ultimately, war became unavoidable. 
 Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait came at a complete surprise to OPEC, 
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much of the international community, the superpowers, and many of the regional players 
in the Middle East. Since the invasion, several attempts have undertaken to explain the 
rationality of why the war happened. 427 Greed, miscalculations, and fear on the part of 
the Iraqi Baathist leadership and provocation and an inability to be flexible with Iraq’s 
war debt by the Kuwaitis have all been offered as contributing factors. Yet, it was the 
peculiar mix of miscalculations on the part of the Iraqi Baath that eventually made war 
unstoppable. These miscalculations centered on Iraq’s past behavior with attacking a 
neighboring country and also its perception of the reaction of the superpowers and the 
larger international community. When Iraq invaded Iran, not only did the Baathist regime 
get little to no international condemnation, but indirectly, it was rewarded with financial 
and military assistance, and diplomatic normalization with the West – all the while it 
expanded its relations with the USSR. Thus, when Saddam interpreted the comments of 
US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, as somehow Washington being indifferent to his 
invasion of Kuwait, 428 his misreading was arguably rooted in past experience.  
 By the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam’s relationship with the US was heading 
into troubled waters, by reasons of renewed mistrust and misperception. The Iran Contra 
Affair, in which the Reagan administration used illegal arms transfers to Iran to pay for 
paramilitary operations in Central America, 429  changed the image of the Reagan 
administration to the Iraqis. This mistrust even elicited a strong reaction from senior US 
officials, most importantly President Reagan’s letter of reassurance to Saddam Hussein. 
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In his 1986 letter, President Reagan sought to restore confidence in Hussein that US 
policy was still to “restrain shipment of arms to Iran”. 430 However, the Iraqi Baath 
figured that it could always balance its relations with the US by once again leaning 
heavily on the USSR.    
 Yet these miscalculations were catastrophic for the Iraqi leadership. Though Iran 
was viewed by the West, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Iran, as a globalized threat, 
and hence easily securitized, Kuwait had no such threat factor associated to it. More 
importantly, the Iraqi traditional reliance on the USSR, by 1990, was an obsolete 
geopolitical paradigm, as the Soviet Union, unbeknownst to many, was in the process of 
imploding. And thus, reliance on a failing superpower to keep it from international 
condemnation, just as relations with the US were to fall apart, dramatically put the Iraqi 
regime in an place of international isolation that they had not experienced before.  
 The invasion of Kuwait, the destruction of Kuwait’s oil infrastructure by the 
Iraqis, and the subsequent destruction of key sectors of Iraq’s civilian oil infrastructure by 
the US-led coalition intended to expel Iraq out of Kuwait, crystallized the perception of 
OPEC as a failing, third world relic. Markets, governments, and other international actors 
now questioned OPEC’s self-professed claim to being a stabilizing force in the global 
economy – a mantra that the Organization had adopted years prior and long aspired to. If 
the Organization could not stop its founding Members from going to war with each other, 
how could it possibly diagnosis and prescribe macroeconomic energy solutions.  
 With Operation Desert Storm, the Iraqi-American relationship officially ended. 
The US, no longer constrained by a powerful Soviet Union, which was at that time 
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slowly disintegrating, took this opportunity to force its own preferences upon the 
Organization. The initiation of this process was the implementation of the dual 
containment policy on two of OPEC’s founding Members: Iran and Iraq. 431 What this 
meant was that for the first time since the creation of the Organization, OPEC’s collective 
output policy would now be openly dictated by non-Members. And though granted, the 
US was in the unipolar moment of its geopolitical power, the behavior exhibited by 
Washington towards the Organization had traditionally been measured, indirect, and 
always behind the scenes. US intervention openly targeting the oil production capacities 
of Iran and Iraq was new. And the resulting internal power dynamics within the 
Organization as result of this targeting of Iran and Iraq’s exports created a new set of 
circumstances within the Organization, giving greater influence within OPEC to Saudi 
Arabia and its likeminded allies. 
 Furthermore, the beginnings of the draconian sanctions regime on Iraq would 
commence within months after the US-led expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait. The economic 
warfare that Iraq would undergo after Desert Storm would take the country back – 
economically, socially, environmentally, and politically – at least a generation if not more. 
And as this new process would unfold, OPEC as collective unit no longer had the ability 
to respond or formulate policy in any effective way. And with the beginning of 1993, 
OPEC once again underwent a significant price collapse, of which in its current 
weakened state, was completely helpless to avoid or properly respond to. And so OPEC’s 
civil wars, and the failure of the Organization to prevent the fracturing of unity had 
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mortgaged its future, for the first time, to the outside powers that so long had tried to 
control the direction of Organization.  
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CHAPTER V • THE REBALANCING PHASE, THE GRADUAL 
RECENTRALIZATION OF OPEC, 1993-2008 
 
At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, OPEC’s leadership desperately hoped for reconciliation 
among its Member States. But as the Organization’s hopes were dashed by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Desert Storm war to extricate the Baathists out of 
Kuwait, OPEC, for the first time since its creation, lost control over its functionality and 
future. Subsequently, the Organization entered a phase of its history where its very 
existence became increasingly in doubt, both by its critics and its supporters – even its 
former officials. 432 
 This era of OPEC’s institutional life, more than previous eras, was significantly 
impacted by the evolution of US power and its dominance in the international system. 
Regarding Market Forces, while many OPEC officials had hoped that the price erosion of 
the 1980s would end with the beginning of the 1990s, the continued efficacy of advanced 
economies post-1973 energy strategy (i.e. more efficient transportation, new sources of 
oil supplies, and alternative sources energy.) continued to suppress and even further erode 
the overall price of oil. This was compounded by the implosion of the USSR and its 
disintegration into 15 republics, which would, in time, open up new energy-rich states, 
such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to Western investment.  
 Though OPEC would gradually regain a significant portion of its market share 
that it lost in the 1980s, the aforementioned trends and the inability to collectively act on 
tactical and strategic matters would keep price control out of the Organization’s grasp. 
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This, by default, created a new free-market oriented pricing system, unlike the prior 
systems that either the major oil companies, via cartel behavior, or OPEC, dominated. 
 In the Rebalancing era, the role of the United States vis-à-vis how OPEC behaved 
in the international system would be the most consequential since the creation of the 
Organization. Ever since OPEC’s inception, American policy and behavior towards the 
Organization had always been reactive. Even at the end of the 1970s, when US and allied 
nations successfully began the implementation of their alternative energy and 
diversifications strategies, their motivation was one of defensiveness. Yet in this 
Rebalancing era, specifically for the rest of the 1990s, the US would go on the offensive, 
seeking to reshape the entire dynamics of oil towards its favor while directly weakening 
any centralization of oil export planning. But the ability of the US to consequentially 
weaken the Organization had its limits. At the turn of the century, macro consumption 
changes would ultimately diminish the ability of OPEC’s critics to keep prices low and 
prevent a new era of cooperation among Members – even though this cooperation was 
limited, measured, and tactical.  
 Coincidentally, the US action within the Middle East, coupled with the major 
changes in Venezuelan politics at the end of the 1990s, would set the stage for the 
internal dynamics of OPEC’s Member States to have profound effects on OPEC’s 
resurgence in the first decade of the 2000s. Indeed, the internal changes of leadership in 
Caracas and Baghdad – the former by democratic populism while the latter was imposed 
via invasion – would become the most profound for the Organization in this period. The 
long drawn-out conflict between the US and Baathist Iraq, born out of the Desert Storm 
conflict and resulting in the crushing sanctions regime placed on Iraq (with the overt help 
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of US allied OPEC Members of the Persian Gulf), would finally come to a head in the 
immediate post 9/11 geostrategic environment. With the invasion of Iraq and the toppling 
of the Baathist system, the ramification of Saddam’s fall would affect every Middle 
Eastern state, of which the most consequential would be the Persian Gulf Arab 
Monarchies and Iran. More so, the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to rebuild from 
the Iran-Iraq war and normalize its diplomatic relations during this period, with the 
significant exception of its relations with the US, made it suited to take advantage, albeit 
on a limited basis, of much of the macro changes in internal OPEC dynamics, the wider 
Middle East, and the global oil industry. And this trend was also extended in its ability to 
project unconventional power in US occupied Iraq, which helped it to foster, for the first 
time, a friendly government in Baghdad that would eventually coordinate security and 
economic policy, indirectly affecting oil related matters.  
 The changes at the domestic level of OPEC States would eventually affect the 
interstate relations of the Organization. In the minds of the Persian Gulf monarchies, the 
change of domestic political control in Baghdad, though they traditionally mistrusted the 
Baathists, would fundamentally transform Iraq from a barrier against the Iranians to an 
open collaborator with them. For Iran, an enemy became a potential partner. Furthermore, 
the rise of Hugo Chavez under a populist-driven, socialist movement in Venezuela 
significantly added a newfound relevance to the Organization in the beginning of the 21st 
century. In Chavez and his Bolivarian government, the Organization’s interests would 
once again compete and often times trump the narrow interests of certain Member States.   
 But as these internal and interstate alterations were happening, rising oil 
consumption patterns in the global economy, particularly as it relates to Chinese and 
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Indian energy demands, would eventually intersect with a brewing storm of mass 
spending in the public and private sectors of many advanced economies. Chinese and 
Indian growth, starting in the beginning of the 21st century, would gradually but 
continuously, push oil prices far above what they had been in over a generation. As the 
1990s ended, the US and other allies in the advanced economies witnessed the end of the 
efficacy of their diversification strategies.  
 It was in this period where OPEC solidified the regaining of much of its lost 
market share from the 1980s and 1990s. But as consumption would steadily increase, 
greatly assisted by rising spending in the advanced economies, rising oil prices gradually 
turned into a new threat – a replay of the 1970s. And as new worries about supply, and 
the ‘peak oil’ narrative developed, prices would start to affect economic growth. This was 
highlighted by the direct and indirect affects that rising oil prices had in the summer of 
2008, only weeks before the triggering of the financial crisis of 2008-present. With the 
beginning of this crisis, the Rebalancing phase of OPEC’s institutional life would end, 
bringing the Organization to the present fragile and varying conditions of the global 
economy.  
Market Forces 
As the 1990s began, the geopolitical and geo-economic trajectory of international 
relations was almost impossible to forecast. While the 1990-1991 Gulf War had created 
short-term consensus among rivaling countries in the Middle East region and beyond, 
primarily because of the audacious nature of Iraq’s plan to annex Kuwait, the future of 
international cooperation still was a mystery. US decision makers understood that while 
the 1980s had been a devastating decade for OPEC, it was also trying time for the USSR. 
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Being a major oil exporter, the Soviet Union had dramatically suffered because of 
plummeting prices, some of which was actually expected by Western Sovietologists. 433 
Moreover, by the mid-1980s, Soviet inspired and aligned Communist political systems 
were dramatically lagging behind their free-market counterparts in such critical issues as 
domestic governance efficacy, economic growth, and political stability.  
 But the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, to support and 
uphold a friendly Communist regime, 434 had drained the country of vital resources at a 
time where its oil revenues had dwindled.  For the Soviets, Afghanistan was akin to the 
US experience in Vietnam several years prior. Yet, with the pullback from Afghanistan in 
the Gorbachov era, the war effort, compounded by the mass decrease in oil revenue and 
the structural problems in the Soviet economy, had created terminal issues for the Soviet 
leadership.  
 The US understood that there were deep changes in the Soviet leadership and that 
structural problems in Soviet governance were finally coming to the surface. This was 
evident throughout the end of the 1980s as the USSR experienced serious governance 
problems as smaller provinces on the periphery would agitate for independence, 435 and in 
the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, engage in open warfare with each other. 436 
However, the extent of the problems to the outside world, even though the Soviets were 
attempting at controlled political liberalization and economic reforms, was not known. 
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Thus, the actual, physical disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end to its viability in 
the international system was not expected. And when it did end, under the leadership of 
President George H.W. Bush, the disintegration process was neither celebrated nor 
actively encouraged, but as Christopher Maynard has shown, was handled with deep 
caution and prudence, primarily because of the fear surrounding the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal. 437 
 While the Soviet implosion would have consequential impact on the international 
system, primarily how the end of the Cold War would affect international cooperation 
and security, because it was not widely expected, there was little planning for its 
ramifications it in the wider global economy. Moreover, the fallout on global oil industry 
itself was not well understood. In the early months of the 1990s, just before the Soviet 
demise, OPEC officials were already planning their strategy to bounce back from the 
disastrous 1980s. In a speech given in Tripoli in February of 1991, OPEC’s influential 
Secretary General Subroto, predicted a somewhat return to normalcy for the 
Organization: 
In 1988, growth in world oil demand averaged 3.3 per cent. In 1989, it fell 
to 2.2 per cent, and in 1990 it slowed further to around 1.1 per cent. This 
year, as a result of the combined weight of a number of factors, some of 
which have been gathering strength recently…it is likely to fall yet again. 
However, we in OPEC believe that in the longer term, the downward trend 
will be reversed. According to our OPEC energy in-house model and to 
other predictions, average 1990 world oil demand - excluding the former 
CPEs - stands at around 51.76 million barrels a day. By 1995, it will be 
around 54.83 million barrels a day, and in the year 2000, about 57.67 
million barrels a day. On the supply side, OPEC calculates that non-
OPEC oil supplies, which averaged 27.34 million barrels a day in 1990, 
will decline to 27.07 million barrels a day in 1995, and to 26.19 million 
barrels a day in the year 2000. This would put the call on OPEC oil, 
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including natural gas liquids, at 24.42 million barrels a day at the end of 
1990, at 27.76 million barrels a day in 1995, and at 31.48 million barrels 
a day in the year 2000. This would mean that by the end of the century, 
OPEC would be supplying more than half the total world demand for oil. 
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Subroto’s message, on an elemental level, was not just to provide his audience with a 
panoramic view of the global supply and demand dynamics, but to squarely address the 
deep concerns with OPEC’s collapsing market share. Of the many losses and setbacks 
that the Organization experienced in the decade of the 1980s, it was the erosion of its 
influence in the global oil industry that was the most worrying to OPEC Member States. 
And this loss of influence was directly related to OPEC supply diminishing in the global 
oil market, to be replaced by new sources of supply and better upstream technologies. But 
as Figure 5.1 shows, by the beginning of the 1990s, the Organization, primarily fueled by 
the Saudi decision to break away from the quota system, had already regained much of its 
market share.  
 By the early 1990s, the influx of non-OPEC oil in the global supply, as Figure 5.3 
shows, was simply not enough to keep OPEC from recapturing substantial lost market 
share. And though alternatives sources of energy were making strides for the advanced 
economies’ diversification efforts, their impact was far more limited than was hoped for. 
Thus, Secretary General Subroto’s optimism was not totally unwarranted. However, with 
the Soviet implosion, disintegration, and the emergence of the newly independent Central 
Asian countries, the global oil dynamics – chiefly as it relates to fears of supply 
disruption – radically changed. With no Soviet threat that would menace Middle East 
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supplies, the ‘fear premium’ on global supply would significantly decrease. As pricing of 
crude oil was, by the 1990s, a far more free-market enterprise, lacking a cartel like 
control by the oil companies or the incremental price hikes that OPEC was able to 
implement (again because of its market share domination), investors and speculators were 
able to apply a more predictable model for future supply. And, as Figure 5.4 shows, for 
the rest of the 1990s, global consumption increased only incrementally. Hence with 
predictable, but growing supply, and predictable but measured demand, without the fear 
premium that the Soviet presence and the Cold War imposed on the global economy, as 
Figure 5.2 details, crude oil prices continued to stagnate. Indeed, crude oil prices in 1993 
relapsed to 1986 figures.  
Prolonged ineffectiveness: OPEC in the dark ages, 1993-2000 
As OPEC witnessed the slow regaining of its market share, the next phase of its recovery 
plan, and the most important for the short-term economic wellbeing of its Member States 
was the issue of price. Previously, the supply conditions in the market would 
accommodate the Organization introducing measured price increases for their oil. But 
because the Fragmentation phase had lasted so long, and complimented by the rise of 
alternatives supplies and sources of energy, the notion of centralized price control eroded.  
 The hope was that a recentralization of the Organization would allow it to 
exercise the innate influential capacity that it had with such large market share. But when 
that did not happen, gradually Member States began to realize that even with the 
regaining of large parts of their market share that had been previously lost, the dynamics 
surrounding price control had radically changed. In essence, OPEC’s situation had turned 
back to the 1960s, but this time, with no identifiable set of actors to blame.   
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Figure 5.1: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization. 1992-2010 (1000 b/d) 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Crude Oil Prices: 1990-2011 (US dollars per barrel) Source: BP Statistical Review 
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Figure 5.3: OPEC Crude Oil Production by country, as Member States joined the Organization. 1990-2010 (1000 b/d) 
Source: OPEC Statistical Data. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm 
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Figure 5.4: Global Oil Consumption by Regions: 1990-2010 (Thousand barrels daily) 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2013 
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 In February 1994, in a speech to the Society of Petroleum Engineers in Vienna, 
OPEC’s Secretary General Subroto squarely addressed the harsh reality of crude oil 
prices and the inability of the Organization to fundamentally change or address this 
problem: 
…we cannot ignore the fact that oil prices are so low. In fact they have 
recently been at their lowest for two decades, adjusted for inflation and 
exchange rates. This is partly the result of recessionary economics 
prevalent around the world and partly the result of over-supply due to the 
increasing production coming from non-OPEC sources. OPEC Members 
have been exercising self-restraint and have maintained their current level 
of production for more than six months, but we have also been faced with 
pessimists in the market who take the view that our constant level of 
supplies represents a failure to make substantial reductions. I would 
simply state that OPEC Members are not the only producers and before 
worldwide oil production can be reduced in the short-term it must stop 
expanding. The implications of low prices for the oil industry are clear: 
many fields are becoming marginal, profit margins are being squeezed at 
all levels and oil companies are renegotiating their terms and conditions, 
reconsidering development activities and, in many cases, downsizing their 
operations…These pressures are unlikely to diminish in future, even 
though prices must eventually rise once more. Once strict controls have 
been imposed they are not easily, if ever, eliminated. The oil industry is in 
a new rational, economic phase and we must all pull our weight or be left 
behind. 439 
 
From the optimism of three years prior, Secretary Subroto and the Organization’s 
leadership had now a dramatically different reading of the market conditions that OPEC 
was operating under. They understood that without an active capability to affect and 
influence pricing dynamics, Member States would only suffer from a decrease in revenue, 
increase in budgetary deficits, and experience the political ramifications domestically. 
More worrying for the Organization, was that OPEC had no real viable plan to recapture 
price control or even introduce some temporary fixes. An updated quota system was still 
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in place, which was basically a legacy of OPEC price defense policy of the 1980s – a 
policy which was largely a failure.  
 Yet, even if OPEC had the institutional strength to coherently act collectively, had 
the Organization attempted to significantly cut output, it would have faced significant 
other hurdles. Firstly, just as Arab producing countries found out in the wake of their 
failed oil embargo in 1967 against the supporters of Israel, when supply is increasing, 
faced with steady or stagnant demand, production cuts will have negligible effects on the 
market. Secondly, OPEC would surely have experienced significant backlash from many 
actors within the international community, further staining its reputation, and possibly 
facing a new round of blowback with the same intensity that followed after the 1970’s 
price hikes. In the new post-bipolar world order, lower oil prices were part and parcel of 
what many considered the  ‘peace dividend’ that was purportedly one of the benefits to 
the end of the Cold War. With these hurdles, OPEC’s default policy was to implement a 
measured, limited output into the global supply. 
 However, by 1995, this policy was deemed to be failing, as it did not help with 
price stagnation but also threatened the very same market share that OPEC had recently 
regained. In its 99th Meeting, Venezuela’s Minister of Energy & Mines, Dr. Erwin Jose 
Arrieta, who was acting President of the OPEC conference that year, laid out the 
difficulties of OPEC’s impasse:  
The continued efforts of OPEC intending to stabilize the oil market 
through self-imposed restrictions on output, have been unduly abused. 
Our agreements are permitting other oil-producing countries to steadily 
erode our market share - to such an extent that even the absolute demand 
for OPEC's oil is under threat. While OPEC is producing below capacity, 
other producers are stretching their supply to the limit. As we all know, 
this does not bode well for the general welfare of the market. There are 
also dangers in the longer term. Since the beginning of this decade, we 
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have repeatedly stated the need for an adequate level of investment in the 
production capacity of OPEC. This is the only way to ensure sufficient 
supply for the turn of the century and beyond, to meet future increases in 
demand.… Unchecked increases in non-OPEC supply are depriving 
OPEC countries of vital funds required for investment in new capacity. 
This can only result in a future supply crisis, characterized by an 
escalation in prices and widespread instability. This malaise could then 
continue for a long time… It is in our best interests that the market 
performs at all times in a stable, predictable manner, with equitable 
returns for all its participants. A healthy oil market is essential to OPEC, 
since oil revenue accounts for the bulk of our Member Countries' national 
wealth. Furthermore, security of supply has a broader connotation than 
just dealing with unexpected sharp crises, as and when they may arise. I 
have in mind the situation that was created at the end of the 1980s, when 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought about the withdrawal of a 
substantial quantity of crude from the world's supply in a relatively short 
time; net exports fell by one and a quarter million barrels a day in just two 
years. Then OPEC had the capacity and the flexibility to make up the 
shortfall and thus minimize the impact on oil prices. But next time, if we 
are now deprived of the income needed to support it, this capacity and this 
flexibility is not going to exist. 440 
 
Simply put, Arrieta’s canvassing of OPEC’s predicament is an acknowledgment that the 
Organization was not able to stop the price erosion, while also admitting that the price 
collapse was weakening production capacity. And with production capacity stunted, 
domestic revenue intake would also suffer, thus causing both economic and political 
difficulties at home for Member States.  
 As the 1990s drew to a close, OPEC’s attention was mainly focused on continual 
revisions to its quota system. This was particularly crucial for Iraq in light of the oil-for-
food humanitarian plans that the United Nations had agreed with Saddam Hussein’s 
sanctioned government. 441 But as OPEC’s inability to act collectively, even on tactical 
related matters, was clearly visible to both its supporters and critics, it was increasingly 
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becoming unable to justify to those very officials who had long championed the cause of 
OPEC from within the Organization.  
 One of the most significant critiques came from Fadhil Chalabi, OPEC’s deputy 
Secretary General from 1978-88 and acting Secretary General from 1983 to 1988. 
Chalabi’s article, “OPEC: An Obituary” was a major turning point in how others saw the 
Organization.  442 Chalabi’s proclamation was no mere uninformed opinion by a media 
columnist, but an assessment made from someone who was at the birth of the 
Organization, instrumental in its negotiations with the international oil companies, and 
most importantly, was at the height of decision-making. For him to declare OPEC ‘dead’ 
was no small matter. Since the late 1980s, specifically since the 1986 price collapse, 
many had doubted OPEC’s efficacy, but not its survivability. But when former officials, 
such as Chalabi, utilized this narrative, the continual survivability of the Organization 
was now universally beginning to be questioned. The wider market conditions was 
simply not conducive to the Organization’s recapturing effective influence over supply 
and demand dynamics, as it had previously done in the past. 
Outside Powers 
The key, determining factor behind the changing market conditions was the dominance 
that the US acquired and exercised within the international system in the aftermath of the 
Soviet demise. It is important to remember that OPEC’s very formation was in many 
respects grudgingly accepted by the US, primarily because of Cold War dynamics 
leading Washington towards a policy of neutrality to oil producing countries in the 
developing world. The fear of the Soviet Union exploiting the economic and security 
                                                        
442 Fadhil J. Chalabi, "Opec: An Obituary," Foreign Policy, no. 109 (1997): 126-40. 
 283 
vulnerabilities in OPEC Member States created a major sense of caution in the US. But in 
this period of American unipolarity, 443 there was no reason for the US to exhibit a sense 
of caution towards producers. The Soviets had been defeated, and the Russian Federation 
that took its place was a bankrupt entity incapable of running its own affairs, let alone 
threatening American interests. This allowed American and Western firms to look 
towards the newly independent Central Asian countries for possible future energy 
investment.  
 For the international oil companies (IOCs) who a generation prior had lost their 
concessions and effective control over pricing dynamics to OPEC, the collapse of the 
USSR and the opening up of energy-endowed states on the Russian lower periphery 
presented a major investment opportunity. The world of the old concession system was 
long gone and could not be resurrected – at least in terms of providing the IOCs the 
favorable investment conditions they once enjoyed. Yet, the years that had transpired 
from the end of the concessionary systems and loss of control over pricing had 
transformed the role of the major IOCs. Though at first, the end of the old system was 
seen as a loss to the IOCs, they quickly adjusted to the new realities of the market, and 
thus, with remarkable success, changed the very nature of their global corporate identities. 
This evolution witnessed the IOCs transforming from the dominant concession holders 
with total control over the entire oil industry in a particular country to being global 
contractors to diverse National Oil Companies (NOCs) of hydrocarbon-endowed 
countries. The main factor that allowed this transition was the significant technological 
gap that existed between the IOCs, which in essence created the modern oil and natural 
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gas industries, with that of the National Oil Companies, which were mostly a product of 
the latter half of the 20th century. By the end of the Cold War, it was this very 
relationship, which the IOCs were forced into, that made up the entire structure of the 
global oil industry. 
 Because of the technological gap, even staunchly nationalist NOCs that were 
highly suspicious of foreign firm involvement in their oil sectors, ultimately had to 
consider an invitation to the IOCs in hopes of not only enhanced output from traditional 
wells and future discoveries, but also for more efficient output and environmentally 
sound exploration. This new dynamic gradually created a ‘neo-concessionary system’ 
that was based not on physical domination of the producing country or its political 
apparatus, but one of enticement through enhanced production and export prospects. 
Eventually, in hopes of recovering from the disastrous 1980s, OPEC Members would 
either enhance their cooperation with the IOCs, such as the case with Saudi Arabia and its 
Persian Gulf monarchial allies, but also nationalist price hawks such as Algeria, Iran, and 
Libya.  
 With the confluence of the massive technological gap between NOCs and IOCs 
and the new sources of supply because of the Cold War’s end, for the first time in a 
generation, oil firms gained tangible leverage in the wider global oil industry.  
The opening of the Post-Soviet Space: New Sources of Energy 
The years immediately after the Soviet collapse, once dominant actors, 
particularly Russia, and to a lesser extent China, were quite helpless in obviating newly 
independent Central Asian Republics from inviting both foreign capital and polices into 
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the region. 444 The Russian Federation’s attempt to jettison its former affiliations with 
fundamentally weak, and unstable regimes in oil-rich Central Asia, exemplified in its 
reoriented “common European home” policy, 445 laid the groundwork for the cooption of 
Central Asia by the West via energy firms. Moreover, Russia’s catastrophic transition 
from a command to a market economy mired the state in domestic unrest and fiscal 
inertia for almost a decade, 446  essentially causing a paralysis in its geostrategic 
considerations. It was during this very time that advocates of Western economic and 
political intervention in the post-Soviet space were at its zenith, 447  buttressed by 
prospects of both lucrative enhancement as well geopolitical gains. 448 
Whether motivated by apprehension concerning their newly found independence 
or a sincere desire to seize a moment when the traditional dominant actor was weak, most 
Central Asian countries, particularly Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, 
overtly courted Western capital, technology, and diplomatic relations. This was chiefly 
due to their own internal inability to access the vast amount of hydrocarbons within their 
respective territories and also not possessing the technology to export the hydrocarbons to 
the global market. With these events, by the turn of the century, the West’s relationship 
with dependent new states of Central Asia firmly granted it a foothold in Eurasia that it 
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never possessed prior to the Soviet demise. 449  And as new supplies from Central Asia 
and the Caucuses came online, it was this very strategic foothold that helped perpetuate 
the very market conditions that OPEC and other oil producers, like Russia, were suffering 
from throughout the 1990s.   
The New Consumer Base: South and East Asia  
 
But as the 1990s drew to a close, the role of outside powers, even in this age of 
unipolar American domination, was not just relegated to the US. The exponential 
increase in consumption patterns in the developing world, particularly due to massive 
development in China and India, played a decisive impact on the gradual rise in oil prices 
(see Figure 5.4). 450  For all the complexities surrounding Chinese and Indian 
industrialization, past and present, the concept of energy security as it relates to their 
post-Cold War development was far more elemental. Distinctively for China, as internal 
development endeavors, coupled with the international pressures for continuing 
modernization, transformed it into an oil importer in 1993, 451  Beijing, since 2000, 
witnessed imports triple, with rising consumption every year. 452  By 2030, the 
International Energy Agency predicts Chinese consumption far exceeding that of the 
European Continent, and taken together with East Asian economies and that of India’s, 
consumption from the East will most likely surpass both North America and Europe 
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combined by the same period.  453 For India, the experience with energy security, chiefly 
with the OPEC crisis of 1973 had differing ramifications as compared to Western 
industrialized countries. Although at the time, Indian energy consumption was low in 
comparison to industrialized counterparts, it affected key sectors of India’s economy, 
forcing the country towards enhancement of energy diversification efforts with both 
traditional and new partners. 454  
As Figure 5.4 shows, the largest growth in consumption of oil in the post-Cold 
War era has been in Asia. Therefore both of these mass populous countries, particularly 
since the turn of the century, ambitiously courted energy rich countries to secure access. 
455 The biggest ramification of the Chinese and Indian search for energy is that it has 
rendered their own NOCs as alternatives to the technologically savvy Western firms. 
Although the state owned agencies of both these countries are still years behind their 
Western counterparts as it relates to better efficiency in the upstream sectors, and 
certainly on transportation, it is their sheer internal market demand that has enticed many 
producing countries, in OPEC and beyond. This had been particularly important for 
producing countries that have no access or have been denied access to Western 
technology. For OPEC during this period, this would have been Libya, Baathist Iraq, Iran, 
or even Algeria. As consumption gradually increased in the first decade of the 2000s, 
OPEC Member States, though still unable to collectively act on strategic matters, 
gradually regained some market leverage and diversification options because of China 
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and India. Not only did this provide the energy producers with new opportunities of fiscal 
gain, but also explicitly tied them to the internal developments of many rising developing 
countries. 
American policy failure: Fallout from interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
With the awesome power that the US did inherit after the end of the Cold War, came 
more vulnerability. It is here where the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Iraq would 
come to affect the internal functionality of OPEC.  When the United States entered the 
Middle East subsystem militarily in the first Gulf War, to counter and contain an 
irredentist Iraq, it introduced itself, more than ever in its historical dealings with the 
region, as both a regional country and a hegemon, becoming an integral actor within the 
Middle East. From that decisive victory in the spring of 1991, the American role 
gradually aggrandized to being the sole guarantor of regional stability, expanding its 
military apparatus in the Gulf Cooperation Council states (GCC), heavily arming their 
militaries, increasing frequency of US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, as daily 
sorties kept intact the no-fly zones of an increasing emasculated Iraq. For the next decade, 
the US strategy remained unvaried as the region witnessed a host of economic and 
political revisions that ultimately laid the groundwork for current regional realities: 
American attempts to implement the Oslo Accords (at the time seen as a breakthrough in 
the perennial Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Turkey’s socio-economic progression, the 
beginnings of the spike in oil prices (now seen as a threshold to the enhancement of the 
sovereign wealth funds of many Persian Gulf States), and the protracted strangulation of 
Iraq.  
However, a parallel undercurrent was also taking shape beneath many US 
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sponsored peace efforts between Israel and the Palestinians, economic development in 
regional US-aligned nations, and the common wisdom that promulgated the stability of 
the status quo. Over time, the conventional narrative began to unravel in the face of the 
Palestinian Intifada of 2000, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in that same year – 
leaving Hezbollah in a much stronger position, the American inability to subjugate Iran 
with economic warfare, the overall failure of President Clinton’s peace efforts at the end 
of his tenure, and Afghanistan’s descent into fratricide (with patches of the country under 
the firm grip of the Taliban). Moreover, the no-fly zones implemented by the coalition 
forces as a result of Saddam’s proclivities towards his Shī'ah and Kurdish populations led 
to the ipso facto formation of two semi-autonomous regions within Iraq proper – the 
forerunner for the difficulties that the US would face in the current occupation. The 
September 11th attacks not only extended the military dimensions of the United States 
within the region, but also transformed the American accepted wisdom on how stability 
and US objectives could be sustained in the Middle East and, fundamentally altering the 
logic behind the use of force.  
It was in this backdrop that the US interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 
in 2003 need to be measured against. Though the US emphatically succeeded in 
overthrowing the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, the host government of Al-Qaeda’s 
apparatus, and the entrenched Baathist autocracy in Iraq, the cost for American actions 
has yet to be fully tallied. To date, the financial expenditures of the wars have been 
projected to tally at $4-6 trillion. 456 
These expenditures appear at a time where the American economic paradigm of 
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governance has been openly critiqued internationally (by reason of exorbitant national 
debt and an unregulated financial sector). Moreover, the human costs of the wars have 
approached 7,000 coalition deaths (of which almost 5,000 are American), coupled with 
an untold amount of Iraqis and Afghans who have since perished. As the years have 
passed since the initiation of the Iraq conflict, numerous historical analyses and 
commentaries, both in print and in film, emanating from an eclectic pool of observers, 
have been produced regarding American regional intervention. Yet, no matter how 
critical or laudatory they may be to the current state of US military involvement in the 
Middle East, there is an inferred harmony amongst them; that is, outside of conventional 
air power, with which the US has unquestioned superiority amongst all other actors, 
American power projection capability has weakened – some claiming dramatically so.  
 While the war with Saddam was a result of the new, post-9/11 approach that the 
United States adopted towards the Near East (i.e. preventative military intervention), it 
was also a byproduct of the efficiency and speed that characterized the early months of 
the US intervention into Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom. Consequently, with 
the intervention in Iraq, and the rapid fall of Saddam’s fragmented military, the US 
perception of its regional position was arguably at its zenith. Nevertheless, this 
assessment was at best incomplete, and now, in hindsight, grossly inaccurate. With the 
US transitioning from a fighting to an occupational force, the American claim, both 
within Iraq and Afghanistan, was becoming suspect.  
Intrastate dynamics 
The US interventions in the Middle East would create the conditions where the most 
consequential internal state dynamics that transpired during this period was in the Iraqi 
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political scene. This was not only because of Iraq’s importance in OPEC as it pertains to 
collective production and decision-making. The US intervention in Iraq and the creation 
of a new post-Baathist political system would begin the process of bringing back Iraqi 
production capacity in the global market. And from these internal events in Iraq, 
subsequent regional ramifications that would affect the entire Middle East would 
gradually lead to the irrevocable altering of the balance of power, setting the stage for a 
shift of power in OPEC consensus, and creating new alliances in the region and beyond. 
Iraq 
 
In Iraq, as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) systematically dismantled the 
entrenched Baathist socio-political infrastructure, the fragility of the state itself was 
glossed over while the strength of civil society was idealistically overestimated. What is 
more, the existence of two semi-autonomous entities within Iraq for more than a decade, 
specifically the Northern Kurdish portion, had greatly eroded the notion of an Iraqi state. 
457 In other words, if there had ever existed a unitary sense of Iraq, the years that followed 
the 1991 defeat of Saddam Hussein had now questioned that assumption to many 
differing factions within the country. The incapability of the US military, the CPA, and 
Iraq’s fragile elected government to restore domestic order as mass looting, sectarian war, 
and internecine bloodshed continued, manifested the occupation’s shortcomings. 
Although the violence within Iraq has significantly declined since late 2007, the 
overarching political reconciliation amongst the country’s disparate factions has yet to be 
realized, still lacking the qualities of political permanence. If violence were to return to 
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previous levels, the threat of the Iraqi state being ripped asunder still looms on the 
horizon, inviting intervention by regional actors, particularly, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and 
most certainly Iran. Additionally, the deep sense of frustration amongst many Western-
allied Arab regimes, chiefly the Arab states of OPEC, about regional systemic alterations 
associated with US actions acts as a compounding force upon an increasingly 
questionable American regional strategy.  
But with the Iraq intervention, although the political and security situation within 
the country significantly worsened in the occupation period, Iraq’s oil sector did begin 
the long process of revitalization. This dynamic not only affected the country’s exports 
potential, but would also alter its power position within OPEC, a process that is still 
underway. For the first time since the 1970s, Iraq would once again become a magnate 
for major oil firms, not just the traditional technologically advanced Western 
multinationals, but increasingly NOCs from China, India, and the African continent. 458 
Ironically, the same set of factors that has kept Iraq’s political system paralyzed, which 
directly affects its internal security, has also, by default, created the conditions for mass 
investment from abroad. These factors are the inability of the central government in 
Baghdad to unify state policy vis-à-vis oil production, differing perspectives on oil 
exports held by varying regions of the country, and the larger question of 
decentralization/federalism. As result, what differing regions of Iraq have done, most 
notably the Northern Kurdish-speaking portion of the country, is to invite foreign capital 
and expertise into their regions so that their oil production would not be dependent upon 
Baghdad, whom degrees of autonomy is wanted. The result has been massive investment 
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of foreign oil companies, such as BP, ExxonMobil, and Chevron’s presence in Northern 
Iraq, NOCs, such as Russia’s Gazprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) throughout the country, while smaller European and Asian firms fill in the gaps. 
459  
 As Figure 5.3 shows, since 2003, despite the political and security chaos in Iraq, 
the country has steadily made measured advances in oil production. Indeed, the only 
impediment that has kept Iraq from advancing further in its oil production has been the 
political paralysis of its new, post-Baathist leadership. And with this advance in 
production, by reason of the technological influx that has come into the country, has 
come a revision of the country’s oil reserves. According to OPEC’s 2013 Annual 
Statistical bulletin, Iraq now owns roughly 11.7% of the proven oil reserves in the world, 
making it the fourth in OPEC and fifth in the world. 460 
Venezuela  
 
As the US intervened in Iraq, internal changes were also taking place in Venezuela. 
Historically, successive Venezuelan governments not only were considered reliable 
partners for the US in regional trade initiatives but also had cooperated, often times 
intensely, on oil policy. With the rise of Hugo Chavez in the late 1990s, the US would 
gradually begin to realize that its relationship with Venezuela was to undergo a 
significant change. Chavez’s democratic rise was not just an internal issue for Venezuela, 
461 but had serious repercussions in Latin America. For OPEC in particular, Chavez and 
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his Bolivarian allies within Venezuela sought to utilize the country’s vast oil reserves and 
export potential for social programs at home. 462  Yet, to do that effectively, Chavez 
sought to revitalize the Venezuelan presence in OPEC, not just ceremonially but in terms 
of decision-making. Though a founding Member, the decision-making influence of 
Venezuela in OPEC had long declined, primarily because it could not keep up with 
initially Iranian, and then Saudi output. 463 
 Chavez’s rise, first from his failed coup-attempt in the early 1990s with his 
military colleagues, 464 then to the civilian-led populist campaign that brought him to 
power, fundamentally challenged the entrenched ruling elite that had run Venezuela for 
more than two generations. However, though the Chavez administration would become 
known as revitalizing the socialist model in the 21st century, his initial economic and 
social policies were quite moderate, only to be considered center-left. 465 It was only after 
a series of constitutional referendums, and particularly after Chavez’s survival from a 
2002 coup attempt, that his administration really embarked on socialist policies at home, 
and supporting like-minded governments abroad.   
 In order pay for the increased expenditures at home, the Chavez administration 
understood that significant changes needed to be implemented to the country’s oil sector, 
which had usually relied on Western capital investment and technology – even since 
nationalization. And since the coup attempt against him had severally degraded his once 
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normal relations with the US and much of the West, Venezuela gradually reached out to 
both Russia and China for technological assistance with its oil industry, and to other 
fellow OPEC NOCs.  
 However, increased Venezuelan production was simply not enough. In order to 
change the dynamics of oil as it pertains to the Venezuelan economy, and to subsidize 
what was becoming an increasingly activist foreign policy, the Chavez administration had 
to reach out to OPEC. Throughout the early years of his tenure, Hugo Chavez would 
become a renewed voice of collaboration among Member States that often did not trust 
each other. Through Venezuelan initiatives, harkening back to Organization’s formation, 
Caracas introduced new ideas for cooperation to the Member States that had undergone 
traumatic years prior. Chavez’s efforts did bring forth modest results. Beginning in 2001, 
oil prices began their slow climb back. It was during this very period that OPEC countries 
would gradually begin renewed cooperation on price defense measures and a renewed, 
but ultimately unsuccessful, commitment to stick by their quota responsibilities and not 
overproduce. Chavez’s ability to personally corral the diverse leaders of OPEC countries 
greatly assisted the Group in arriving at some form of tactical cooperation.  
Interstate relations 
By 2004, what started with Venezuela’s initiative at short-term, tactical compromises in 
order to increase revenue broadened out into a more functional, working relationship 
among Member Countries. The biggest item on the agenda was to recapture OPEC’s 
ability to fundamentally influence global supply and demand dynamics. And price 
defense measures, a failing legacy of the 1980s and 1990s, was simply not enough. 
OPEC’s post-1980 policy of scaling production, either through measured cutbacks via the 
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quota system or more extreme measures, had rendered the Organization’s power over the 
market a short-term enterprise. In the mid-1980s and sporadically in the 1990s, this 
policy, often times, had virtually no effect because of the oversaturation of the market. 
But by 2004, OPEC gradually began to realize that their efforts to recapture influence 
would need the Organization to start implementing long-term strategies that would 
benefit all consumers, as opposed to short-term measures intended to protect producers.  
 At OPEC’s 132nd meeting in Vienna, Austria in September of 2004, Member 
States began to implement this very concept. In reacting to the increasing oil prices 
(which would only rise further in the years ahead), OPEC began the process of once 
again regaining influence over prices, with the secondary goal of presenting the 
Organization as a force for stability in the global economy. In their press release, OPEC 
revealed that the Group would be unilaterally increasing production to offset prices, 
which was a stark contrast from past behavior: 
Having reviewed the current oil market, the Conference noted that higher 
crude oil prices are a result of such factors as the demand surge earlier in 
the year, especially in North America, China and Asian countries, 
geopolitical factors and concern about adequacy of spare capacity to meet 
possible supply disruptions, exacerbated by the significant impact of 
speculators and by tightness experienced in the downstream industry. It 
also observed that OPEC’s timely actions had been effective in ensuring 
that the market remains well supplied, resulting in commercial OECD 
stocks build-up to levels close to normal, thus succeeding in reversing the 
OPEC Reference Basket price trend down to levels around $38/b.  In the 
light of the foregoing, the Conference decided to raise the OPEC 
production ceiling (excluding Iraq) by 1.0 mb/d, to 27.0 mb/d, with effect 
from November 1, 2004, in order to bring prices down further to a more 
sustainable level, whilst, at the same time, vigilantly monitoring market 
developments. In taking this decision, the Organization reiterated its com-
mitment to take action to stabilize the market at prices reasonable to both 
producers and consumers. Taking into consideration the market outlook 
for 2005, with its concomitant uncertainties, especially in the first and 
second quarters, the Conference further decided to convene an (Ex-
traordinary) Meeting in Cairo, Egypt, on December 10, 2004 to review 
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market developments and take whatever measures are deemed appropriate 
at that time. Taking this decision in recognition of the importance of 
maintaining oil market stability for the benefit of the world economy, as 
well as consumers and producers, the Conference expressed its 
expectation that non-OPEC oil producers will take concrete measures to 
actively share with the Organization the responsibility of maintaining 
price and market stability in 2005 and thereafter.  466 
 
OPEC’s actions in 2004 and in subsequent years to balance crude supply to meet demand 
were neither new nor revolutionary. But the rediscovery of this very concept, and in 
many respects, this responsibility of the Organization to the global economy, after almost 
twenty years of infighting, consensus breakdown, and paralysis was neither expected nor 
predicted. This was particularly true in light of the many obituaries that were written for 
the Organization, by friends and foes alike.  
 In the following year, OPEC’s Acting Secretary General, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, 
sought to assure markets on OPEC’s role in price stabilization. As prices were gradually 
rising, he reiterated “OPEC’s commitment to ensure adequate supplies”, affirming “the 
Organization stands ready to take the necessary decisions to maintain market stability.” 
467 Moreover, in the same period, OPEC made efforts to reach out to other important 
international organizations, exemplified in their third meeting with the International 
Energy Agency in 2005 concerning the energy outlook in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 468  More importantly, the Organization reached out the European Union to 
facilitate a broader dialogue on energy concerns, and in June of 2005, held its first 
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official European Union-OPEC Energy Dialogue. 469 
 But the Organization’s ability to continuously act as a stabilizer of global prices 
had its limits, ultimately reaching its potential in 2006. In virtually every press release of 
that year, as prices were steadily rising, OPEC would continuously reaffirm that the 
market was well supplied, and thus there was no need for additional output into the 
market. 470 And in July of that year, as price increases no longer could be ignored, the 
Organization addressed this new dynamic in the global economy: 
OPEC has noted with concern the strong upward pressure on oil prices of 
the past few days and wishes to reassure the market of its continuing 
commitment to order and stability, to the benefit of producers and 
consumers alike. Geopolitical developments, over which OPEC has no 
influence, have been behind this sudden rise in volatility, and these have 
come at a time when the market was already out of line with today’s 
supply and demand fundamentals, with speculation playing a significant 
role in driving up prices. It has also occurred in spite of the fact that the 
market remains well-supplied with crude, and, with crude volumes 
continuing to enter the market well in excess of demand, OECD stocks are 
above their five-year average levels. This healthy state of the upstream 
sector has been very much due to OPEC’s abiding commitment to market 
stability, with prices at fair and equitable levels, in support of sound 
world economic growth, in particular with regard to the needs of 
developing countries. OPEC’s MCs have increased crude oil production 
substantially since the recent heightened state of volatility first manifest 
itself in spring 2004, as well as accelerating their plans to bring on-
stream new production capacity to meet continued demand growth and re-
establish a comfortable cushion of spare capacity. However, to be truly 
effective in increasing stability and moderating prices, OPEC requires the 
full support of the other major players in the market, on both the producer 
and consumer sides. All parties gain from market stability and so all 
parties must contribute to it. In welcoming the major advances that have 
been made in dialogue and cooperation within the industry in recent years, 
OPEC recognizes the potential for this to provide tangible benefits in the 
present volatile market conditions. 471 
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Subsequently, in its September 2006 meeting, the Organization essentially reaffirmed this 
view by stating “crude oil supply in recent years has continued to exceed growth in 
demand — the rebound in non-OPEC supply in 2007 is predicted to be at its highest level 
since 1984 — and that market fundamentals indicate a clear imbalance between supply 
and demand”. 472 OPEC was confirming that though they will not allow systemic shocks, 
such as 1973 or 1980 to occur again, this new era of gradual price increases was one in 
which they felt not only comfortable with, but would most likely defend: “the 
Organization will continue its proactive policy of supporting market stability by restoring 
a balance between supply and demand, at prices reasonable to both producers and 
consumers and conducive to continued world economic growth”. 473 
 This same approach remained OPEC’s policy throughout 2007, exemplified by its 
familiar refrain that “oil markets remain well supplied and market fundamentals do not 
require any additional supply from the Organization at this time”. 474  But as prices 
climbed to the highest they had been in over a generation, OPEC’s cautious, albeit 
content approach with more revenue for Member States, needed to provide an answer for 
the changing market conditions.  OPEC’s Secretary General, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, 
was ultimately compelled to defend the Organization in the face of insinuations about 
purported responsibility by the Group for rising prices: 
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High oil prices, which we are now witnessing, are not a consequence of 
insufficient crude supplies. Inventory data, continues to demonstrate that 
crude stocks are ample. US crude stocks are now at nine year highs, while 
OECD stocks are healthy, and are above their five year average. This data, 
therefore, shows us very clearly, that current high oil prices are not in any 
way related to crude supplies. Inadequate refinery capacity, ongoing 
glitches in US refinery operations, geopolitical tensions and increased 
speculation in the futures market are, however, driving high oil prices. So 
even if OPEC were to supply the market with additional crude at this time, 
these refinery-related problems mean that any extra barrels would not be 
refined into products. OPEC is closely observing developments in the 
global oil market, including the current price trend. If the Organization 
sees any evidence that oil prices are rising because of a shortage of crude, 
which does not exist at this time, it will not hesitate to act immediately to 
alleviate any such deficit. 475 
 
El-Badri analysis concerning limited refining capacity in North America, which 
incidentally was also occurring in Europe and the Far East, in addition to the geopolitical 
tensions in the Middle East were fundamentally correct. American investment in refining 
capacity had lagged, primarily because in the immediate years of the post-Cold War era, 
the rapid and massive consumption trends from China and India were simply not 
expected. Therefore, the US, with its European counterparts, not expecting the rising tide 
of consumption post-2000, allowed its refining capacity to stagnate. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, the Middle East, in the aftermath of the US intervention in Iraq, 
was a different place. And the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, in that 
the latter fought the technologically advanced Israeli military to a standstill, was not only 
a turning point in regional politics, but also what many considered the heralding of new 
era of conflict. 
 But pointing out these issues, although they were temporary, did little to relieve 
the situation in the global oil market. As 2007 drew to a close, OPEC increasingly 
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became aware that many in the global economy were attributing the substantial increase 
in the price of oil to OPEC’s inaction. These concerns, once again, forced OPEC’s 
Secretary General to the podium” 
OPEC is carefully watching developments in the oil market and has 
observed with concern the recent escalation in oil prices. While the 
Organization does not favor oil prices at this level, it strongly believes 
that fundamentals are not supporting current high prices and that the 
market is very well supplied. There has been no interruption in crude 
supplies and OECD commercial inventory levels remain above five-year 
levels. Forward cover, which stands at 53.5 days, is at a comfortable level. 
The rising oil prices which we are currently witnessing are, however, 
largely being driven by market speculators. Persistent refinery bottlenecks 
and seasonal maintenance work, ongoing geopolitical problems in the 
Middle East and fluctuations in the US dollar, also continue to play a role 
in pushing oil prices higher. Additional political tensions, seen during 
recent days, are also pressurizing oil prices upwards. OPEC continues to 
strive for a balanced market and a fair price that is favorable for both 
consumers and producers. As part of its mission to keep the market well 
supplied, and as agreed in September, the Organization will raise output 
by 500,000 b/d from 1 November 2007. Member Countries are in the 
process of implementing their share of this increase. OPEC will continue 
to monitor the global oil market and will respond to any supply disruption, 
so as to ensure the market remains well supplied during the winter months. 
 
The decision to increase output by half million b/d was thought by the Organization to at 
least have a psychological effect on the global economy, possibly to roll back the 
influence of speculation about future supply. An indirect, albeit significant, result of the 
rising consumption patterns coming from China and India was the rebirth of the 
‘exhaustibility theory’ of the 1970s. This new variation was labeled as “peak oil”, 
popularized by the fusion of two interconnected strands of thought: resource wars and the 
ramifications of climate change.  476 As these theories occupied mainstream thought in 
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both the policy-making and business communities, it was important for the Organization 
to show it had at least attempted to pacify prices. But as 2008 began, and well into the 
summer, limitations in global refineries, Middle East tensions (including heightened 
tension between the US and Iran), and open conflict between Russia and Georgia (which 
created additional supply disruption fears), all compounded by speculation, drove prices 
to their highest level since the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war. Yet with the arrival of the 
US financial crisis in the fall/winter of that year, drying up credit in advanced economies, 
slowing consumption down and significantly reducing oil prices, OPEC once again, 
entered into a period of uncertainty. 
Ending the Rebalancing Era 
Nevertheless, the newfound tactical cooperation amongst Members brought about 
tangible, positive results for the Organization during this period, allowing them to take 
advantage of the circumstances surrounding global oil supply and demand dynamics. 
However, uncertainties about the accommodation of the new Iraq (and its economic and 
political ramifications) has still kept OPEC from returning to its pre-1980s unity. From a 
political standpoint, the rise of a new political system in Baghdad has evoked the ire of 
Saudi Arabia and their Persian Gulf allies, ostensibly because it would empower a 
political group in Iraq that’s always been disenfranchised in the former countries. From 
an economic standpoint, the full integration of Iraq in the global economy would 
gradually erode the power of OPEC’s traditional major producers, of which Saudi Arabia 
has long been dominant.   
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 Needless to say, though these lingering political disputes are still extant, they did 
not impede the slow recentralization of OPEC. Even though the traditional Iranian/Saudi 
divide is still alive, along with the newfound concerns of Iraq from specifically the 
Persian Gulf monarchies, Member States were able to take advantage of the remarkable 
growth in the global economy from 2001-2008. During this period, the altered nature of 
the global oil industry, primarily the rapidly growing consumption from East, allowed 
OPEC Member States to reap economic windfalls that it hadn’t seen since the end of the 
1970s. For many OPEC Members, the hyper infusion of capital into their economies, 
because of the high price of oil, would help create the large sovereign wealth funds that 
would be crucial during the current, still unnamed era, where many of OPEC’s Arab 
Members have to deal with the fallout of the Arab Spring of 2011-Present, a changing 
regional balance of power, shifting relations with the US, and changing demographics.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The post-2008 phase of OPEC’s institutional life has yet to be defined. This era will most 
likely take years to fully take shape, and within its wider context, several key trends and 
factors – possibly which are entirely new – will affect how OPEC behaves. However 
three particular trends that will be crucial in how this current phase of OPEC’s 
development evolves.  
 The first concerns the permanent fallout of the financial crisis that began in the 
fall of 2008. While the ramifications of this crisis has touched virtually every region of 
the world, the most consequential factor that would affect OPEC and the nature of the oil 
industry is what the financial crisis will do to consumption trends. Will certain regions of 
the world that were growing or slated for growth before the financial crisis, no longer 
grow, and thus consume less energy?  
 As Figure 5.4 shows, the consumption patterns for 2009 dropped from the prior, 
clearly indicating the impact of the global financial crisis on world oil demand. And as 
expected, with this consumption drop, in the face of steady and growing supply, crude oil 
prices for 2009, as shown in Figure 5.2, significantly fell. Although they have recovered 
since the crisis, the recovery has been anemic and tenuous, as the health of diverse 
markets, chiefly the EU, still remain in doubt. For OPEC in particular, the immediate 
years after the financial crisis has seen prices partially rebound, but have also severally 
affected the recapturing of its market share recover. As Figure 5.1 shows, OPEC’s market 
share of global oil production dropped 5% in 2010 from 2008 figures. 
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On the reverse side, will new consumption patterns from Asian economies create 
a new relationship with OPEC Members, in the same way that the US and UK forged a 
bond with the House of Saud or other Persian Gulf monarchies in the early part of the 
20th century? In the last decade, a fundamental shift has happened in the direction of oil 
exports from the Persian Gulf. Though Venezuelan exports will always have a heavy 
presence in the Western Hemisphere, for the other Members of OPEC, exports to the Far 
Eastern economies (India, China, South Korea, Japan, etc.) rose astronomically. By the 
time of the 2008 financial crisis, most Persian Gulf exports were travelling to Eastern 
markets. 
Such a change in consumption patterns, if history is a guide, will invariably alter 
the relationship between certain OPEC Member States (such as Saudi Arabia and their 
Persian Gulf allies) with that of the United States. Moreover, the recently renewed 
tensions between the Russian Federation and the US and EU over Ukraine will 
undoubtedly affect OPEC Member States’ export policies. Since the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, there has been a systematic US attempt, aided and facilitated by the EU, to 
reduce and weaken Iranian oil exports.  
This dynamic indirectly led to Europe’s reliance on Soviet, and then later Russian 
oil and natural gas exports. As a result, for Russia, Europe had been a market they had 
dominated for the entirety of the post-Cold War period, having no real viable rival that 
could help Europe diversify. Yet, if the relationship between Russia and the EU 
deteriorates – a likely possibility in the wake of Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian 
territory – Europe would then need to reach out to viable alternative hydrocarbon 
suppliers. Because of its location, the size of its oil and natural gas reserves, and relative 
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ease of transport to Europe, Iran is the most likely and plausible alternative. But for the 
EU to make this diversification decision vis-à-vis the Iranians, a necessary rethinking of 
the sanctions regime on Iran needs to happen.  
 The second factor that would affect the current era of OPEC’s institutional life 
concerns the ultimate fallout from the Arab Revolutions of 2011 to the present. As it is 
virtually impossible to separate Middle East politics from OPEC’s functionality, 
decision-making, and ultimately behavior, the trajectory of the Arab Spring, and whether 
they will impact other OPEC Members, as it violently did in Libya in mid-2011, will be 
crucial for the Arab Member States and also for the Organization as a whole. For the 
Arab Members of OPEC that have or are currently being affected by the fallout of 
political turmoil, the main impact has been a halt or reduction in production. For Libya in 
particular, the protests that developed in early 2011, which coincided with other protests 
in North Africa, eventually led to civil war, NATO intervention into the country, and a 
whole scale regime change. As a result, large swaths of Libya’s infrastructure were 
destroyed, oil production plummeted, and the Libyan oil industry, including personnel, 
was severally damaged. Though there is now an elected government in Libya, its ability 
to function, to control Libyan territory, and operate Libya’s critical infrastructures, 
especially its oil sector, is extremely limited. 
 For Arab Members that have yet to experience the Arab Spring or fear its arrival, 
oil revenue directed towards calming social unrest has totally changed their traditional 
approaches to prices and profits. For Saudi Arabia in particular, the current, ongoing 
Bahraini political instability, which required Saudi and UAE troops to enter the country 
in support for the Bahrain monarchy, has a distinct possibility of affecting domestic Saudi 
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stability. Thus, Riyadh has moved to pacify public discontent with lavish subsidies. 
However, for the Saudis, this has impacted the country’s ability to withstand periods of 
low oil prices. And when considering their relations with Iran, and the ‘oil production 
weapon’ that they have historically used against Tehran (by overproducing and hurting 
Iranian revenues), this option will increasingly become more difficult for the Saudis. And 
it has yet to be determined how other major producers, such as Kuwait or Iraq will be 
affected. 
 The third and final factor concerns the future of the unconventional side of the oil 
industry, particularly the rise of shale oil and natural gas and tight oil. While these 
technologies have been around for several years, it has only been since 2008 that they 
have become viable enough to replace output from some conventional suppliers, albeit on 
a very limited basis. For these unconventional technologies, the key determining factor 
that would make them competitive with conventional supplies (i.e. OPEC oil) is the cost 
of recovery. It is important to note, there still exists a wide gap between how much it 
costs to recover oil from conventional sources vs. unconventional sources. Although 
individual figures do vary, recovery costs for OPEC crude and other conventional oil 
producers is roughly less that 1/10th that of unconventional production. 
 Indeed, it was the major spending and growth spurt that started at the turn of the 
century and ended with the financial crisis that pushed the price of crude oil to 
unprecedented levels and thus made unconventional production economically feasible. 
Therefore, due to this recovery cost dynamic, for unconventional supplies to have an 
impact in the market vis-à-vis conventional producers, the cost of crude must be quite 
high. Assuming that recovery costs for unconventional supplies do not decrease much, in 
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this scenario, the interests of the unconventional producers will become align with 
traditional OPEC Member States, particularly those with hawkish views on oil. Such an 
outcome would be a first for the global oil industry, changing alliances and rendering old 
rivalries relics of the past. 
 Yet, if the unconventional side of the oil industry becomes more efficient and 
cheaper, there could, with time, develop a serious risk to OPEC market share and the 
production rationale of other producers, not unlike what transpired in the 1980s. And 
with the uncertainty in regards to the cost, comes also uncertainty vis-à-vis the 
environment. The environmental effects of large-scale hydraulic fracking and shale oil 
and natural gas production have yet to be fully tested. 
 But within these three major trends, the four determinants that have created the 
context in which OPEC makes its decisions, and thus behaves, will still continue to 
impact how this Organization engages with others and itself in the international system. 
And it is within the confluence of these determinants that the longevity and survivability 
of OPEC is seen. OPEC’s capacity to stay together and to continue is precisely because it 
is not solely an economically based organization and certainly not a cartel. OPEC is an 
intergovernmental organization where politics and economics, from the domestic to the 
global, merge and interact for all its Member States. It is a forum of otherwise medium-
strength States, all from the developing world, that do not enjoy any real, objective status 
or power in any other global institution. It is still an Organization where the 
overwhelming majority of its Members find, at least some utility, in remaining. And 
finally, its survivability, is not dependent on ideology or alliances, but one the 
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fundamentals of the dominance of hydrocarbons in the current international system – a 
reality that will not change easily or anytime soon.  
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